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PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This work is a contribution to an ongoing Third World debate on the role of peasants and 
peasant movements in rural development. The present study was actually intended to be a sequel 
to my first publication, "The History of Peasant Movements in Thailand and the Philippines", 
Plough Publications, Hong Kong, 1984, when I began to document and study the history of 
peasant movements in India and Sri Lanka. In the course of this work, my involvement with 
peasant organisations in these two countries, as well as continued contact with the peasant 
movement in the Philippines, stimulated me to document the emerging struggles of the peasants 
in these countries. Through this experience I was led into new areas of inquiry, and the peasants 
and peasant leaders with whom I interacted during this period urged me to carry forward their 
own struggle by broadening the scope of my study. This thesis is, therefore, the end result of this 
process. 
The background study and preparation of initial drafts of this thesis was undertaken in 
1985 when I was granted a scholarship by CEBEMO (Catholic Organisation for Development 
Cooperation the Netherlands) to spend about 6 months in the Netherlands to document my 
experiences of involvement with peasant movements in India and Sri Lanka. During this period 
I was fortunate to be granted a Research Fellow status with the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) 
in the Hague, which provided me the opportunity to work closely with many distinguished 
scholars and researchers and to utilise secretarial and library facilities at the ISS. I am grateful to 
the ISS for the assistance provided and the encouragement I received from, among others, Ben 
White, Vicky Meynen, Peter Waterman and Aurora Carreon. 
It was during this research work in the Netherlands when Professor Gerrit Huizer at the 
Third World Studies Center in the Catholic University of Nijmegen, urged me to write up my 
experiences of work with peasant movements in Asia for a Ph.D. programme. Since then, Gerrit 
has been my chief mentor, colleague and friend helping me along the way as my work 
progressed. I am deeply indebted to Gerrit for his close supervision, stimulating insights and 
constructive criticism of the many drafts of this thesis which he closely monitored during several 
years. Without his constant encouragement and guidance, this entire project would not have 
been possible given the nature of my international work and frequent travels since 1985. 
My stay in the Netherlands during this period was facilitated by the warm and self-less 
hospitality of Frans van Vliet, Anita and their children - Geertje, Sam and Hilda - who put up 
with my long hours of work day and night and many meetings and discussions at the "Open 
House". Other Dutch friends who have encouraged me and also shared in the successes and 
difficulties of the many years of work on this Ph.D. thesis include Fr. Piet Van Dongen, Tony 
Femandes, and the staff of CEBEMO and VASTENAKTIE in the Netherlands. 
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On completion of the case studies on India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, I received 
useful comments and suggestions to my earlier drafts from friends and colleagues in these 
countries to whom I owe at least a word of gratitude. In India, valuable comments and criticisms 
were received from, among others, Mohan Ram, Professor Т.К. Oomen, Stan Lourduswamy, 
Paul Guerviere, Manuel Alphonse, Professor A.R. Desai, and Ajit Roy. Some peasant activists 
and organisations, who prefer to remain anonymous, provided me valuable grassroot information 
and rich insights during my study of their specific struggles. 
In Sri Lanka, the All Lanka Peasant Congress, the Social Scientists Association of Sri 
Lanka, Devasarana Development Centre and others facilitated my field-visits in 1986-1987 and 
commented on earlier drafts. In particular, I would like to thank Charles Abeysekera, Hector 
Abeywardena, Sarath Fernando, Patrick Fernando, Yohan Devananda, Kumudu K. Kumara, 
Newton Gunasinghe, and S.Balakrishnan. There were others, especially peasant leaders and 
activists in Monaragela district whom I met and interacted with during the course of my field 
work, many of whom have today laid down their lives for the peasants struggle in Sri Lanka. To 
one in particular, Ananda Weerakoon, a 62-year old peasant leader of the All Lanka Peasant 
Congress, who was assassinated by unidentified armed youth in front of his family in his home 
in Monaragela -1 am specially grateful for his valuable contribution to my study of peasant 
struggles in Sri Lanka. 
In the Philippines, my regular visits and fieldwork was facilitated by, among others, 
Philippine Peasant Institute, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Filipinas (KMP), Forum for Rural 
Concerns, Farmers Assistance Board, REAPS, National Federation of Sugar Workers, and 
others. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the solidarity and assistance provided by long­
standing friends as Pancho Lara, Jaime Tadeo, Joel Rodrigues, June Rodrigues, Charlie Ocampo, 
Prof. Randolf David, and many other leaders of the peasant and sectoral movements in the 
Philippines. 
I also wish to express my thanks and appreciation to M S Shivakumar from the Division 
of Human Settlements, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok (Thailand) for his assistance in 
formatting and typesetting this manuscript, and to my Dutch friends - Mr. Toon van Kaan, Prof. 
Dr. Jan Nuchelmans and others - who provided valuable assistance in enabling me to make the 
necessary arrangements for the printing of this thesis in the Netherlands. 
Finally, my personal sustenance to complete this work over the years was made possible 
by the support and understanding of my dear family members in India. A special thanks for their 
unlimited patience, concern and tolerance while I went through the tedious process of compiling 
and writing this work. My wife, Wanida (Lek) has been a constant inspiration and support, 
especially after January 19,1991 when our first child, Mallika was bom in Geneva. It has been a 
struggle for her to put up with my late nights and working holidays while I completed the final 
sections of this thesis and, at the same time, to care for our baby girl. On completion of this 
work, I share the happiness of success with Lek and Mallika - an acknowledgement of the love, 
concern and support shared by them both in my work. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Nature and Context of the Study 
It is only in recent decades, more precisely, since the 1970s social sciences became 
seriously attentive to peasants and peasant societies from an emancipatory perspective. Earlier, 
during the colonial period, peasants and peasant societies were chiefly attractive to Western 
cultural anthropologists to meet the needs and policies of colonial regimes. During that time, 
colonial administrators tried to better understand peasant societies so that they could exercise 
control over the so-called "natives" and "savages" of the colonies. 
There are a number of reasons why peasant societies are now being studied seriously. 
The salient ones are the following : 
(1) By far, the most important reason for scholarly interest in peasant societies and peasant 
movements was the victorious "peasant revolutions" in China, Cuba and Vietnam. For 
the first time in history, revolutionary peasants under the leadership and guidance of a 
Communist party, brought about national liberation from the seemingly overwhelming 
power of "feudalism" and "colonialism". In this situation, peasants portrayed a 
"revolutionary potential" that could not be explained or interpreted within the orthodox 
Marxist theory and the various approaches used by anthropologists and colonial policy 
makers. 
(2) Around the same period when peasant rebellions were sweeping across many parts of the 
so-called "Third World", in other countries, the peasantry constituted the backbone of 
escalating nationalist movements or regional separatist struggles, for example, the less-
violent nationalist movement in India under the inspiration of Mahatma Gandhi or the 
long history of peasant struggles by the Moro people in southern Philippines. What was 
specific to this situation was that the peasantry found an effective leverage in the 
nationalist struggles to better their situation and therefore rallied enmasse in support of 
national liberation against colonial rule. 
Although the peasantry were not to reap the fruits of these struggles, they nevertheless 
brought their demands and aspirations onto the agenda of the "independent nations" after 
gaining freedom.1 Thus, the peasantry became the focus of attention during this period, 
not only for the nationalist political leadership, but also for scholars and social scientists. 
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(3) The colonies were largely agricultural countries i.e., over 60-80% of the population 
earned a living by working on or living off the land. In the post-colonial situation, 
therefore, the character of the independent nation state was determined by the respective 
roles of the vast masses of peasantry. Their active participation in, or their passive 
subjugation, in the post-colonial social formations was to shape the class character of the 
State in these countries. Hence, the question of the role of the peasantry in the post-
colonial society gained importance for scholarly enquiries as well as for nationalist 
leaders. 
Ironically, however, the nationalist leadership and research scholarship of the Third 
World countries continued to neglect such interest in their own history of peasant movements. As 
Desai notes in relation to the Indian context : 
"It is also equally sad that such a comprehensive account is not available inspite 
of the existence of various political parties, including the traditional communist 
parties, some of which have even been ruling in some of the states. A number of 
these parties have been working in rural areas, through their peasant 
organisations, kisan sabhas and khet mazdoor sanghs (farm labourers 
associations). Inspite of working with and leading their struggles, these parties 
and organisations have not systematically documented or published a 
comprehensive all-India account of the evolution of the struggles of the rural 
poor, portraying and analysing them dialectically in the context of the type of 
development taking place in Indian society, during the post-independence 
регкхІ.
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The only exceptions have been a few active participants or close observers of such 
struggles who had first-hand knowledge and experience, and who have documented this history.3 
The policy makers of the independent nations failed to develop an indigenous intellectual 
community that could document and interpret its own history. 
Also, the attempt by the nationalist ruling elites to incorporate the peasantry and its 
leadership into the status quo seemed to take predominance over their desire to submit to the 
radical demands and aspirations of the peasantry for radical reform and change. Consequently, 
the origins of Asian scholarship in the study of the peasantry and peasant movements in the 
period immediately after independence manifested itself in an "elite bias" that catered to the 
needs of the political leadership and policy makers (national and international) rather than to the 
aspirations of the peasantry. 
Today, we have come a long way in our understanding and interpretation of the agrarian 
question and the peasant movements in the Third World. PaÄ-breaking studies and research by 
a school of radical social scientists in the Third World and the West, intellectual debates and 
discussions, and, more important, concrete historical experiences of peasant protest in the post-
independent periods of these societies, have all brought about further clarity in the analysis and 
our knowledge of peasant movements in our countries.4 
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The scope of this study is based on two broad areas of concern and inquiry that have 
emerged from my involvement with the Asian peasantry elaborated below, and which have 
theoretically challenged traditional approaches to the study of peasant protest and agrarian 
movements, particularly in Asian countries. These two areas can be elucidated by the following 
questions : 
(1) In spite of a long history of spontaneous and organised peasant movements and struggles 
during the colonial period and since independence in our countries, agrarian revolt and 
movements are largely sporadic, regionalised and lack necessary direction and sustenance 
in recent years. What have been the historical and sociological factors that have 
contributed to the present crisis in agrarian protest and peasant organisations? 
(2) In Asian history, the role of ideology vis-a-vis peasant consciousness plays a dual role. 
On the one hand, it provides for organisation and direction in the course of a peasant 
movement; and, on the other, it appears to be one of main factors resulting in 
fragmentation and disillusionment within peasant movements and ultimately contributes 
to their collapse and subjugation by the forces of the State and the rural elite. 
How does one grapple with the problematic of ideology - used here to mean "not fixed or 
systematic meanings, but to the moment of formation of consciousness in practical activity : in 
work, social and cultural reproduction, and in struggle",5 in relation to peasant consciousness 
and peasant protest, and in what concrete manner does ideology determine and/or influence the 
form of protest and its consequence ? While the above two broad areas of concern would be 
central to our analysis of peasant protest and agrarian movements in Asian countries, it further 
suggests more specific questions that would also be considered in this study, namely : 
(a) Have there been significant shifts overtime in the form and impact of peasant protest and 
agrarian movements - in particular relation to the ideology of protest, role of the 
leadership and social base, class alliances and strategies ? 
(b) To what extent have power elite strategies and State-sponsored agrarian policies enabled 
or hampered the articulation of peasant protest and why ? 
(c) What has been the role of local/national and international forces in response to radical 
peasant protest in Asia ? Here we intend to focus our attention on foreign states, aid 
agencies and local/international power elites that exercise significant influence in the 
Asian countryside. 
(d) What strategies were adopted by the State and rural elites to co-opt the peasant 
movements? How did the State and rural elites facilitate certain movements on particular 
issues and what movements were repressed ? 
In recent years there has been considerable literature on the definitions of the concept of 
"peasantry", "peasant movements", "ideology" and "peasant consciousness". Below I only 
intend to outline the broad ideas of the salient concepts used in order to clarify how it is 
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understood and applied in this study. In this study the concept "Peasantry" is used in a very 
broad sense to mean "rural cultivators" and whose surplus produce is transferred to the dominant 
group or elite. This definition adopted is based on the approach of Eric Wolf to the study of the 
peasantry.6 At the same time, the broad Marxist definition of agrarian social classes in terms of 
the rich, middle and poor peasants and agricultural labourers, is also a useful working definition 
for our analysis. 
The use of the term, "Agrarian Protest" implies two aspects (a) Agrarian Protest as 
specifically Peasant Protest : that is, all forms of spontaneous and organised expression of protest 
of the peasantry against a dominant political power/elite. These expressions of protest are 
basically reactions to given conditions and/or changes in those conditions felt as oppressive or 
detrimental to the interests of the peasantry.7 (b) Agrarian Protest as Popular Protest : that is, it 
is a form of protest or political expression that does not belong to any particular social class or 
group, but has a popular element in that it expresses the consciousness of various strata/classes in 
a given social context, mostly rural but also urban elements. This clearly distinguishes "agrarian 
protest" from "ideology as class consciousness".8 
In the following review of rural elite strategies and peasant protest in Asia (specifically in 
India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka), we would observe that both these aspects of agrarian 
protest are prevalent in different points in time, or within the process of development of a 
specific peasant struggle/movement in a particular area. Therefore, it is necessary to view 
agrarian protest in both these aspects, sometimes distinctly separate, but in others, mutually inter-
related and dialectic. 
The working definition of "Ideology" put forward by Goran Therbom is useful for our 
purposes of analysis : "Ideology will refer to that aspect of the human condition under which 
human beings live their lives as conscious actors in a world that makes sense to them to varying 
degrees. Ideology is the medium through which this consciousness and meaningfulness operate. 
Thus, the conception of ideology employed here deliberately includes both everyday notions and 
"experiences", and elaborate intellectual doctrines, both of the "consciousness" of social actors 
and the institutionalized thought-systems and discourses of a given society."9 We define 
"Popular Protest" or "Popular Ideology" as constituting two main elements - the "inherent" and 
the "derived" : 
"Popular ideology...is most often a mixture a fusion of two elements, of which 
only one is the peculiar property of the 'popular' classes and the other is 
superimposed by a process of transmission and adoption from outside. Of these, 
the first is what I call the 'inherent' traditional element - a sort of 'mother's milk' 
ideology, based on direct experience, oral tradition or folk-memory and not 
learned by listening to sermons or speeches or reading books. In this fusion the 
second element is the stock of ideas and beliefs that are 'derived' or borrowed 
from others, often taking the form of a structured system of ideas, political or 
religious, such as the Rights of Man, Popular Sovereignty, Laissez-faire and the 
Sacred Right of Property, Nationalism, Socialism, or the various versions of 
justification by Faith."10 
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To use the above definition in the context of our study, we can say that the "inherent" 
element would imply, for example, the peasant's belief in his/her right to land - whether owned 
individually or collectively - the desire for freedom and justice, the consciousness of belonging 
to a community. The "derived" element, on the other hand, could imply, for example, the 
ideology of Marxist socialism or Maoism as brought to the peasantry by external forces -
communist parties, social activists, NGOs and others. 
1.2 Theoretical Considerations 
A large part of this study deals with "peasant consciousness". Following Turton and 
Tanabe, I understand "consciousness" as not just an abstract entity in the realm of thought and 
ideas; but as a concrete social force present and acting in society.11 Also, the peasant 
consciousness is determined not only by conceptions, beliefs and ideas coming from "external 
forces" (e.g., rural elites, State, Communist parties, peasant organisers and NGOs) but primarily 
from "internal forces" (e.g., the cultural norms, values and praxis of the peasants and the socio-
economic context of rural life).12 The latter is similar to the Gramscian concept of "non-organic 
ideologies" which is defined as the "less structured forms of thought that circulate among the 
common people, often contradictory and confused and made up of folklore, myth and day-to-day 
popular experience".13 
The distinction between "external" and "internal" forces that shape peasant consciousness 
is crucial. Conventional Marxist theory - including many Marxist scholars studying peasant 
movements - have generally worked within the framework of society divided into two 
fundamental classes : the capitalist class and the working class. All other classes are subject to 
these two fundamental classes in relation to the level of contradiction and conflict that prevails in 
society. Thus, the consciousness of traders and artisans, middle classes and professionals, 
farmers or peasants, indigenous peoples or tribals, must be seen within the framework of the 
consciousness of one or the other of the two fundamental classes in society. This view of 
orthodox Marxist theory has deemed the peasantry "a sack of potatoes" unable to constitute a 
social force by themselves and a critical force in societal transformation - as was ascribed to the 
working class by Marx. 
Also, this orthodox framework is based on the "trickle-down theory" - "the revolutionary 
spirit must thus trickle-down to the workers from the vanguard and its professional intellectuals. 
Both the trickle-down hegemony theory and the corresponding trickle-down counter-hegemony 
strategies are analytically misplaced perspectives in the Marxist political tradition".1'' This has 
reimposed a "teacher-pupil" relationship between the vanguard intellectuals (Party) and the 
workers. In the case of peasant movements in Asian societies, conventional Marxist parties have 
also adopted the same strategy vis-a-vis the peasantry. 
Our study will challenge this orientation and show, to the contrary, that the peasantry 
does possess the potential for a radical consciousness of protest and to play a critical role in 
societal transformation. The historical evidence of peasant revolts in many parts of Asia -
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particularly in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, India and the Philippines - has proved this point 
beyond doubt. This history of peasant resistance in Asia was inspired by Marxists who took a 
distinct position away from conventional European-centred Marxist theory vis-a-vis the 
peasantry. 
While Marxism was elevated to an official ideology in about 30 countries covering over 
one-third of the world's population, none of the official communist parties in Europe ever won a 
revolution to bring them into power. Rather they were installed by the Soviet army and thus had 
to depend on the USSR for support to survive. On the other hand, Marxism in Asia had a 
distinct history as Francisco Nemenzo notes : "the Soviet party in 1917 and the Chinese, 
Yugoslav, Cuban and Vietnamese parties which achieved genuine revolutions were all led by 
creative Marxists who refused to be hamstrung by ideological orthodoxy. Lenin, Mao, Tito, Ho 
Chi Minh, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara devised effective strategies that stunned the 
imperialists because they used Marxism to comprehend the uniqueness of their respective 
societies and to firmly grasp the specific laws of their respective revolutions."13 
It is this specific history of Marxism in Asia that sets it apart from the European version 
of Marxist states that existed until very recently. The decade of the 1990s has marked a historic 
turning-point in the world of Marxism with the collapse of Stalinist-style authoritarian regimes 
that ruled under the disguise of Marxism. In recent years the collapse and near-extinction of the 
East or Central European models of Marxist states and communist parties has proved beyond 
doubt that Marxism also possesses its version of authoritarian rule and dogmatic party politics. 
With the downfall of the East/Central European Marxist states many - especially the 
capitalist powers - claimed the "downfall of Marxism" itself and the triumph of the "free-market" 
model over the "centralised socialist" model. Ironically, Third World states have also used the 
same pretext to de-legitimise and repress Marxist opposition parties, and radical social 
movements. The fact is that these historic developments in Europe have had limited impact in 
the Asian region, largely because of the distinct "Asian" and "Chinese" praxis of Marxism in this 
region and especially the continuing stability and example of the Chinese model to Asian 
conditions. 
Thus, what we have seen in recent years is not the universal collapse of Marxism per se, 
but the downfall of the Stalinist version of socialism personified in the centralised and 
authoritarian East/Central European states. Socialism and Marxist ideas, therefore, adapted as in 
the Chinese and Asian experiences, continues to respond to the needs of peasant movements and 
democratic forces in many Asian countries. Against this background, and as we shall see below, 
for example, in the case of Mao Tse-tung in China and Mahatma Gandhi in India - the ideology 
that contributed to the growth and success of peasant protest in these two countries was drawn 
from the "internal forces" ("non-organic ideologies") of peasant consciousness and clearly 
negated the European models of orthodox Marxist theory and praxis in the mobilisation of the 
peasantry which contributed to the fundamental transformation of these two societies. Recently, 
the sociologist, S.C. Dube observed in a U.N. University study : 
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"The Mahatma (Gandhi) and Mao make strange company : one was a votary of 
non-violence, the other believed that power lay in the barrel of the gun; one was a 
believer, the other an atheist; one supported austerity as a way of life, the other 
chose it as a temporary expedient. But they had many similarities also. Both 
shared a concern for the common man, both believed in the dignity of labour, both 
advocated a philosophy of self-reliance and both opted for a self-limiting society. 
And both were great mass mobilizers for their cause."16 
Following Dube, it appears important to re-examine the stature and role of two 
charismatic personalities - Mao Tse-tung in China and Mahatma Gandhi in India - when one 
attempts to interpret and understand better the dynamics of peasant protest and rural elite 
strategies in the Asian context. 
Mao Tse-Tung, in his early years, had been rather skeptical about the working class and 
the peasantry. He is quoted as confessing in late years : "I began life as a student and at school 
acquired the ways of a student; I felt that intellectuals were the only clean people in the world, 
while in comparison workers and peasants were dirty."17 His "discovery of the peasantry" was 
only in 1925 when Mao returned to his province of origin, Hunan, and worked directly with the 
peasantry in the aftermath of the struggles of the Hunan peasantry which has come to be known 
as the May 30, 1925 Incidents. In late 1926, Mao conducted a thorough investigation of the 
Peasant Movement in Hunan Province which has become a classical work on the peasantry 
entitled "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan", published in March 
1927.18 
In this work, Mao perceived the various forms of domination over the Chinese peasantry 
in three distinct types of authority : (i) the state system (political authority) ranging from the 
national, provincial and county government down to that of the township, (ii) the clan system 
(clan authority) - ranging from the central ancestral temple to its branch temples to the head of 
the household, (iii) the supernatural system (religious authority) - ranging from the King of Hell 
down to the town and village gods belonging to the nether world and the Emperor of Heaven 
down to all the various gods and spirits belonging to the celestial world. Further, there prevailed 
another type of authority over women - the authority of the husband. "These four authorities 
(political, clan, religious and masculine) are the embodiment of the whole feudal-patriarchal 
system and ideology, and the four thick ropes binding the Chinese people particularly the 
peasants."19 
It was his direct experience with the Hunan peasantry that Mao developed his philosophy 
and theory of revolution for China centrally based on the revolutionary potential of the peasant 
classes. His experience among the peasantry in Hunan was to remain pivotal in the evolution of 
his thought in later years. Mao has discovered in the Hunan peasantry his destiny - "what 
remained for him now was to transform his feeling that the peasants were the key to the success 
of the revolution into a theory that would lead to eventual victory."20 Indeed, it was this 
experience with the Hunan peasantry between August 1926 and May 1927 which was crucial to 
the development of Mao's own Marxist thinking.2 
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Mao's recognition and faith on the potential of the Chinese peasantry was affirmed in that 
experience and provided the concrete basis for his conviction - "A rural revolution is a revolution 
by which the peasantry overthrows the power of the feudal landlord class. Without using the 
greatest force, the peasants cannot possibly overthrow the deep-rooted authority of the landlords' 
which has lasted for thousands of years."22 Thus, "without the poor peasants there can be no 
revolution. To reject them is to reject the revolution. To attack them is to attack the 
revolution."23 
Also, Mao's faith in the poor peasants as the "vanguard of the Chinese revolution"24 was 
a significant distinction from Western Marxism which attributed the "revolutionary potential" 
only to the working class. In this conviction, Mao was to make a radical break with classical 
Marxism, and for the first time in history, bestow the potential of revolutionary upsurge on the 
peasantry in a predominantly agricultural society. 
This specificity in Mao's Marxism is crucial to the understanding of the character of the 
Chinese peasant revolution. The significant contribution of Mao to the theory of peasant protest 
and peasant revolution in Asia is precisely in his attempt to develop an indigenous interpretation 
of Marxism. In other words, Mao's contribution was his determined effort to re-interpret and 
adapt Western Marxism to the given local (historical, social and cultural) conditions of China in 
the early part of the 20th century. He affirmed his fervent desire to inspire the Chinese peasantry 
with a Marxian theory of revolution that was specifically "Chinese" in character, in the following 
words : 
"For the Chinese Communists who are part of the great Chinese nation, flesh of 
its flesh and blood of its blood, any talk of Marxism in isolation from China's 
characteristics is merely Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in a vacuum. Hence to 
apply Marxism concretely in China so that its every manifestation has an 
indubitably Chinese character i.e., to apply Marxism in the light of China's 
specific characteristics, becomes a problem which it is urgent for the whole Party 
to understand and solve. Foreign stereotypes must be abolished, there must be less 
singing of empty, abstract tunes, and dogmatism must be laid to rest; they must be 
replaced by the fresh, lively Chinese style and spirit which the common people of 
China love."25 
It is a strange paradox that while, on the one hand, this specificity of the Chinese 
experience provided the cultural and historic uniqueness of the revolution and contributed to its 
success in China, on the other hand, it was this same Chinese specificity that also shaped the 
character of the Chinese society after revolution and contributed to the debacle of Mao in later 
years. As Isaac Deutscher notes : "national history, custom and tradition (including the deep 
philosophical influences of Confucianism and Taoism) have been reflected in the patriarchal 
character of the Maoist government, the hieratic style of its work and propaganda among the 
masses, and the magic aura surrounding the leader."2 
The victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949 signified the victory of the Maoist vision 
of a peasant revolution based predominantly on peasant participation and mobilisation. China in 
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1949, therefore, had proved itself a classical example and a model for most Third World 
societies. The Chinese Communist Party was undoubtedly a peasant party and the peasantry 
formed the vast majority of the population of Third World countries.27Thus, the role of the 
Chinese peasantry in revolution became in the succeeding years of this century the main 
inspiration for Communist parties and peasant movements in many parts of Asia as will be 
elaborated below. 
Mahatma Gandhi's influence on the Indian peasantry during the nationalist struggle for 
independence from British colonialism, lay not only in his charismatic personality but also in the 
specific Indian vision of a free and independent society that he posited for its people. The 
philosophical and strategic basis of his peaceful revolution was "satyagraha" i.e., "soul force" - a 
non-violent civil disobedience movement against British rule. For the Indian peasants, Gandhi 
was not just "a remote, western-educated lawyer-politican : he was a Mahatma, a Pandit, a 
Brahman ..."28 
Furthermore, the "Mahatma as an idea was thought out and reworked in popular 
imagination"29 In other words, Gandhi signified the hope of freedom from landlord oppression, 
independence from foreign rule and a firm affirmation of the dignity of Indian lifestyle and 
history for the peasantry. It was precisely this mass appeal of Gandhi that won over the Indian 
peasantry to the side of the Indian nationalist movement. Although the leaders of the Indian 
nationalist movement arose from an urban-educated and elitist background with little or no 
affinity to the genuine grievances of the peasant masses; Gandhi was able to reconcile the 
contradictory interests of antagonistic social classes and groups in Indian society and mobilise a 
united movement for Indian independence. 
This "populism" of Gandhi's appeal was crucial to the unity among the Indian people -
hence, landlord and peasant, rich and poor, Hindu and Muslim forged a delicate unity inspite of 
adverse political ideologies and economic interests within the Indian national movement, and 
Gandhi bonded together and symbolised this paradox. As Shahid Amin notes, the consciousness 
of the Indian peasantry was influenced by a popular enticement with Gandhi who was "to initiate 
the very first moments of a process which, given other factors, could help the peasant to 
conceptualise the turning of his world upside down. This was an incipient political 
consciousness called upon - on the possibility of an inversion of many of those power relations 
deemed inviolable until then, such as British/Indian, landlord/peasant, high-casteAow-caste, 
etc."30 
Like Mao, Gandhi was also opposed to foreign models of revolution and change, but was 
convinced that only by re-discovering the liberative elements in Eastern traditions and cultures 
that a relevant mass movement for societal change can be mobilised effectively. Furthermore, 
such an Eastern or Indian vision as Gandhi propounded was rooted in his concept of "non-
violence" and "satyagraha". To quote Gandhi : 
"Let us not be obsessed with catchwords and seductive slogans imported from the 
West. Have we not our own distinct Eastern traditions ? Are we not capable of 
finding our own solution to the question of capital and labour?...Let us study our 
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Eastern institutions in that spirit of scientific inquiry and we shall evolve a truer 
socialism and a truer communism than the world has yet dreamed of. It is surely 
wrong to presume that Western socialism or communism is the last word on the 
question of mass poverty... Cl as s war is foreign to the essential genius of India 
which is capable of evolving a form of communism broad-based on the 
fundamental rights of all and equal justice to all."31 
Mahatma Gandhi signified for the Indian peasantry an Indian deity, as the Hindi weekly 
"Swadesh" which played an important role in spreading the message of Gandhi in Western India, 
reported in 1921 : "Even in the time of the Buddha, Mohammad and Christ such miracles were 
supposed to have taken place. Then we see no reason why miracles (chamatkar) should not be 
associated with Mahatma Gandhi whose name is perhaps even better known in India than that of 
Ram and Sita. It has been said...'7aW rahi bhavanajaisi, prabhu moorat dekhi tin taisi" 
("Whatever faith one has, the image of god appears accordingly")."32 
While Gandhi's role in the historical evolution and final victory of the Indian nationalist 
movement remained decisive, the end result of the process was the emergence of the Indian 
ruling elite under the banner of the Congress Party to the helm of political power after gaining 
independence from the British, with the peasantry relegated to the background. It is precisely for 
this reason that today Gandhism in India is often considered a "thing of the past", no longer 
providing the necessary relevance for contemporary Indian society and particularly the griev-
ances of the Indian peasantry. Thus, as Partha Chatterjee notes : "..Gandhism, like Russian 
Populism, was not a direct expression of peasant ideology. It was an ideology conceived as an 
intervention in the elite-nationalist discourse of the time and was formed and shaped by the 
experiences of a specifically national movement...In the Indian case the largest popular element 
of the nation was the peasantry. And it was the Gandhian ideology which opened up the histori-
cal possibility for its appropriation into the evolving political structures of the Indian state."33 
1.3 Active Involvement as a Research Methodology 
This study has utilised a research methodology based on active involvement with the 
peasant movements and key actors in peasant protest in Asia. This approach is also known as 
"Participatory Action Research" (PAR) popularised by, among others, Orlando Fais Borda from 
Latin America as follows : 
"Our idea was to take grassroots knowledge as a starting-point and then to syste-
matise and amplify it through action in collaboration with external agents of 
change - such as ourselves - in order to build and strengthen the power of formal 
and informal rural workers' organisations".34 
Following this approach the purpose of this thesis is to present the history of peasant 
protest and rural elite strategies in some selected countries of Asia from a specific "view from 
within and below". This concept has been defined by Gerrit Huizer as follows : 
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"View from Within and Below implies that these realities are being seen most 
critically, and thus probably scientifically, by those who are suffering the efforts 
of these changes, watching them with suspicion and doubt, the basis of all 
science. Objectivity can be guaranteed in such committed research by the 
distance through self-reflection which researchers can take from themselves and 
their own personal and cultural biases and the political-economic context to which 
they structurally belong."35 
In the context of our study, this connotes that we would look at the history of peasant 
struggles and its "counter-forces" (e.g., state, foreign business/corporate interests, rural elites -
both national and international) from the point of view of the peasantry, who are the main actors 
in the long history of peasant struggles in Asian countries, as well as the subjects and victims of 
the counter-forces. In order to present this perspective from within and below, we have reviewed 
the history of peasant protest and rural elite strategies from a specific standpoint of highlighting 
the peasant's own perceptions and analysis of this history and interpreted their success or failure 
accordingly. 
In my involvement with the peasants, I always envisaged my role as one of 
sympathetically reflecting the peasant's perceptions, cultural contexts and perspectives of their 
own milieu and the process of social change. Further to present this perspective, I have 
consciously based the analysis on my personal reflections on this experience and to faithfully 
reflect the peasants' viewpoints within the overall socio-economic and cultural context of 
peasant protest.36 
In this sense, this thesis seeks to supplement and further concretise conventional 
academic work on peasant protest and agrarian society in Asia. Wherever we have relied on 
academic sources, it has been mainly to provide the necessary historical background and 
contextualisation to our study. This study, therefore, draws on the richness and relevance of both 
academic works as well as "perspectives from within and below" on peasant protest and rural 
elite strategies in Asia. 
Based on the involvement with the peasantry, the perspective of this study outlined above 
is seen as both important in terms of documenting the history of peasant protest from a stand­
point that is rooted in the perceptions and cultures of the actors themselves, as well as attempting 
a comparative analysis across local and national situations to identify broader trends and 
potentials in the process of evolution and change in Asian rural societies. 
This conviction has emerged from many years of close contact and involvement with 
peasant organisations and movements in some countries of Asia - particularly, India, the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka which constitute the main case-studies of this thesis. My first 
involvement with peasant movements began in India in the late 1960s when, as students, we 
developed close contact with the peasantry through "exposure programmes - where we went 
down to the villages" and participated in "work camps" with peasants in the fields.37 This 
experience not only gave us a good "first-hand" knowledge and experience of the lifestyle and 
plight of the poor Indian peasantry, but also gradually began to politicize us as students with the 
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problems, issues and concerns of the peasants vis-a-vis the rural elites (e.g., landlords, rich 
peasants, money lenders, traders) and the Indian state. 
The 1960s and early 1970s in India was also a period of intense radicalization of the 
social sectors - primarily the peasantry - which were greatly influenced by the Chinese peasant 
revolution and successes of peasant-led revolutions in other parts of Asia. Although there was a 
strong tendency to "import models" of peasant revolutions into India - especially by the Indian 
communist parties, the process, however, resulted in the formation and growth of radical peasant 
associations and coordinated struggles in the Indian countryside. 
As students, we were exposed to this reality and were drawn into becoming allies of the 
peasantry in their concrete struggles to alleviate their situation through radical social 
transformation of the Indian society. In this involvement over a period of about ten years, we 
began to closely study the nature, scope and impact of peasant protest and to assess our own 
perceptions, attitudes towards the potentials of the peasantry with those of the "actors" 
themselves. This was indeed a learning experience which broke down many inherent 
misconceptions and biases on the peasantry and peasant protest 
The more experience we accumulated through direct contact and alliance-building with 
peasant movements in various parts of India, and consequently the lessons we learnt from the 
peasantry themselves, the more we became convinced that the role of the "external agents" (like 
ourselves) in interpreting and studying the nature of peasant protest should be one that adopts a 
sympathetic "view from within and below". This implies testing theories and concepts in 
concrete history and life-experiences of the actors themselves. 
In other words, to find a mediation between "theory" and "practice", "analysis" and 
"experience", "knowledge" and "reality". It is only in this manner that "external agents" can 
usefully serve the interests of the peasantry and produce knowledge that can be used in 
supporting and enhancing the genuine interests of the rural poor and peasant movements.38 
The severe crisis emerging from political rivalries and the ensuing ideological splits that 
confronted the radical peasant movements in India and other Asian countries in the early and 
mid-1970s and their dramatic collapse under the repression by the State and landlord classes, 
brought to the fore many fundamental questions that were vital to be addressed and resolved. In 
our involvement with the Indian peasantry we attempted to grapple with some of these crucial 
questions, which can be summarised as follows : 
(a) In many countries of Asia (including and especially in India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines) 
the history of peasant protest has been replete with ideological conflicts within the 
leadership and/or between the "party leadership" and the "peasant mass base". What 
were the causes for such internal political rivalries and splits within the leadership of 
peasant movements (including the Communist Parties that led many peasant revolts)? 
(b) In the analysis of peasant protest in Asia one often notes a serious disparity between the 
"ideological leadership" (especially of the political party) and the "peasant 
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consciousness" at the grassroots level. Hence, it is important to pose the question as to 
what extent were the participating peasantry really convinced of the ideology of the party 
and the leadership of the peasant struggles ? 
(c) Since independence, most Asian governments have evolved various "Rural 
Development" policies and programmes to appease the peasantry and to curb radical 
peasant protest. In what manner did these strategies and counter-forces of rural elites and 
the State contribute towards the collapse of peasant movements ? 
(d) As we will see below, there has also been a strong tendency among communist parties 
with peasant support in some Asian countries to import models of peasant revolutions 
from other neighboring countries. In particular, how far did the "model of peasant 
revolution" in China and Vietnam really apply to other Asian societies in the 1960s and 
1970s ? 
(e) The Asian scenario of peasant protest in the post-independence period is characterised by 
two distinct features : countries in which there are consolidated national-level peasant 
movements (e.g., the Philippines, Korea); and others in which peasant movements are 
largely localised and divided if not disintegrated altogether (e.g., Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
India). What lessons can be learnt from the history of peasant struggles in these Asian 
countries and to what extent are they comparable to each other 7 
(f) The fact that for the foreseeable future most Asian societies will remain predominantly 
agricultural-based and consequently conflicts in the Asian countryside will intensify, it is 
important to enquire into the potentials of future peasant protest. What is the future of 
"peasant movements" and "agrarian revolts" in India and Asia ? To what extent can 
peasant struggles constitute the backbone of an organised process of social transformation 
of predominantly agrarian societies in Asia ? 
Between 1983-19861 had another opportunity of involvement with peasants in the sugar-
belt of Maharashtra state in Western India wherein I joined a team of researchers and social 
workers working in Puntamba village in Ahmedanagar district. Our objective was to gather first-
hand knowledge and experience of the life and working conditions of poor sugar workers in 
around ten villages in that area. We conducted an informal research survey among sugar 
worker's families in these villages in order to identify their real needs and their potentials for 
building up rural organisations of sugar workers and migrant sugar labourers. Our "entry-point" 
into these villages was our enthusiasm to share the lives of the poor farmers and to assist through 
community development programmes and basic literacy classes. 
This experience was similar to that cited by Gerrit Huizer in the Latin American context, 
where he successfully utilised the approach of "view from within and below" to understand and 
interpret peasant protest. As Huizer noted : "Villagers often (and with considerable justification) 
passively reject an outsider, but once he has proven himself to be trustworthy, he may be even 
more highly respected because of his non-peasant background and dedication to the peasant 
cause (while - as peasants believe - he could have had an easy life in town)."39 
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This opportunity provided the valuable direct experience and exposure to the power and 
politics of the rural elites - in this case, the landlords and owners of sugar estates and sugar 
factories. In that experience we leamt the complex network of intertwining relations between the 
power elite, police and security forces and the rural rich. We also experienced the role of 
political parties and rural workers' organisations which were competing with each other to win 
over the massive electoral base of sugar workers in Maharastra State. From this experience new 
quesdons arose in my mind, especially, on the nature and role of the rural elite and their impact 
on the rural poor and on peasant protest. 
My eagerness to grapple with these questions and in the process attempt to re-read the 
history of peasant movements in India led to study similar experiences in other Asian countries. 
Between 1979-1982 and 1986-1988, I worked at the Asian level, firstly, with an 
International/Asian students movement, and later with a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
on a Documentation and Research programme monitoring "Agribusiness Transnational 
Corporate Activity in Asian countries". This enabled me to visit and conduct research among the 
peasantry in other Asian countries - particularly Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Thailand. During 
this period I had the opportunity to be directly involved with the All Lanka Peasant Congress 
(ALPC) and peasant leaders in Sri Lanka when they launched two major struggles, and also with 
peasant organisations in the Philippines. In this study I have attempted to exhaustively document 
and study the case of peasant protest in Sri Lanka based on this active and direct involvement, 
and my own desire to dialogue and learn from the Sri Lankan peasants given my other 
experiences with peasant movements in India, Thailand and the Philippines. 
In this way I began to comprehend the nature of peasant movements in these countries 
during the same period as my own experience in India and started to take a closer look at the 
process of growth, consolidation, success and/or collapse of peasant movements in these 
countries during the post-independence (1940s onwards) period. Whenever the opportunity 
provided, I interacted with peasants and leaders of peasant struggles, listening to their histories 
and life-stories and assessing their concrete struggles to transform society. This involvement 
resulted in interaction both with academics and intellectuals as well as peasant activists and 
leaders. The more I began to learn about the history of peasant movements in other Asian 
countries, the more it made me aware of a "common pattern" in the nature of peasant movements 
in Asian countries. There seemed to prevail many common causes of peasant successes and 
failures in their struggle against local (e.g., landlord or state) as well as international actors (e.g., 
transnational corporations, foreign multi-lateral institutions, governments). This "common 
pattern" was confined not only to the history of the peasant movements in our countries but also 
to the strategy ("counter-forces") of rural elites and international actors vis-a-vis radical peasant 
protest. 
Having documented the history of peasant movements in these countries during a period 
of over five years, I began to rewrite the history of peasant protest (in Thailand, the Philippines, 
India and Sri Lanka) in a popular fashion in an attempt to address the questions posed above. 
These two major works, and other research studies and publications since then have attempted to 
address the questions foremost in my mind and experiences with peasant movements in India and 
other Asian countries. 
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In the course of the above-mentioned research work, I had moved from a perspective of 
orthodox rural sociology studying "peasant movements" in terms of leadership, mass base, 
impact, goals/objectives, internal and external causes for success and/or failure; to a perspective 
that consciously refrained from beginning an enquiry with a set of predetermined hypothesis or 
questions or a model or framework. Rather my enquiry began by listening, interpreting and 
reflecting the concrete history and life-experiences of the actors in peasant movements from a 
distinct "view from within and below" perspective. My "macro-framework" of study was a 
collage of "micro-frameworks" which existed among the peasants and emerged from the many 
years of involvement with peasant movements and confronting rural elite strategies in Asian 
societies. 
My "frame of reference" in this study is based on the experience that a genuine "view 
from within and below" perspective in the study of peasant protest in Asia must combine 
academic/intellectual studies on peasant movements with concrete life-histories of the actors 
themselves. This study, therefore, attempts to present history as experienced through my 
involvement with peasants and peasant movements. Wherever possible, I have also attempted to 
study "ongoing movements" especially in the three Asian countries we have chosen as "case 
studies". As Ghanshyam Shah notes : "The study of ongoing movements provides greater insight 
into the course of the movements."41 
1.4 Outline of the Study 
Chapter 1 discusses the perspective of "a view from within and below" which is utilised 
in this study to review the ideological roots of peasant protest in Asia (India, The Philippines and 
particularly Sri Lanka), the impact of State policy and power elite strategies to counter peasant 
protest, the role of national and international forces to coopt the peasant movements and the 
politics of rural elite vis-a-vis the radical peasantry and peasant movements. This chapter 
explains the roots of peasant consciousness which is influenced not only by "external forces" 
(e.g., elites, state, political parties), but fundamentally by "internal forces", i.e., the cultural 
norms, values and praxis of rural society, and the peasant's way of life. Although peasant 
movements in Asian societies have been largely inspired by communist parties, this chapter 
explains that the Marxist ideological orientation of these parties have been more influenced by 
the Chinese Revolution and Mao Tse-Tung Thought, rather than from conventional Western 
Marxism. In looking at the influence of Mao Tse-Tung in China and Mahatma Gandhi in India, 
this chapter suggests that Gandhi is no longer seen as relevant in the Indian context, whereas the 
ideas of Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese peasant revolution continues to influence and determine 
the nature of peasant protest in some Asian countries. 
Chapter 2 reviews the agrarian context in Asia. Many Asian governments have attempted 
to address the problem of land ownership and control through Agrarian Policies and Land 
Reform programmes. This chapter reviews the socio-economic and political context of Land 
Reforms introduced in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, and identifies the political and 
ideological basis of these reforms with specific attention to US policy in the Asian countryside. It 
is suggested that the ideological basis of these reforms were centred on neutralising radical 
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peasant protest and the spreading communist influence - especially with the victory of the 
Chinese peasant revolution and its impact on anti-colonial struggles and rising nationalism in 
other Asian countries. Against this background, the next three chapters discuss the three main 
cases of peasant movements and rural elite strategies in India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. 
Chapter 3 reviews the long history of peasant struggles in India during the colonial period 
and after independence. This includes a discussion of the All India Kisan Sabha during the peak 
of Indian nationalism against British rule, the salient peasant struggles in the post-independence 
period - peasant struggles under Communist Party leadership - the Tebhaga struggle (1946-1947) 
and theTelangana Uprisings (1946-1951), the Maoist agrarian resistance - the Naxalite 
movement (1967-1971), and contemporary Maoist peasant struggles. This chapter also discusses 
the emergence of "farmers' agitations" led by the rich peasantry in recent Indian history, and 
situates them in the context of the post-Green Revolution period and outlines its potential threat 
to the growth of radical peasant movements in the Indian countryside. 
Chapter 4 reviews the history of peasant struggles in the Philippines. The Huk Rebellion 
(1942-1945) against Japanese imperialism during World War II and the US and Philippine 
government policies to curtail the growth of this radical peasant movement and coopt its 
leadership is elaborated upon. This chapter also assesses the Agrarian Reform programmes (e.g., 
Masagana 99, Samahang Nayon, Corporate Farming Program) of the Marcos government and 
the repression carried out on the radical peasantry organised under the Communist Party of the 
Philippines and its New People's Army by this regime. The agrarian policies of the Aquino 
government are also discussed with special attention to the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Programme" and the intense controversy between government agrarian policy and radical 
peasant organisations in the Philippines. In this context, this chapter highlights the contemporary 
stage of peasant struggle under the leadership of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas -
National Peasant Movement of the Philippines. 
Following the study of peasant movements in India and the Philippines, special attention 
has been paid in Chapter 5 to peasant protest in Sri Lanka. Studies on peasant protest in Sri 
Lanka have been rather limited until today, and hence it has been found necessary to document 
more exhaustively in this chapter the evolution of peasant protest and rural elite strategies in Sri 
Lanka. This chapter reviews the salient British policies in traditional Ceylon and the numerous 
cases of peasant uprisings documented during this period. The chapter then critically assesses the 
agrarian policies of successive Sri Lanka governments after independence - the Green 
Revolution and Peasant Colonisation (1948-1971), Land Reform and Nationalisation (1972 -
1977), Open Economy Policy (1977-1985), and the Mahaweli Development Scheme, the Ceylon 
Tobacco Company and the Sugar Transnational Corporations in the Agricultural Promotion 
Zones in Sri Lanka. Against this background, this chapter focuses on the key role of the All 
Lanka Peasant Congress and reviews the two main struggles launched by this national peasant 
movement in recent years, viz., the Water Tax struggle and the Monaragela struggle against 
Sugar TNCs. These two cases have been studied and documented by the author through personal 
involvement with the ALPC and the peasant leaders and activists during the period 1985-1987. 
In the concluding Chapter 6, we discuss the problematic of peasant protest and rural elite 
strategies in Asia today, drawing on the main conclusions from the three case studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE AGRARUN CONTEXT IN ASIA 
2.1 The Politics of Land and U.S. Policy in the 
Asian Countryside 
"Land is at the heart of agrarian conflict and reform and is the pivot of power. 
More precisely, the problem is one of human and social relations in respect to 
control and use of land and access to accruing benefits. The land system is a 
network of these relations in institutionalised form. Land becomes the pivot of 
power because people depend on it for their vital needs : the greater the 
dependence, the more strategic becomes control of land and the more power it 
confers. Monopoly control of land may lead to monopoly control of power over 
people."1 
Asia is predominantly an agricultural region2 with the large majority of its population 
directly working on or deriving their livelihood from land. It is this fundamental characteristic of 
the Asian region that makes land central to our understanding of the dynamics of this region's 
development in the past and its prospects for the future. More precisely, to undentand the nature 
of people's relation to land and the larger socio-economic and political factors that determines its 
control and usage, provides us the basis to interpret the respective history of development of 
these societies and distinguish the internal and external political and economic forces that shape 
this history. To quote Chnstodoulou : 
"As rural societies are predominantly agrarian and thus dependent on land, control 
of land is the strongest force in shaping their economic, social and political 
structure. To understand the nature and dynamics of these societies it is therefore 
essential to examine them in relation to the land."3 
Both during the period of colonialism and more particularly after independence, Asian 
societies have attempted to address the central issue of land ownership and control through land 
reform. This has been on the political agenda of governments in power, which has both ensured 
their legitimacy as well as determined their power. Many Asian governments derive their 
political and economic power from the landed elites and rural rich - who also provide the main 
power base in the predominantly rural sector where the majority of the population - and hence 
the electorate - lives. While addressing these issues, Asian governments have been strongly 
influenced by external factors - foreign governments that have exercised direct control in 
determining the respective national economic policies of Asian countries; so also powerful 
international institutions that have financed and provided support to national agrarian reforms 
and rural reconstruction and development programmes. 
17 
However, an important determining factor that has pressurised Asian governments to 
address the land question and agrarian reform has been not only the huge disparities in class 
stratification in the Asian countryside, but also the consequent intensification of agrarian 
conflicts and radical peasant protest movements. Peasant protest in Asian countries has a long 
history going back to the early period of colonial rule. Among the salient questions addressed by 
the radical peasant movements in Asia have been the inequality in the ownership and control of 
land, terms of rent and tenancy, agricultural workers' wages, government subsidy for agricultural 
production and repression by landlords and political forces of radical peasant protest. 
The increasing radicalisation of the peasant movements in Asia, especially during the 
period 1940-1970s, initially during the independence struggles against colonial rule later 
consolidating with the influence of Marxist and Maoist ideology and political praxis, set the 
stage for an intensive confrontation between the peasantry and the State in many Asian countries 
on the issue of Land Reform. The spreading Communist influence on peasant associations and 
especially among the peasant leaders threatened the prevailing "top-down" structure of power of 
the ruling elites and local and foreign interests that supported them. As Christodoulou notes, 
Agrarian Reform has always been a highly political issue as it touches the central political 
questions of land ownership and control : 
"Agrarian Reform is a drastic, planned public intervention aimed at bringing 
about a new structure of access to land more adequate to the requirements of the 
socio-economic and political system for which it serves as support or with which 
it is closely linked. Thus agrarian reform inescapably involves the whole network 
of power relations and brings into play a vast range of forces.'"1 
The United States has for long direct interests in the politics and development of the 
countries of the Asian region. The chief objective of this interest has been, among others, to 
ascertain that "developing nations evolve in a way that affords a congenial world 
environment...that strategic areas and the manpower and natural resources of developing nations 
do not fall under communist control...that the resources and markets of the less developed world 
remain available to us (USA) and to other Free World countries."5 To realise these objectives, 
US foreign policy has been based on the assumption that "the United States retains the right and 
obligation to intervene in the Third World in any way it ultimately deems necessary, including 
militarily".6 
Since the Chinese revolution of 1949, US foreign policy had direct interests particularly 
in those countries in the Asian region (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand) which it considered as open to communist threat and the presence of radical 
peasant rebellions. This was based on the assumption that the victory of Communists in China, 
if left unchecked, could be exported to neighboring Asian countries. The US fear was based on 
its contention that the only remedy to offset the expansion of Chinese communist influence in 
other parts of Asia, was to provide the logistic and economic basis to fight the communist 
ideology. 
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The policy described above, therefore, included providing of military, technical and 
financial assistance to the local governments in these countries to undertake fundamental Land 
Reform programmes. This policy was particularly in practice in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and 
the Philippines, which we will discuss later. At the same time, US policy also entailed providing 
the necessary assistance to promote "counter-insurgency" programmes to fight local dissent, 
including radical peasant organisations and peasant movements. The fear of US policy vis-a-vis 
the Asian region, is well summarised in a confession of an ex-CIA agent as follows : 
"Historically, every great Chinese dynasty that developed sufficient military 
capabilities took a turn at trying to conquer mainland Southeast Asia. Taking 
these past trends into consideration made it seem inevitable that the newly 
emerged power in Asia, Red China, having proved its military prowess in Korea, 
would want to make history repeat itself."7 
It is interesting to view the American perception of China in the aftermath of the 1949 
communist victory, and how much that directly influenced American policy towards the region. 
It was this narrow perception that provided the basis for the framing of US foreign policy 
towards China and the rest of Asia. The Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) between 1969-1973, Mr Ray S Cline, characterised China and outlined the goals 
of American policy towards Asia in the following words : "China is a politically oppressive one-
party dictatorship governing one billion desperately poor Asian people with too few resources to 
raise standards of living much or easily in the next few decades....The goal of US foreign policy 
ought to be an energetic, reinvigorated cooperation among the Asian states whose political 
ideology, economic health, and strategic security are in accord with US interests."8 
In the above scenario of US foreign policy in Asia, the Philippines was the strategic 
centre-piece of US hegemony in the Asian region. In 1951, Assistant Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk is quoted as saying : "Should it (the Philippines) fall out of the "American orbit" it would, 
more than any other single factor discredit the United States throughout the length and breadth of 
Asia... it is vital that we hold the Philippines whatever the cost - unless we are prepared to write 
off Asia."9 In reviewing the agrarian situation and peasant movements in the Philippines in the 
sections below, we shall see how US policy decisively determined the course of history of the 
Filipino people, from colonial times to the present. 
It is important to review the history of Agrarian Reform and peasant protest in the 
countries of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea as these countries were the first in the Asian region 
to implement drastic Land Reform programmes under the direction and massive financial and 
technical assistance of the USA. This post-World War II phenomenon in these countries is often 
seen as "success stories" of AgrarianA^and Reform in Asia, but a closer examination reveals a 
scenario that is marked by intense political interests of "counter-insurgency" of US foreign 
policy in this region and a programme whose chief objective was to curtail the possible growth 
of radical peasant movements and to open up the internal market for US imports and dumping of 
agricultural surplus. 
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2.2 Japan : Тор-Down Land Reform to Eliminate 
Fascism and Liquidate Radical Peasant Protest 
Agnculture had provided the means of livelihood for the majonty in Japan for a long 
penod in its history From the Meiji Era (1868 1912) to World War II, agnculture involved over 
5 5 million households or 13 7 million people m Japan 10 Rice remained the pnmary crop for 
the Japanese farmers until the mid-1970s Paddy fields occupied more than half of the entire 
arable land, and rice accounted for more than half of the total value of agncultural production. 
Naturally, rice culture forms the core of Japanese agriculture and holds unchallenged 
importance " Land Reform was a post-war phenomenon in Japan In the 1930s and 1940s the 
farmers movements were gaining strength demanding "Land-to-the Tiller" which threatened the 
traditional power of the landlords To eliminate increasing class tensions between the peasants 
and the landowners, the Amencan Occupation Forces deployed in Japan after the War urged the 
Japanese government to implement radical Land Reforms 
Japan had experienced a long history of peasant rebellion Between 1600 and the end of 
the Togugawa period in 1868, over 3,000 peasant riots are reported to have occurred dunng 
penods of famine 12The first national level peasant organisation, the "Japanese Peasant Union -
Nichino" was inaugurated on Apnl 9, 1922 in Kobe, then comprising of only about 253 peasants 
who were members and about 15 local chapters At the Second Convention of Nichino in 
February 20, 1923 the strength had grown to about 300 affiliated chapters and about 10,000 
members13 
In the ensuing years, Nichino developed into a strong peasant organisation based on its 
chief aims of reducing rents and ensuring legislative protection for tenants Increasingly, 
Nichino also played a political role in initiating the formation of a Workers and Peasants Party in 
Japan Nichino also played an instrumental role in fighting court cases to defend tenant's 
interests against landlords who tried to evict them With landlords becomes more conscious of 
the emerging strength of the Nichino and consequently opposing tenants from joining the union, 
as well as the fact that the court rulings were often in landlords' favour and hence detrimental to 
the peasants' interests, the Nichino became more and more aware of the need for radical action 
at the national level to defend its interests 
The government, alarmed at this escalating radicahsation of the Nichino, clamped down 
in a wave of arrests οι Nichino leaders - which has come to be known as the "3-15 event' (March 
15, 1928) This cnppled the Nichino as most of its top leaders were impnsoned, many of them 
remaining in pnson until World War II The subsequent split in the Nichino led to the formation 
of the "National Peasants Union" (Zenno) on May 27, 1928 However, in another wave of 
repression in 1929 both the remnants of Nichino and the newly-formed Zenno were eliminated 
With this sudden collapse of the peasant movement in Japan, farmers were left to carry out 
individual actions at local levels which had limited impact and remained largely ineffective. As 
Huizer noted. 
"The peasant unions as national and prefectuial organisations were also affected. 
At the local level, tenant action against landlords tor more favorable conditions 
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continued, but at the national level the emphasis was laid more strongly on the 
demand for a greater share in the distribution of the national income for 
agriculture as a whole, for landowners as well as tenants."14 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the peasant movement, the Japanese government 
sought to de-politicize the peasantry. In the 1930s, efforts were made by the government to 
harmonize the interests of landlords and tenants through village self-help movements such as the 
"Village Rehabilitation Movement" of 1932. Under this program, the government promoted the 
formation of Agricultural Cooperatives to bring together landlords and tenants to serve the 
interests of national policies. These cooperatives were dominated by the affluent landowners and 
the government allied with them to ensure the pacification of the radical peasantry and to ensure 
maximising of the productive capacity of the rural population to serve national economic goals. 
It was precisely this scenario of rural Japan that "prepared the way before and during World War 
II for the land reform finally carried out in 1946." 
However, in February 1946, with the re-organisation of some left-wing political parties, 
the Japanese Peasant Union (Nichino) was re-formed. The issues thrown up by the Land Reform 
programme stimulated the peasants with the support of the socialists, social-democrats and 
communists to re-organise the national peasant movement to ensure that the Land Reform 
benefited the tenants and poor farmers. The Nichino now began to play a crucial role within the 
Agricultural Land Committees which were set up under the Land Reform programme. Later, 
amidst stem opposition from landlord interests and government officials, the Nichino struggled 
hard to defend the tenant's interests within these committees at the local levels. However, the 
tenants were outnumbered by the overwhelming dominance of landowners within the 
Agricultural Land Committees. "In the country as a whole, 24.8% of the chairmen of 
Agricultural Land Committees were tenants, 39.1% were landlords and 34.5% owner-farmers, 
the rest being independent outsiders."16 
It is against this background that we need to situate the Land Reform Programme in 
Japan. The salient reasons for Land Reform in Japan during this period included the following : 
(a) The feudal system in Japan - dominated by the powerful landowning class - provided the 
social base for Japanese authoritarianism . Hence, it was necessary to eliminate this social 
base in order to democratize society. 
(b) The US also feared that with the radicalisation of the farmers movement, Japan would be 
pushed to a socialist path of development. It was in the immediate interest of the US to 
prevent Japan from becoming socialist.17 
The Land Reform programme affected over 6 million farmers who were granted an 
average of 1 ha. of land which created a massive base of small owner-cultivators.18 Aside from 
this impressive redistribution of land to cultivators, the government also ensured that collective 
control over land was prohibited and cooperative efforts of farmers was strictly controlled by the 
State. 
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On completion of this Land Reform programme, the government signed a "Mutual 
Security Act" with the United States in the early 1950s which, among others, provided for food 
aid through the dumping of US agricultural surpluses on Japan. Under this agreement, tons of 
wheat and milk were imported into Japan. The consequent effect of this was the drastic 
reduction in Japanese wheat production and the sudden introduction of bread and milk on the 
market. In 1946, the Japanese government passed a Law to provide free lunch to school children 
to improve their health - US bread and milk was introduced to the children, thereby changing 
their food habits.19 
In 1960, a policy legislation was passed to modernise agriculture in Japan. This policy 
proposed to create independent farmers engaged in large-scale mechanised production and there-
by eliminating inefficient and non-competitive farmers. Thus, there was a sharp increase in the 
use of "power-tillers" - between 1955-1959 the use of power-tillers increased from 89,000 to 
514,000. By 1961 their use had reached 1 million and by 1965, 2.5 million power-tillers were in 
use.20 Displaced farmers migrated to the cities to join the expanding industrial labour force. 
Modernisation of Japanese agriculture included, among others, the massive use of chemical 
fertilizers which gradually replaced organic fertilizers. 
The above factors brought about drastic changes in the demographic composition of the 
Japanese rural society, as well as resulted in an overwhelming dependence of Japan's 
consumption patterns on foreign - particularly US - aid. For example, in 1960, the Japanese 
farming population was 10 million. By 1987, it was down to just 4.4 million. In 1960, Japan 
could meet 82% of its consumption of grain. Now, it can only meet 32% of its needs in grain.21 
The government has allowed free imports of food products into the Japanese market in exchange 
for its industrial exports. 
Thus, the Japanese market was flooded with imports of the same vegetables and fruits 
that the Japanese farmers produced. Many Japanese farmers were thus forced to find other 
sources of income besides farming. "It has been said that Japanese farmers are overproducing, 
but this is true only because foreign food traders are given first priority. The amount of food to 
be imported is decided first, considering trade balances, then the levels of domestic food 
production is set."22 
There are three distinct features of the "Japanese model" which can be said to have 
contributed towards the success of its agricultural development : 
(a) agricultural output increased within the framework of the existing small-scale farming 
system; 
(b) the bulk of the nation's farmers were involved in increases in agricultural productivity -
through adoption of technical innovations or new inputs; and 
(c) agricultural and industrial development went forward together in a process of "concurrent 
growth".23 
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23 Taiwan : U.S. -managed Land Reform 
against the Communist Threat 
Japanese occupation of Taiwan between 1894 and 1945 did not result in the taking-over 
of direct control of land and agricultural production by the Japanese colonisers. In Taiwan, the 
Japanese chose not to intervene directly in agriculture and found it expedient to leave much of 
the rural social structure intact, insofar as it provided the necessary surplus to feed the Japanese 
people. Under the slogan "Agricultural Taiwan, Industrial Japan", the colonisers sought to 
expand agriculture and introduce export-production. 
However, Japanese investment played a decisive role in introducing capital into 
Taiwanese agriculture during this early period of colonization. This witnessed the spread of 
irrigation and farm machinery to the cultivating peasants and also the introduction of new seeds. 
Thus, Japan took over 85% of Taiwan's exports between 1911 and 1940 and supplied over 74% 
of its imports, mainly, fertilisers, machinery, manufacture and fishery products. 
After the Second World War and the defeat of Japan, the impetus in Agrarian Reform and 
Rural Development came from the United States and its aid agencies. In Taiwan, the Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), with both American and Chinese members, 
advised on and monitored the radical programme of Land Reform during the period 1949-1953. 
The JCRR was created on October 1, 1948 after considerable lobbying at the US Congress 
chiefly by Dr Y С James Yen. Its formation was sanctioned given the danger of communist-
takeover in China and the JCRR was empowered to utilise massive funds available for rural 
reconstruction programmes under the US Law 472 which dealt with US economic aid to China. 
In 1949, the JCRR Headquarters was moved from Nanking to Taiwan, with a team of 36 
staff members. Moreover, in 1948, Taiwan signed a Bilateral Agreement with the USA which 
stipulated that the government should promote agricultural and industrial production and ensure 
economic stability. In collaboration with the JCRR, the USAID (US Agency for International 
Development) played an unprecedented role by laying the basis for Taiwan's industrial and 
agricultural development. 
Land Reforms were introduced between 1949 and 1953 with the main purpose to 
simplify the ownership system by eliminating sub-tenancy and absentee landlordism. The 
objective was to encourage production for the market, to force the peasants to look beyond his 
family and village needs and to raise productivity. Land Reforms involved three distinct phases : 
(i) rent reduction, (ii) sale of public land confiscated from the Japanese.and (iii) land-to-the tiller 
programme.25 In this manner, over 1/4 of Taiwan's private farmlands changed hands - families 
owning all or part of the land they tilled rose from 61% to 88% of all families; tenant farmers 
plummeted from 39% to 12% of all families during this period.26 
In Taiwan, land reform was a product of the populist streak in Chinese nationalism as 
their defeat in mainland China was attributed to the inequality of land ownership and partly 
because they themselves were not tied to the land. "Learning from the bitter experience of 
mainland China, the KMT sought to use land reform to blunt the appeal of Communism among 
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the peasantry, as well as eliminate the Taiwanese landlord class as a competing elite."27 The 
three-stage Land Reform Programme of 1949-1953 began by substantially reducing rents and 
giving tenants greater security. In 1952, the government sold off all the public lands to the land-
less farmers. The final stage required private owners to sell to the government all holdings above 
three hectares in exchange for government bonds and shares in state enterprises. The 
government then sold off these lands to tenants. 
Thus, while in 1952 owner-cultivators comprised 38% of the rural population, by 1965 
they had increased to 67%. Here, it is important to note that after the Land Reform Programme 
investments in land were not profitable, and this witnessed the shift of entrepreneurship to 
industry and commerce. The decisive factors that contributed to the success of the Land Reform 
programme in Taiwan were clearly spelt out by the former chairman of the JCRR, Dr Moniin 
Chiang, in the following words - as quoted by an authority on Land Reform in Taiwan : 
"He reminded me of the circumstances under which the land reform was initiated 
in Taiwan. It was during the difficult period in 1949 when the crossing of the 
Taiwan Straits by the mainland Communists were thought imminent. Second, he 
gave credit to such groundworks as the cadastral system and household 
registration, etc. which were laid during the years that the island was under the 
control of Japan...Third, he thanked the United States for the financial support and 
provision of experts on agricultural technology and production know-how...but he 
was understandably too modest to mention the role played by him and JCRR as 
catalytic agents in harnessing these factors into a winning combination."24 
As noted above, US aid played a key role in the industrial and agrarian development of 
Taiwan. Between 1951 to 1965, US aid to Taiwan contributed 34% of total gross investment. 
More than a third of the total allocation to specific sectors (i.e., US $ 1.1 billion) went to 
infrastructure and human resources and agriculture received about quarter of each, leaving 15% 
for industry. The bulk of investment in Taiwan's infrastructure in the period was funded by the 
US aid (over 74%) and more than half of agricultural investment came from the same source 
(59%). Thus, the importation of foreign capital and goods (mainly from the US) and their 
deployment in infrastructure and agriculture played a decisive role in private capital 
accumulation and laid the basis for Taiwan's rapid industrialisation.29 
The tightening of control over agriculture and the economic pressures experienced by the 
farming population resulted in migration to the cities and the urban centres. Between 1950 and 
1965, over one million farming people migrated to the cities, and another 860,000 between 1965 
and 1982. Those migrating were mainly youth, leaving behind an agrarian population of mostly 
ageing farmers; of those left behind, over 58% were over 30 years old, and nearly 50% were 
women farmers earning only 60% of what their male counterparts would earn.30 
In Taiwan, currently the rural sector is declining, although it is heavily subsidised by the 
State. Increasing pressure from imports as well as the predominant urban and industrial bias of 
government policy, has rendered farming a less lucrative occupation. Many farmers work only 
part-time at farming, working off the land to augment incomes. The fanning population which is 
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now about 16% of total Taiwanese population, is expected to drop to 9% by the year 2000, 
according to estimates provided by the Council for Economic Planning and Development.31 
American strategy to completely dominate the agricultural economy of Taiwan rested on 
the aid programme of PL (Public Law) 480 in the 1950s. Under this programme, more than US$ 
281 million worth of wheat and flour imports and $125 million worth of soybeans were unloaded 
on Taiwan during the period 1951-1968. Today, Taiwan is heavily dependent on the USA for its 
agricultural needs - nearly 85-95% of wheat imports, 95% of high-quality beef, and 56% of wine, 
are imported from the USA. Overall, USA accounts for over 40% of Taiwan's agricultural 
imports.32 
In Taiwan's rural society today, two key institutions symbolise the tight governmental 
control over the rural populace : the police and the so-called "farmers associations". As a 
government official described : "the police is the most important resource person of all for 
community development on the island." On the other hand, the "Farmers Associations" are 
"much more agencies assisting the penetration of state power into the countryside, then vehicles 
for village-level mobilisation or participation."33 
These Farmers' Associations, which were initially setup during Japanese occupation were 
later strengthened and institutionalised by the Taiwanese government with the guidance of the 
JCRR in the 1940s. Between 1949 and 1963, the JCRR provided grants equal to about US$ 5 
million to the Farmers' Associations to assist them in providing services (e.g., agricultural 
extension work, farm credits or construction of warehouses) to the farmers in the countryside.34 
From the above, it is evident that the Land Reform programme in Taiwan was possible 
not only because of stringent government policy to lay the base for sustained agricultural and 
industrial development, but one that was undoubtedly aided and supported for political and 
ideological reasons by the USA. Thus, "the agrarian policies in Taiwan were designed, with US 
assistance, to control the peasantry through certain benefits channeled through organisation from 
above, in order to guarantee political stability, while facing the influence of the example of 
radical reforms carried out in the People's Republic of China on the mainland."35 
This severe economic and political (ideological) control over the fanners exercised by the 
KMT government in collaboration with the US policy has evoked strong reactions from the 
farmers themselves. To quote one source : "(villagers) would not be surprised if one day the 
Government should take the position of the landlords...Some villages even said that in effect 
their land belongs to the nation and fanners are just its cultivators."36 
Generally, farmers have been considered as obstacles to the path of industrial and 
technocratic development that Taiwan has followed in the past decades. Indeed, "fanners were 
considered, at the very least, as problems, and at most, as obstacles that needed to be weeded 
away in the interest of development or pacified in the pursuit of political stability."37 
Today, the rural scenario in Taiwan is one in which the importance of agriculture to the 
overall economy has significantly declined, resulting in the removal of the central role of the 
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farmer in Taiwanese history during the pre-industrial period to one of subsidising a "necessary 
evil". In 1964, agriculture accounted for 28% of GDP and by 1988 it had dropped to just 5-
6%.38 
The resulting pressure on the farmers from government policy, foreign aid and dumping 
of US agricultural surplus on Taiwan, has sparked off marked reactions from the farming 
population beginning in 1988 with the formation of two independent farmer's associations. This 
step is significant in that it symbolises the sentiments of the Taiwanese farming population to 
speak out against government and agricultural trade policies that are detrimental to their interests 
and threaten to sacrifice them for the sake of industrial growth and US political and economic 
hegemony over Taiwan. 
2.4 South Korea : Land Reform, U.S. 
Food Dumping and Peasant Protest 
The 20th century Japanese occupation of Korea witnessed the take-over of direct control 
of Korean agriculture by acquiring large tracts of land. By 1942, 80% of forest and 25% of 
cultivated lands was in Japanese control. Japanese exploitation of Korean agriculture was 
primarily intended to siphon off the agrarian surplus to fuel Japan's rapid industrial development. 
This caused widespread rural pauperisation in Korea : 56% of farm households were left with 
only 5.6% of the land and rice consumption was halved from 1912 to 1936. The traditional 
Korean landed aristocracy was severely weakened by Japanese occupation and land take-over.39 
The path of rapid industrialisation adopted by South Korea after independence was 
closely aided by the US AMG (Army Military Government) that took over after the defeat of the 
Japanese in World War II. The Land Reform programme of 1949 basically aimed at making all 
farm lands owner-occupied and outlawing tenancy. The reforms, which set an upper limit of 3 
hectares, brought about the redistribution of over 40% of the total arable land and affected the 
majority of rural households. By 1974, 70% of farm households were fully owner-occupied. 
The decisive impact of these reforms is that it severely undermined the dominance of the 
traditional rural landowners, and by 1950s and 1960s, they left the land to pursue more lucrative 
investment opportunities in Korea's rapidly-developing industries. 
While agricultural productivity did increase due to the independence of the tiller: the land 
reform programme could not solve the problem of land fragmentation and proliferation of small 
and miniature farms. In 1962, miniature farms (i.e., under 0.5 hectares) comprised 51% of total 
farms. Moreover, this stagnation in agriculture was also accentuated by the dumping of huge 
shipments of grain (mostly wheat, barley and rice) from the USA under the PL 480 scheme. 
Between 1965 and 1985, South Korean food self-sufficiency fell from 93.9% to 48.5%.40 
This crisis in South Korean agriculture witnessed the natural tendency of rural to urban 
migration. The rural population declined from 56% in 1965 to 17% in 1988, which in absolute 
terms, is a decline from 15.8 million to 7.8 million people. The rate of migration to the cities has 
been one of the highest in Asia - approaching an average of 400,000 yearly during the mid-
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1980s.41 Thus, the long-term effect of land reform had been to drive both the richest and the 
poorest from the villages. 
The rapid industrial boom in South Korea in the 1960s left behind a stagnated agriculture, 
propped up by the dumping of American grains to feed the burgeoning population. In the post-
war period, therefore, Korea witnessed the inflow of US $ 4.5 billion in grant aid alone from the 
USA, much of it in the form of commodities, that is, about one half of the South Korean 
government revenue came from the USA. Further, the proportion of foreign capital in total 
investment in South Korea increased rapidly - from 42% in 1953 to 58% in 1955, rising to a peak 
of65%inl961.42 
South Korean agriculture is traditionally based on rice cultivation, which is the staple 
food of the Korean people. In 1985, about 1,237,000 ha out of a total of 1,780,000 ha was used 
for rice cultivation. The fanning population in South Korea was about 8,521,000 (or 21.1%) out 
of a total population of 40,467,000 as of 1985. Two decades earlier, in 1965, over 15,812,000 (or 
55.1%) were engaged in agriculture. Now just over 28% of the agricultural population is 
between the age of 20 and 49 years, and fanners over 60 years constitute about 14% of the rural 
population. Increasing migration to the cities and the industrial-bias of Korean development 
policy had resulted in a steady decline in the farming population over the years.43 
Farmers' debt per household exceeds over 4 million won. Between 1975 and 1985, the 
farmers' income recorded 6.57 times increase while the debt increased over 61.3 times. The 
number of fanners indebted has also rapidly increased - from 79.2% in 1976 to 98% in 1985. ** 
The government adopted the "Open Door Policy" in the agricultural sector after independence. 
This policy consisted of the following : (a) to encourage large scale enterprise for agricultural 
activities, (b) to encourage the farmers to grow extra items, like vegetables, fruits or livestock; 
and (c) to liberalise the import of foreign agricultural products and livestock. 
To sum up, the "economic success" of South Korea in agriculture is inseparable from US 
control and investment in that country. The rapid pace of industrialisation at the cost of a 
stagnating agricultural base was possible only through the "dumping" of US aid, especially food, 
on the Korean people. Naturally, this is the crucial link in the chain of US strategy in South 
Korea vis-a-vis its political and military policies in this part of Asia. ^ 
One of the populist responses of the government to the serious crisis in Korean 
agriculture in the 1970s was the introduction of the "Seamaul Undong" (New Community 
Movement). Its aim was to mobilise the rural masses to self-reliance, by organising farmers into 
cooperative production teams and work brigades to repair roads, bridges and rural infrastructure. 
It also included "rural beautification programmes" through which a number of villages were 
entirely re-built. "Seamaul, above all, was an intense campaign of moral and ideological 
indoctrination meant to defuse peasant dissatisfaction after years of neglect and to mobilise the 
peasantry behind a central government constantly worried about its legitimacy."47 
Farmers' agitations in South Korea had been widespread in the past two decades. These 
struggles have been led by national peasant associations viz., the Korean Catholic Farmers' 
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Movement, the Korean Christian Farmers' Federation, National Peasant Association, Catholic 
Womens' Farmers Association, and other independent peasant associations. In 1980s, the wave 
of farmers protests intensified signifying the deep crisis in Korean agriculture. Between 1980 and 
1988, for example, South Korean farmers agitated demanding, among others, the following : 
(a) restriction of imports of foreign products, 
(b) unfair domestic prices for farm products, 
(c) unreimbursed appropriation of lands, 
(d) against water-taxes, 
(e) lack of fair system of health insurance for fanners, and 
(f) for a democratic agriculture.48 
The 17th National General Assembly of the Korea Catholic Farmers' Movement was 
convened between January 27-29, 1986 on the theme : "Overcome the Monopoly, Dictatorship 
and Subjugation, and Realise Reunified Nation". This was followed by the National General 
Assembly of the Korea Christian Farmers' Federation between March 13-14,1986. As a result 
of these two Assemblies, and especially based on the assessment of the situation of the peasant 
movement, a Joint-Statement was published signed by members of the three national peasant 
movements viz., the Korean Catholic Farmers' Movement, the Korea Christian Farmers' 
Federation and the Catholic Peasant Women's Association entitled : "The Call of Ten Million 
Peasants on the Present National Situation". The statement, among others, pointed out the future 
course of action for the Korean peasant movement : 
"The peasantry is faced with the task of consolidating the struggle to prevent the 
disintegration of agriculture and the peasantry and the destruction of the national 
economy through an indiscriminate importation of foreign agricultural and 
livestock produce. This struggle will expose the reality and the nature of the 
foreign domination of Korea by the US and Japan, and the military 
dictatorship.'"" 
On March 1, 1989, the farmers unions banded together to form the "Chonnongnyon" 
(National Alliance of Farmers' Movements) composed of 20 free farmers societies and 80 
district chapters of the Catholic Farmers' Movement and 15 groups affiliated to the Christian 
Farmers' Federation.50 
The South Korean government admits it has a serious problem in agriculture on its hands. 
As the Assistant Minister of Trade and Industry, Kim Chul Soo, himself admitted : "The problem 
is political. Farmers feel they have been left out of the economic development South Korea has 
enjoyed in the past couple of decades."51 
In conclusion, it is clear from the above review of US policy in Asian agriculture and the 
imposition of a "top-down" Land Reform programme in the countries of Japan, Taiwan and 
South Korea; that while initially the Land Reform programmes in these countries attempted to 
reduce the inequalities in land ownership, they finally ended up detrimental to the genuine 
grievances of the peasantry and sacrificing national food security5 to foreign interests. The US 
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has clearly played a decisive role in the planning and implementation of Land Reforms in these 
three countries. Guided by its "National Security Doctrine" which outlined its strategic interests 
in aiding these countries to fight communism, the US strategy was based on winning over these 
governments through providing economic and technical assistance as a precondition to military 
protection to fight internal and external threats from communism. 
Land Reform was pivotal to US foreign policy implementation in Japan, Taiwan and 
South Korea after World War II. This was primarily because of the severe inequalities that 
prevailed in the Far-East during the pre-War period and also the fear that a disgruntled - and 
increasingly politicized - peasantry could be easily won over by communism and hence posed a 
threat to local and foreign elite interests. A radical and redistributive Land Reform programme 
was implemented - under US guidance and help - in these countries to appease the peasantry and 
to lay the economic base for rapid industrialisation and foreign capital and technological 
investment. This was evidently an economic and political strategy of the US to counter the 
increasing dominance of communist China in the region, and especially on its neighboring 
countries viz., Japan, Taiwan, South Korea. 
Land Reforms in these countries followed a general pattern of drastic redistribution of 
land to tillers and breaking up of large landholdings. This was backed with a huge investment in 
infrastructure and providing fertilisers and farm machinery to owner-cultivators to increase 
agricultural production. The US provided the necessary financial, logistic and military and 
technical assistance to undertake this programme on a massive scale in these countries. 
In addition, during the post-Land Reform period these countries were subject to the 
dumping of US agricultural surpluses and also pressurised to introduce export-crops for the US 
and other Western markets. The dependence of these countries on US aid and produce became 
complete, and was justified through political indoctrination and military power. Japan, Taiwan 
and South Korea, sacrificed their national food security to US interests and were thus 
incorporated into the US-led world capitalist system. 
In all these three countries, the peasants associations and peasant movements have 
prevailed for sometime and intensified their struggle in recent years. The Nichino in Japan the 
independent Farmers' Associations in Taiwan, and the Chonnongnyon (National Alliance of 
Farmers Movements) in South Korea, signify the determination of the peasants to defend their 
interests against both national agricultural policy and pressures from dumping of US produce. 
Hence, fanners in these countries have had a long experience of organisation and struggle against 
the State. In response, the governments of these countries - again, under the inspiration and 
collaboration of the US - set up "top-down" so-called "Farmers' Associations" and "Rural 
Development Programmes" : for example, the Village Rehabilitation Programme and the 
Cooperative Movement in Japan in 1932, the Farmers' Associations in Taiwan in the 1940s and 
the Seamaul Undong Movement in South Korea in the 1970s - to subjugate the peasantry and de-
politicise peasant associations. 
These programmes and associations not only served the economic objective of 
streamlining agricultural production and marketing, but were also politically-motivated in that 
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they contained a "counter-insurgency" element that is evident in its ideological impact over large 
sections of the peasantry in these countries. Under the political patronage of the local 
government and the heavy economic subsidy of its agricultural programmes, farmers in these 
countries have generally been subdued into submission. 
In sum, the peasantry in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea were subdued by the State and 
foreign interests. Although initially "successful", the Land Reform programmes in these three 
countries was subsequently followed by neglect and relegation of the peasantry to the backstage 
of an economic development model wherein micro-chip technology and capitalist development 
took precedence over agriculture which remains mainly an appendage to the dominant economic 
system. However, the increasing pressures on land and agricultural production vis-a-vis 
international trade and foreign exploitation has stimulated the peasantry in these countries to 
stand up and organise themselves in recent years. Also, increasing debt, rural-urban migration, 
export-production, foreign competition and dumping of food were some of the key issues 
around which the farmers' in these countries have re-organised themselves in recent years. 
The main political significance - which is indeed a "success story" of the Land Reform 
programme in these countries - was the attempt to eliminate the traditional and ideologically-
backward landlord class. Consequently, this removed the traditional rural elites in these societies 
opening up the possibility for the emergence of new enterprising farmers who capitalised on the 
new incentives for export-oriented agricultural production and politically allied themselves with 
the new industrial and commercial classes. The peasantry too benefited from this process in that 
there were now free from traditional landlord exploitation, but found themselves in the hands of 
a more dominant rural elite who were allied to powerful local and international interests. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INDIA 
3.1 Peasant Struggles in India under British Colonialism 
In India, peasant struggles during the colonial period tended to be sporadic and rather 
spontaneous. Exploitative British-colonial policy appropriated surplus from the traditional 
Indian society, through tax exactions, by introducing the landlord systems in agrarian relations, 
and the forced production of export crops (e.g., indigo, tobacco) at the expense of basic food 
crop production. In addition, the powerful control and exactions exercised by the rural elite (e.g., 
landlords, moneylenders, traders, businessmen and tax collectors) increased political and 
economic pressure on the peasantry. 
Thus, the peasant struggles during this period expressed grave resentment towards both 
forms of economic control i.e., British colonialism and the local rural elite. However, in the 
consciousness of the peasantry the fundamental cause for their state of deprivation and 
subjugation was the alien ruler. It was for this reason that most struggles during the colonial 
period in India were directed against British rule. Another factor that contributed towards 
directing the struggles against the British, was the interests of the local rural elites, who with the 
coming of the British had lost their traditional control and authority in the village. These rural 
elites, therefore, organized the peasantry, under their leadership, in an attempt to expel the 
British and restore their continued authority over the peasantry. 
In such instances, the peasantry expressed their loyalty to the traditional leaders by their 
militant participation. It was a spontaneous response on the part of the peasantry, but it was also 
an expression of their desire to better their situation. Although this was not to be realised by the 
eviction of the British and restoration of the traditional powers of landlordism. The extra-
economic powers of domination over the peasantry in this pre-capitalist situation was the most 
important factor to explain the expression of unconditional loyalty on the part of the peasantry to 
the local rural elite. 
Struggles against British colonialism also took another form. Particularly, among the 
tribals, and sections of the peasantry who were members of a dominant religious group, it took 
the form of "social banditry" or "millenarian movements". In this situation an individual leader, 
often charismatic in nature, or a religious doctrine played an important part in mobilising the 
peasantry in struggle. The fact that both these forms of ideological motivation of peasant 
consciousness had a strong influence on the peasantry resulted in these struggles taking on a very 
militant and violent form. These peasant struggles were localised and regionally-specific, often 
involving peasant classes from a particular village or geographical region. It hardly signified any 
organisational character of protracted struggle, rather they were spontaneous and, in some cases, 
suicidal in nature. 
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Various scholars of Indian history have documented numerous peasants struggles that 
took place during the colonial period. Specifically, Kathleen Gough made an important 
contribution by categorising those peasant struggles. In her cursory study of the peasant 
struggles in India, Gough documented 77 peasant revolts - the smallest of which involved 
several thousand peasants, about 30 revolts affecting tens of thousands, and about 12 which 
included several hundreds of thousand peasants.1 Gough classified these 77 peasant revolts into 
the following 6 main categories : 
(a) Restorative Movements : (Oudh revolts : 1778-81, Santhal tribal revolts : 1855-1856, 
Sepoy Mutiny : 1857-1858). 
These revolts were basically "backward-looking", that is, they attempted to restore an 
"old order". The goals of these revolts were complete annihilation or expulsion of the 
British and reversion to the previous government and agrarian relations.2 
(b) Religious Movements : (Moplah revolts : 1836-1896, Munda tribal struggles : 1890s, 
Bhil tribal movements : 1900-1912). 
These were primarily "millenarian movements" i.e., transformative rather than 
reformative in their expectation of a sudden and total change. The rebels believed that 
the "Golden Age" would be imminent and subject to some kind of supernatural 
intervention.3 
(c) Social Bandits : (Thuggee revolts : 1650-1850, Kallar tribal revolts : late 18th century to 
20th century) : 
These revolts were similar to the religious movements in that they too possessed religious 
cults, charismatic leadership and a belief in the fact that the struggles would eventually 
release the world from pain. These "bandits" were recruited from displaced or outcast 
groups and individuals - disbanded soldiers, unseated nobles, evicted peasants, 
unemployed artisans, outlaws of the state. 
(d) Terrorist Acts with Ideas of Vengeance and Justice : (Lusahai Kukis headhunting raids : 
first half of 19th century) 
These revolts were characterised by peasants attempting to seek vengeance for salvation. 
"The individual terrorist kills and risks his life for his community, in vengeance but also 
partly with a sense of group pride and natural justice, sometimes, with a religious belief 
that this is his unavoidable destiny and his road to salvation".4 
(e) Mass Insurrections : (Moplah uprisings : 1921, Indigo uprisings : 1860, Deccan peasant 
revolts : 1875) : 
In these revolts, peasants provided the leadership and were the sole or dominant force. 
All these uprisings involved tenants or small owner-cultivators and were against 
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economie deprivation resulting from British policies and, in most cases, also from 
landlord exactions. These revolts were sudden and dramatic and initially tried to redress 
particular grievances. The peasants started with peaceful mass boycotts, but fought back 
when reprisals were taken against them. 
(f) Modem Peasant Uprisings : (Tebhaga movement : 1946, Telangana uprising : 1946-1948, 
Tanjavur peasant struggles : 1948, Maoist peasant resistances : 1967-1970) : 
Most of these post-colonial peasant struggles were initiated and led by established 
Communist parties with a clear ideological and political programme. In general, their goal was 
to set up "People's Democracies" as a prelude to the transition to socialism throughout India. As 
Shah pointed out in a survey of literature on social movements in India, studies on Indian peasant 
movements have generally revolved around the following main questions : (a) who among the 
peasants participated in the movement ? (b) which class of peasants has the greatest potential to 
bring about a revolutionary or radical changes in the agrarian structure ? (c) what strategies and 
styles did leaders adopt in organising and mobilising peasants ? (d) what values do they evoke in 
them ? and (e) what modus operandi was evolved by the leaders in mobilising peasants ? 5 
In this Chapter on peasant struggles in India we shall consider the above questions in 
relation to concrete peasant struggles in the post-independent period of Indian history viz., the 
All India Kisan Sabha, the Tebhaga and Telangana struggles, the Naxalite movement and others. 
3.2 The All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) 
During 1930s the Indian national movement against British rale was gaining momentum 
under the leadership of the Indian National Congress, which had as its main goal the expulsion of 
the British and the establishment of a "free and independent India". The Congress was the 
platform from which India's freedom struggle was launched. However, within the ranks of the 
Congress party there were varied perspectives of the nature of a "free and independent India". A 
significant section of the Leftists within the Party formed a coalition viz., the Congress Socialist 
Party (CSP) which turned its attention to the predominant agrarian sector, where the majority of 
the Indian people earned their livelihood. The hardships of the Indian peasantry were a direct 
result of the exploitative colonial agrarian policy coupled with landlordism and exactions from 
moneylenders, merchants and others. "Freedom" and "Independence" for the CSP meant 
bringing about radical transformation in the agrarian sector of Indian society. 
It was during the National Conference of the CSP in January 1936 in Uttar Pradesh that 
the decision was taken to establish the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) - The All India Peasants 
Organisation. Swami Sahajananda Saraswati, the peasant leader from Bihar, was elected the first 
President of the AIKS. The AIKS laid down its chief objectives as follows : 
(1) Complete freedom from economic exploitation of the peasantry and to achieve full 
economic and political power for the peasants, workers and all other exploited classes, 
through the active participation in the nationalist struggle for independence. 
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(2) Whereas the present system of landlord-tenant relationship is unjust and burdensome to 
the peasants, all such systems of landlordism should be abolished and all rights to land 
vested in the hands of the cultivators. 
(3) The abolition of all systems of land revenue and resettlement imposed by the British 
government resulting in the pauperisation of the peasantry.6 
The establishment of the AIKS was a historic step in the history of the freedom struggle 
in India, especially as it signified a national organisational structure for the Indian peasantry. 
Moreover, it projected a vision of an "independent India" that would enable the peasantry to free 
themselves of colonial/landlord oppression. In this vein, the perspective went far beyond the 
Congress-led national movement. However, the AIKS's weakness at this initial stage was its 
attempt to reconcile the contradictory interests of various sections/classes of the peasantry that 
included the rich peasants to landless labourers, and unite them on a common platform. The 
emphasis was on unity and on immediate demands that would appeal to all sections of the 
peasantry.7 The attitude of the AIKS towards the Indian National Congress became clear by 
1938 during its Third session held in Comilla (now Bangladesh): 
"The Kisan Sabha must be a separate and autonomous organisation. It is danger-
ous to agree that the Congress is a peasant organisation because 95 per cent of its 
members are peasants... in that case it should reflect the class interests of the 
peasants and cease to be dominated by those who fatten on the exploitation of the 
peasants".8 
The resolutions adopted during this meeting clearly challenged the Congress to take note 
of the daily sufferings of the peasantry, and warned that the peasants would loose their 
confidence in the Congress if it continued to be dominated by vested interests and upper classes. 
Further, it was in 1940 that the first serious treatment of the agrarian question was taken 
up by the AIKS. The AIKS stated that money-lending and commercial capital was intimately 
connected with the existing propriety interests in the Indian countryside, and this cannot support 
any radical alteration in the present agrarian order ! It called for the socialist reorganisation of 
agriculture which would alone solve the agrarian problem in the country. "Unless the whole land 
system is thoroughly overhauled and reconstructed on the principle of socialism, no permanent 
relief can be given to the peasantry."9 
The AIKS was clearly heading for a confrontation with the Congress Party in the course 
of the consolidation of the Indian national movement. The increasing influence of Marxist 
ideology and the Communist party (banned from 1934 to 1942 by the British colonial 
government) on the AIKS was marked by the latter politically differentiating itself from the 
mainstream of the national movement. Although the AIKS claimed to be an independent 
organisation of the Indian peasants, the influence of the ideology of the Communist party was 
quite apparent from the political resolutions of the AIKS during this time. And yet, the AIKS 
held that : 
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"despite the fact that various political trends, Communist and non-Communist, 
have always been at work in the AIKS, it had never identified itself with any of 
them. Neither has it today identified itself with the Communist party which is 
represented in the Kisan Sabha in prepondering numbers. The Kisan Sabha has 
always remained and does remain today an independent mass organisation of the 
peasants with an independent policy of its own and is not deflected from that 
policy on any account."10 
With the AIKS gradually opting for a more radical political programme from the 
Congress, the militant peasant struggles during this period resulted in internal contradictions 
within the AIKS itself. Some sections within the AIKS, especially petty landowners and middle 
peasants, joined the Congress as the national movement developed. This internal crisis, together 
with the British repression on militant peasant struggles in the 1940s, drove the leaders of the 
AIKS underground. 
A unique accomplishment of the AIKS was its success in uniting Hindus and Muslims 
within its ranks. This was particularly significant because during this period the Hindu and 
Muslim leaders were negotiating with the British on the status and identity of these two 
communities after independence. At the Seventh session of the AIKS held in Bakna Kalan, 
Punjab in April 1943, the AIKS passed the following resolution: 
"to organise a unity campaign in the rural areas all over the country to promote 
unity between the Hindus and the Muslims masses, between various castes and 
communities, and between all patriotic sections of the towns and villages."11 
In the AIKS women actively participated, and this fact was recognised in a resolution 
adopted by the AIKS in 1945 : "This time the peasant struggle is not fought by menfolk alone but 
women also have shown their interest, initiative and militancy. They have participated in large 
numbers, performed heroic deeds in beating the enemy and saving the honour of the Red Rag as 
well as their own."12 The AIKS was truly an organisation of the Indian peasantry, with its 
leadership dominated by radical socialists of the CSP and the Communist party. Right through 
the history of the Indian national movement, the AIKS was stimulating its members to adopt 
more militant actions against British colonial rule and landlord oppression. However, the first 
real test case for the AIKS militancy was the "Tebhaga struggle" in Bengal in 1946. The 
significance of his struggle lies not only in its militancy and effectiveness, but also in that it laid 
the basis for a more protracted peasant uprisings in the period after independence in India. 
3.3 Peasant Resistance under Communist Party Leadership 
"These revolts were politically progressive in that they sought a new state of 
peasant society which would combine freedom from alien rule together with some 
traditional virtues and modern democracy and popular government, rather than 
merely reverting to pre-British social structures.' 
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i. The Tebhaga Peasant Struggle (1946-47) 
In 1940 the Land Revenue Commission recommended that "two-thirds of the harvested 
crop would go to the cultivator and the remaining one-third to the owner." This recommendation 
was not implemented which angered the cultivators as this demand was finally accepted after 
many years of militant peasant struggle in Bengal. In 1943, the Great Bengal famine devastated 
the meager living of thousands of cultivators. While millions of poor peasants and tenant 
cultivators were starving to death, the class of rich landowners fed themselves on the food 
produced by the starving peasantry. In the aftermath of this famine, the situation was ripe for a 
militant peasant movement to force the implementation of the Tebhaga demand i.e., two-third of 
the share of the crop. Though this struggle was strongly supported by the Peasant Organisation 
(Kisan Sabha) of Bengal and the Communist Party, it was largely a spontaneous peasant revolt in 
response to the peasants not receiving their just share of the produce. 
The Bengal Provincial Peasant Organisation (Kisan Sabha) gave the call for the Tebhaga 
struggle in September 1946. They popularised slogans to articulate the tebhaga demand, like : 
"Stack the paddy in your house", "We want Tebhaga", "Long Live the Revolution."14 
The Tebhaga struggle first began in Dinajpur district and later spread to the region then 
known as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Leaders of the Peasant Organisation went from 
village to village popularising the Tebhaga slogans and inviting the participation of the share-
croppers and poor peasants. 
One source describes the nature of mobilisation of the peasantry during the Tebhaga 
struggle as follows : 
"The cultivators response was overwhelming and spontaneous. Within a 
fortnight the movement spread to 22 out of the 30 police stations in the Dinajpur 
district...Several thousand peasant enrolled as volunteers. The peasants from one 
village were called upon to assist those of another, not by the beating of drums but 
by shouting 'Inquilab'. The carrying of lathis (sticks) was compulsory for 
volunteers.' 
The police tried to repress the movement with force. With increasing repression, the 
Peasant Organisation was confronted with the dilemma whether or not to resist to ensure success 
of the peasant struggle. However, the militant peasants continued to confront police repression 
and forcibly retain their two-thirds share of the crop. The leadership of the Kisan Sabha 
remained divided on the question of the future of the Tebhaga struggle. 
Some leaders advocated a more radical approach to further the gains of the struggle. 
They put forward the slogan : "Land to the Tiller". But the immediate question was how to resist 
police repression. If the government succeeded in crushing the movement there would certainly 
be great demoralisation among the peasants. As there was no clear directive in terms of tactics to 
resist repression, the movement was allowed to drift. 
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The Tebhaga movement received widespread support from poor cultivators and middle 
peasants. The leadership was in the hands of the Peasant Organisation and cadres of the 
Communist party. A survey of two villages carried out by Krishna Kant Sarkar indicates the 
nature of the class composition of the Tebhaga struggle : In the first village, over 65% of the 
peasant families were poor and those who actively participated in the struggle constituted over 
89%. In the second village, over 41.7% were poor and their participation was nearly 100%. 
The main reason for such active participation of the poor peasants and cultivators was the 
fact that the Tebhaga demand offered the sharecroppers and additional gain of one-fourth of the 
crop. It was found that in the first village, about 6.6% of the peasants did not join the movement 
because they were wage-labourers, and as such, they had no prospect of economic gain in the 
Tebhaga movement. Further, in the same village, about 4.45% of the poor peasants were 
opposed to the Tebhaga struggle as they were supporters of the Congress party, which was the 
main rival to the Communist party that led the Tebhaga struggle. 
Among middle-farmers, 66% in the first village and 32.29% in the second village 
supported the Tebhaga struggle. The middle-farmers stood to gain from the Tebhaga movement 
as they cultivated extra lands as share-croppers. Only 5% and 29% respectively, in the first and 
second villages, were opposed to the Tebhaga struggle, and again, the main reason was that they 
belonged to the Congress party. The rich families formed 8.6% and 3.2% of the total families 
respectively. Of such families, only 33.3% took part in the movement from the first village.16 
Similar figures from other villages in Bengal show that it was predominantly the poor 
peasants and middle peasants who provided the chief participants in the Tebhaga struggle. It was 
only those sections of the rich farmers who stood in conflict with the big landowners and thus 
stood to gain from the struggle, who supported Tebhaga. 
While the Tebhaga struggle was largely a spontaneous phenomenon, the Communist 
Party and the Peasant Organisation played a decisive role in providing the movement with 
leadership. However, this leadership role was only in the later stages as the movement 
developed. Sarkar identified two main groups that exercised this leadership within the Tebhaga 
movement : 
"... the leaders who came as members of the Communist party to uphold the 
peasants' cause without personal interest; and those local leaders who personally 
suffered because of the extant socio-economic system. At the initial stages of 
organisation, the leaders of the first group was less effective and had little direct 
contribution. It was the local leadership that was most effective in the formative 
stages. The leaders of the first group assumed bigger role when the organisation 
developed."17 
The militant Tebhaga struggle developed during the turbulent period of 1946-47 when 
India was on the eve of gaining independence from British rule. This was also the period marked 
by intense communal violence between Hindus and Muslims. The fact that the Communist Party 
put forward radical slogans of total structural change in India resulted in its isolation from the 
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political mainstream of the Indian national movement. This was seen by the Congress as a 
"threat to the nation's interests". 
Thus, the Congress viewed the Tebhaga struggle as basically a "law and order" problem 
to be solved by police repression. The following is a statement from a leading Congress Member 
in the Bengal Assembly: "... there is not merely a general wave of unrest but of lawlessness and 
defiance of authority...It is a matter of great regret to the government that innocent law-abiding 
cultivators have fallen a prey to this agitation and have resorted to such steps as made it 
incumbent on our forces of law and order to use force against force."18 
Yet, it is clear that the experiences of the Tebhaga struggle had a significant impact on 
the peasantry in Bengal inspite of the ruthless repression unleashed on it by the police. The 
struggle collapsed basically because the struggling peasantry were unable to defend themselves 
from intense repression. The significance of this struggle lies in the fact that it laid the basis, 
through its militancy and organisational abilities, for the emergence of more organised struggles 
in Bengal after independence. In fact, this was the first militant experience of the Bengal 
peasantry under the guidance and support of the Communist party. Many of the key leaders and 
peasant organisers of this struggle were to join the forces of the Communist party in the later 
peasant struggles in Bengal. According to M.A. Rasul, a key leader of the Kisan Sabha, there 
were a number of significant gains of the Tebhaga struggle : 
"it instilled in (the peasants) a spirit of fighting and sacrificing as well as a sense 
of camaraderies..it taught them that nothing could be achieved by them without 
organised class struggle; that agricultural workers and poor peasants including 
cultivators, must unite for struggle; that peasant women have an important part to 
play in their class struggle through which they imbibe a sense of class solidarity 
and self-respect; that the exploiting classes are always treacherous in a class 
struggle; and that the movement should be pursued further with adequate 
preparation and better political understanding."19^ 
On the other hand, the Tebhaga movement had specific weaknesses which prevented it 
from providing the necessary impetus for similar struggles in other parts of India. The leadership 
was clearly unable to consolidate the struggle of Tebhaga and proceed further into stimulating 
mass peasant revolts. Another weakness was the fact that the struggle was unable to develop a 
volunteer force for defence of the peasants from escalating police repression and landlord 
attacks. The peasants could not enlist enough support from the working class and the urban 
middle class, which resulted in their isolation and hence succumbing to police repression. 
ii. The Telangana Peasant Uprising : (1946-1951) 
(a) Social background 
The state of Hyderabad was ruled by the Nizam, a Muslim, from around 1720. The 
majority of state officials were Muslims. They also controlled law and education in the State. 
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While the official languages of the state were Urdu and English, the medium of instruction in 
schools and colleges run by the State was Urdu. The character of the State was projected as 
being Muslim.20 There were three distinct linguistic regions within the state : Telangana (9 
districts of Telugu-speaking people), Marathwada (5 districts of Marathi-speaking people), and 
Kamataka (3 Kannada-speaking districts).21 
The agrarian systems of Hyderabad state was characterised by a feudal-type landlord 
system, known as the peasant proprietary system. About 60 per cent of the land in the state was 
under the proprietary revenue system and the remaining 40 per cent was under the direct control 
of the Nizam, the overlord, and his sub-lords.22 
The deshmuks (landlords) exercised tremendous control in the Telangana countryside 
mainly due to the expansive area of land under their control. One landlord controlled more than 
1,500 acres of dry land, while another had more than 1,000 acres of wet land. ^ The landlords 
also exercised their political authority as moneylenders, magistrates and "village officials". The 
people had to address these powerful landlords as "master" or "lord of the village". The 
notorious exactions that the landowners imposed on the peasantry in Hyderabad state was 
legitimised by a system of "forced labour" called the vetti system under which a landlord could 
force a family from among his customary retainers to cultivate his land and to do one job or the 
other - whether domestic, agricultural or official - as an obligation to the master. Most of the 
agricultural labourers, on whom the vetti obligations fell, were from the lower and untouchable 
castes. 
Many of the Telangana peasantry became serfs under the forced labor system. They were 
under feudal bondage to the landlords, and were also bound through indebtedness to the same 
landowner. When the peasant died the debt was inherited by his heir. The result was generations 
of agricultural labourers did not receive any wages for their work. This enabled the landlords to 
cultivate their large holdings while paying the most minimal wages. 
Two major developments in the otherwise backward region of Telangana affected the 
agrarian economy in the state viz., (i) the development of irrigation facilities and cultivation of 
commercial crops - groundnuts, tobacco, castor oil seeds - which gained increasing prominence 
after 1925, and (ii) the development of commercial farming did not bring about any development 
in industry, growth of towns, transport or communication facilities. Thus, the peasantry 
continued to rely on the traditional money-lenders, traders, merchants and businessmen from 
urban areas who exercised immense control over the market in Telangana and other districts in 
the state. 
These developments began to affect significantly the class structure of the state, and in 
particular the feudal landlord system. There was gradual growth of rich-peasants who began to 
challenge the feudal landowners and the feudal exactions {vetti system) imposed on the 
cultivators. These new class contradictions provided the necessary impetus for the political 
mobilisation of the peasants against the feudal agrarian relations that prevailed in Telangana at 
the time. 
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(b) Early Political developments and 
Peasant mobilisation in Telangana 
Hyderabad was a multilinguistic state (the main languages being Telugu and Tamil) yet 
Islam and the Urdu language were imposed. This resulted in the rise of communalism among 
other ethnic communities and language groups. 
The Telugu-speaking community was perhaps the most conscious of its language and 
ethnic identity, and firmly opposed the imposition of Islam and Urdu in Hyderabad. Sections 
within the Telugu-speaking community, primarily the petit-bourgeois elite, launched the Andhra 
Jana Sangham on November 12, 1923 to preserve their language and culture. This communal 
organisation was set up with the following objectives : establishment of libraries, felicitation of 
Telugu pandits (i.e., wise man), development of research in Telugu language and culture, and 
spreading education among the people. Gradually, the Andhra Jana Sangham developed into 
a social reform movement and protested against social evils such as the vetti system, purdah, and 
child marriages. 
But with the steady decline of the Andhra Jana Sangham by 1930, the Andhra 
Mahasabha came into prominence based on the following objectives : reduced land revenue 
rates, abolition of the vetti system, introduction of Telugu in the local courts.25 This radical 
shift in the objectives of the Andhra Mahasabha was to bring it in direct conflict with the 
Hyderabad state and the ruling Muslim elite. 
Early communist influence in this region commenced with the establishment of the 
Andhra Communist party in September 1934. By 1936 regional-level peasant organisations were 
formed in the state which affiliated themselves to the All India Kisan Sabha. The major support 
for the Communists in Andhra was from the caste of Kammas, well-to-do peasant proprietors, 
who provided the party with funds and workers, in a way to express their opposition to their 
arch-rivals - Brahmins and Reddys - dominating the Congress. When the Communist party 
was banned in 1940, the communists worked through "front organisations", like the Andhra 
Mahasabha and Kisan Sabha, which increasingly came under the influence of the communist 
party and ideology. 
The Andhra Mahasabha had paid no serious attention to the feudal agrarian situation in 
Hyderabad until the Communist party exercised its influence over the leaders of the Mahasabha. 
Between 1940-42 the leadership of the Andhra Mahasabha, influenced by the Communist Party, 
began to deliver speeches calling for a more radical transformation of the agrarian system in 
Hyderabad. When the ban on the Communist party was lifted in 1942 the Communist Party 
began demanding radical agrarian reforms. The communist influence in the Andhra Mahasabha 
was made complete with the election of two young communists, Ravi Narayan Reddy and 
Badam Yella Reddy, as the President and Secretary respectively.27 Between 1944-46 
communist activities spread to Nalgonda, Jangaon, Suryapet, Huzumagar, Bhongir and other 
districts in Hyderabad state. The young communists within the Andhra Mahasabha, guided by 
the Communist Party, went about mobilising the peasantry and agricultural labourers and 
recruiting them into the Sabha and the Communist Party. 
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During this period some basic Marxist literature was translated into Telugu and gained 
popularity among the people. The Communist Party of India (CPI) also organised "political 
classes" for its cadres. There were two main themes : (i) The National Movement, the 
International Situation, Party organisation and Marxist theory, and (ii) The Revenue system of 
Hyderabad, students, women and the trade union movement. The CPI cadres who participated in 
these classes were the ones who later played a crucial role in organising the Telangana peasant 
insurrection. 
However, there was one main contradiction within the Communist party, which greatly 
influenced its strategy and perspective of struggle in Telangana. Many leading communists 
within the party in Telangana, as in the rest of Hyderabad state, were wealthy landowners and 
members of the rural elite. Thus, their class interests were clearly reflected in the Communist 
party's demands during the course of the struggle i.e., "in promoting a class alliance between the 
rich and small holders, tenant cultivators and the landless labourers against those isolated land-
lords and rich landholders who were either inconsiderate to their tenant-cultivators or paid poor 
wages to their labourers".28 
Keeping in line with the Party's collaborationist policy with regard to the Indian National 
movement, the political emphasis was on a "nationalist" and therefore "multi-class" line. The 
contradiction in this "multi-class" approach vis-a-vis the practical strategy and tactics adopted in 
the course of the Telangana insurrection became clear in the ensuing years. It created further 
dissension within the ranks of the Communist Party and contributed towards its first major split 
in 1962. 
(c) Peasant Insurrection in Telangana 
The period of 1944-46 of Communist Party activities and political campaigns in the 
Telangana region contributed towards militant peasant struggles in Nalgonda, Warangal and 
other districts. There was a general spontaneous response from the peasantry towards these 
mobilisation campaigns. The salient features of the struggle during this initial period according 
to Dhanagare was as follows : "large masses of peasants spontaneously participated in the 
struggles directed against the government, landlords and their agents. The insurgents had neither 
firearms nor the training required to use them. A few volunteer groups had come into existence. 
They were not well-organised guerilla squads as such, but were rather spontaneous formations 
that responded to each situation. Initially, therefore, the revolt was spasmodic."29 
With the independence of India and Pakistan the British gave the provincial states the 
option to either remain autonomous or join India or Pakistan. The Nizam, backed by his Muslim 
nobility, declared Hyderabad independent on August 27, 1947. This decision brought about 
communal conflicts between the Muslim nobility who choose independence, and the Hindu 
majority population, which wanted to join the Indian union. 
This development brought about a tactical political alliance between the Congress and the 
Communist party in common opposition to the Nizam and the Muslim nobility. Although the CP 
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had launched a radical agrarian struggle in the Telangana countryside, it now joined forces with 
the nationalist movement inspired by Mahatma Gandhi. Two definite, and obviously 
contradictory perspectives and interests, had merged tactically into one united movement against 
the Nizam. Meanwhile, the fundamentalist Muslim elite i.e., the Majlis Jttehad mobilised a para-
military force called the Razakars to carry out violent attacks against anti-Nizam groups. They 
raided and plundered the troubled villages, arrested or killed suspected and potential agitators, 
terrorised the innocent, and also abducted women all over Hyderabad. They were particularly 
vicious in Telangana, where the rural mass of peasantry was coming under the communist 
influence !3 0 
Sundarayya provides us a balance-sheet of the wave of repression that was unleashed on 
the Telangana peasantry : 
"As many as 4,000 communists and peasant militants were killed; more than 
10,000 were thrown into detention camps and jails for a period of 3-4 years... A 
minimum of 50,000 people were dragged into police and military camps from 
time to time to be beaten tortured and terrorised for weeks and months at a time. 
Hundreds of thousands of people in thousands of villages were subjected to police 
and military raids and suffered cruel brutalities; the military and police looted or 
destroyed properties worth millions of rupees; thousands of women were 
molested and subjected to all sorts of humiliations and indignities".31 
The Telangana struggle was to provide the model for militant peasant protests and the 
basis for future programmes of "agrarian revolution". According to Sundarayya, the following 
were the main achievements of the Telangana struggle : 
(1) Village Governments were set up in more than 3,000 villages, with a population of about 
3 million, in an area of about 16,000 square miles (Nalgonda, Warangal and Khammam 
districts), 
(2) In these villages people's committees guided the seizure of land from landlords (over 1 
million acres) and redistributed it among the peasantry, 
(3) All evictions were stopped and the forced labour service was abolished, 
(4) Exorbitant rates of usury were either drastically cut or forbidden, 
(5) Daily wages of agricultural labourers were increased and minimum wages was enforced, 
(6) For a 12-18 month period the entire administration in these areas was conducted by 
village peasant committees, and 
(7) The people organised and built a powerful militia, comprised of 10,000 village squads 
and about 2,000 regular guerilla squads, to defend the peasantry. 
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India became independent on August 15, 1947 when a "Standstill Agreement" was signed 
between the Indian government and the Nizam of Hyderabad. But with the escalation of the 
armed peasant struggle in Telangana and violent campaigns of the Razakars against the Hindu 
population, the government of India ordered its Army into Hyderabad on September 14, 1948. 
Politically and militarily this was a two-pronged attack:- (i) to defeat the forces of the Nizam and 
annex the state into the Indian union, (ii) to crush the armed resistance of the Telangana 
peasantry and the Communist party. 
As a result of the widespread repression and arrests the Communist party was in a state of 
disarray. Thousands of members were arrested and many resigned from the party after being 
subject to cruel torture. From an original membership of thousands by the end of 1948 the party 
strength dwindled to hundreds. Fifty to hundred members were left in each taluka (district). The 
guerillas were not able to fight against the army in the plains and they were forced to move into 
forest areas for self-defence. 
Severely beaten by the Indian Army's "pacification campaign" in Telangana the CP 
formally withdrew the struggle in October, 1951. Why was this peasant resistance, which began 
with a spontaneous response from the peasantry and showed signs of developing into a mass 
peasant insurrection under CP leadership, suddenly called off by the Party leadership ? What 
were the objective conditions that contributed to this withdrawal and what was its impact on the 
future course of action of the CP and the Telangana peasantry ? We shall turn to these questions 
in the next section. 
(d) Ideological rifts within the Communist Party 
The significant shifts in the ideology and political positions of the international 
communist movement in the post-World War II period had a definite impact on the Communist 
party in India. The Indian CP was increasingly influenced by the political developments in 
China, where Mao Tse Tung was guiding a protracted people's war against the forces of the 
Koumingtang. The Second Congress of the CP, held in Calcutta in 1948, called for a "People's 
Democratic Front" : a class alliance of the working class, peasantry and the revolutionary 
intelligentsia, under working class leadership. Their slogan was the attainment of a democratic 
state of workers, peasants and the petit-bourgeoisie, through a one-stage people's democratic 
revolution, through violent means. " 
During this Congress, B.T. Ranadive, General-Secretary of the Communist Party of India 
proclaimed : "Telengana is another big landmark in the history of the struggle under the 
leadership of the Party. Here we took the struggle to new qualitative heights with exemplanr 
organisation ... Telangana today means Communists and Communists means Telangana." 
The Andhra CP went even further to propose a 4-class strategy for the struggle in Telangana 
known as the "Andhra Letters". In short, this meant the following : feudalism and imperialism 
were considered the main enemy and a two-stage revolution was proposed which included 
alliances with a section of the (middle) bourgeoisie, the middle classes and the peasantry under 
the leadership of the working class for armed struggle.35 
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The Andhra letters which was a clear attempt to apply the Chinese experience and the 
writings of Mao Tse Tung to the Indian situation stated : -
"Our revolution in many respects differs from the classical Russian revolution and 
is to a great extent similar to that of the Chinese revolution. The perspective is 
likely not that of general strikes and a general rising leading to the liberation of 
the rural areas; but the dogged resistance and prolonged civil war in the form of 
an agrarian revolution, culminating in the capture of political power by the 
democratic front."36 
The Telangana peasant uprising was primarily an armed struggle of the poor peasants and 
agricultural labourers against a local system that had oppressed them for generations. However, 
the international tactics of the communist movement, specifically Russia's national policy and 
endorsed by the Communist Party of India undermined that local struggle. Its revolutionary 
objectives were sacrificed for parliamentary politics, its achievements, realised only for a short 
while, failed to live up to the aspirations of its key participants. Nevertheless, it laid the 
objective basis for an ideological debate within the Communist Party with regard to the nature of 
agrarian resistance and the role of various social classes in the process of revolutionary 
transformation in India. 
(e) The Lessons of the Telangana peasant uprising 
The Telangana peasant uprising made a significant contribution to agrarian protest in 
India. As Dhanagare notes : "If seizure of power and sustaining it for a considerable period of 
time is taken as the touchstone of success then, perhaps, no other peasant revolt or movement in 
India was more successful than the one in Telangana."37 According to Pavier and Dhanagare, 
among the lessons of that experience that were to significantly influence the future course of 
peasant resistance, were the following : 
(1) Telangana was the first widespread armed struggle of the Indian peasantry under the 
leadership of the Communist Party. The backbone of the struggle was constituted by 
poor peasants, tenant-cultivators and agricultural labourers. Based on a revolutionary 
ideology of struggle for a People's Democracy and a socialist reorganisation of agrarian 
relations, it attained a protracted political mobilisation of the peasantry. In the course of 
the struggle, the movement developed very effective strategies and tactics to counter the 
violence of the "landlords" and the Indian army - although only for a short time. 
(2) The cultural action adopted during the struggle, especially in its formative stages, proved 
extremely useful and effective in mobilisation campaigns and political education. 
Revolutionary songs, dramas and a popular type of mobile theatre helped immensely in 
propagating radical ideas and motivating the peasantry to action. Later, many of these 
methods were to be used again in peasant revolts in Andhra and other parts of India. 
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(3) The Village Government (Gram Raj) set up in the villages of Telangana during this 
uprising, was a major contribution to the peasantry's first experience of exercising and 
controlling power in the villages. It was basically an alternative village power structure : 
"when the peasantry comes forward to seize land and takes up arms to defend it under the 
leadership of a revolutionary peasant committee, the latter becomes the embryonic organ 
of power."38 
(4) The women also played a significant role in the Telangana struggle. The traditional 
attitude towards women's role continued to prevail, and could not be erased easily. 
However, a considerable number of women were active in guerrilla squads and "gram 
raj" committees - one of them even became a member of an Area Committee. But there 
was much controversy about their participation. Sundarayya cites one such experience : 
"In the course of our campaigns, our squads met many women in small groups. They 
narrated their sufferings and our women cadres in the squads condemned the present 
superstition and encouraged them to fight back against their sufferings. But instead of 
elaborating their sufferings that arose mainly from the social system, and the government 
that maintained it, there was a tendency to attribute them mainly to the menfolk. One 
women, after our squads exhortation, went to the extent of declaring that she would make 
her husband cook the food. The leadership pointed out now this approach would only 
lead to domestic trouble, instead of the women being drawn into the fight against the 
present social and political system."39 
(5) After the Telangana struggle the Communist Party had many debates on agrarian protest, 
resistance in general, and the relevance and limitations of armed peasant struggle. This 
debate as well as the precise role of various stratas of the peasantry in the process of a 
revolutionary struggle in the agrarian sector was to plague the ideology of the Communist 
Party and its approach to the agrarian question. The armed struggle experience in 
Telangana led to future political debates which later caused dissension and polarisation. 
The Tebhaga and Telangana peasant struggles have been defined as "mass peasant 
insurrections" or "mass peasant uprisings" by scholars because they possess both a quantitative 
dimension and a distinct qualitative aspect that separates them from the other forms of peasant 
revolts in colonial India. In these peasant struggles the masses of the peasantry not only 
provided the social base for the movement but also contributed significantly to the leadership. 
Motivated by relative economic deprivation these struggles sought to overcome the exploitative 
nature of British policies and local landlord exactions. Yet, these revolts lacked a clear vision of 
a society to be established after the expulsion of the British. They, therefore, fell an easy victim 
to the vested interests of the rural elite. These revolts merely brought about a class realignment 
in the rural society and failed to realise radical restructuring of the agrarian relations to the bene-
fit of the peasantry. 
The Tebhaga struggle in Bengal and the Telangana struggle in Hyderabad during the 
period 1946-51 marked an important stage in the history of peasant protest in India. Firstly, 
these peasant revolts received organisational leadership from the All-India Kisan Sabha and the 
Communist Party of India which enabled the struggle to be sustained over a period of time. 
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Ideologically this leadership brought to the peasantry a new vision of the future society and 
radical demands to restructure agrarian relations in the Indian countryside. Strategically, the 
actual methods of struggle and resistance found articulation and effectiveness under the trained 
and equipped leadership of the AIKS and the CP. 
Secondly, these peasant revolts erupted during a period in Indian history that was marked 
by escalating nationalist sentiments and a developing nationalist movements led by the Congress 
Party. This fact provided an additional impetus for the active mobilisation of the peasantry. 
Further, to voice the fundamental grievances of the peasantry and seek radical changes as part of 
the nationalist programme for "freedom" and "independence" from British rule. These struggles 
therefore signified a strange mixture of "Indian nationalism" and "agrarian radicalism". 
Thirdly, these two struggle under the leadership of the AIKS and the CP were to be the 
first organisational experience for the peasantry in a protracted and militant struggle inspired by 
a radical ideology. More specifically, it was the first test of Marxist ideology in the agrarian 
context of India. In this respect, these two struggles marked a stage of emerging political 
consciousness of the peasantry along radical Marxist lines and was to provide the basis for the 
political support from the peasantry for the Communist Party(s) in the future. 
The failure of both these struggles to bring about a radical change in the agrarian situation 
in India was due, not only to the failure of these struggles to defeat State repression, but more 
important, because of ideological contradictions within the leadership and the peasantry. The 
strategic limitations of the multi-class approach of these movements and the fact that peasant 
militancy was reduced to a strategy of "individual guerrilla warfare", directly contributed to the 
collapse of the struggles. 
Moreover, the international pressures on the Communist Party leadership to abandon 
"armed struggle" tactics and adopt a more compromisory and collaborationist policy towards the 
Indian government had a serious impact on the struggles. The CPI was told by Moscow that 
since Nehru's non-alligned foreign policy was a "very important development in international 
affairs" its "present paramount task is to build the peace movement and the broad democratic 
front".40 
Inevitably therefore, the mass armed struggle during the Tebhaga and Telangana 
movements succumbed to "parliamentary politicking" ! The attempt to consolidate the gains of 
these peasant struggles and create more powerful organs of self-defence and protracted struggle, 
to mobilise and draw support from the labour movement, middle sectors and urban sympathisers, 
was clearly not on the agenda of the leadership of these struggles, especially when it reached a 
stage of provoking the violent repression of the State. 
As Bandyopadhyay notes : "In 1946 they had no land. They had a dream. They joined 
the Telangana movement. Dudi Kumariah died. In 1975 they had no land. They had no 
dream...perhaps Dudi Kumariah died in vain."41 
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3.4 The Naxalite Movement : Maoist Agrarian Resistance (1967-71) 
(a) Introduction 
We have seen in the last section how the first militant peasant struggles in India under the 
leadership of the Communist Party were stunted because of ideological rifts and conflicts within 
the CP and the international communist movement. Moreover, these militant peasant struggles 
provoked the violence of the repressive state and the military quickly crushed the peasantry, 
paralysing the Communist party. Abandoning armed militant resistance, the CP opted to bring 
about socialist transformation through the "parliamentary path". This ideological shift within the 
CP initiated a vicious debate within its ranks, widening the ideological gaps on the nature and 
future course of peasant resistance in the Indian countryside, and the class character of the Indian 
state and revolution. 
In the post-independent period, especially during 1950s and 1960s, ideological rifts 
within the CP culminated in the first split of the party and the formation of the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist) in 1964, and another split with the formation of India's third CP, the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) - the first Maoist party in India - in 1969. These 
splits were caused not only by differing ideological positions, but also because of varied direct 
political experiences of CP cadres and leaders. 
(b) Ideological Shifts in the Indian Communist Movement : CPI, CPI(M) & CPI(ML) 
The multi-class approach of the undivided CP, directly contributed towards its 
ideological confusion over the future course of action in the militant peasant struggles of 
Telangana in the 1950s. Further, the class nature of the CP and its leadership stunted the growth 
of the peasant movement during this period. This was acknowledged in later years in a 
document of the CPI(M), as follows : 
"Whatever peasant movement was organised and led, was mainly oriented to the 
middle and well-to-do peasant sector, instead of the growing number of agri-
cultural labour and poor sections. The new opportunities for well-being that 
presented themselves to the middle and rich peasants in no small way, influenced 
the CP in the rural areas, and in particular, a good number of the cadres of middle 
and rich peasant origin who occupied leading positions in the rural party 
committees.'"12 
The ideological rifts within the ranks of the CP was particularly manifested in 
contradictory attitudes towards the Nehru government. The Rightists within the party called for 
the establishment of a "National Front" in alliance with the Congress party whom they 
categorised as the "progressive national bourgeoisie". The Leftists, on the other hand, argued for 
the establishment of an anti-Congress "United Front" of all progressive and democratic forces in 
the country. The Indo-China war of 1962 further aggravated these rifts and created conditions 
for the formation of a new Communist party. 
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The Leftists within the CP held a Congress in Calcutta in 1964 and established the 
Communist ралу of India (Marxist) based on the following programme : "The CPI(M) called for 
the establishment of "People's Democracies" based on an alliance of all anti-feudal and anti-
imperialist forces in the country. In this alliance it is essential that the working class lead the 
national democratic revolution."43 One of the fundamental questions which split the CP in 
1964 was the party's attitude towards China and the relevance of Mao Tse Tung's Thought for 
Indian conditions. The CPI(M) programme, adopted at the Calcutta congress in 1964, did not 
present any definite position on this question. However, many CPI(M) leaders and cadres had 
clearly opted for Maoism and "armed agrarian revolution" in India. 
The CPI(M) was distinguished by a seemingly neutral position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 
and China. However, certain sections, especially in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, 
manifested a clear allegiance to China and the Maoist strategy of revolution. Charu Mazumdar, 
from North Bengal, was the first to give theoretical articulation to these Maoist sentiments. His 
famous "Eight Documents", written during the period 1965-67 propounded the need for a 
revolutionary party based on the revolutionary practise of the peasantry: "The main thing about 
our tactics will be to see whether there is a mobilisation of the broadest sections of the peasantry; 
and our aim will be to see whether the class consciousness of the peasantry has increased -
whether they have moved forward towards widespread armed struggle."44 
In 1967 the CPI(M) decided to join other parties to form a "United Front" government in 
West Bengal. Although the CPI (M) formed the government, many of its members criticised it 
for taking the "parliamentary path". The dissidents within the CPI (M) centred around Cham 
Mazumdar who sought to bring about unity among the dissident groups. Charu Mazumdar set 
down four points as the fundamental basis of unity for the dissident groups : 
"First, acceptance of Mao Tse Tung as the leader of the world revolution and his 
Thoughts as the highest form of Marxism-Leninism of this era. Second, belief in 
the view that a revolutionary situation existed in every corner of India. Third, 
belief in area-wise seizure of power as the path for taking forward the Indian 
revolution; and fourth, belief in guerilla warfare as the only mode through which 
the development and advance of this revolution was possible."45 
(c) Origins of Maoist Peasant Resistance : Naxalbari and Srikakulam 
The militant peasant resistance in Tebhaga and Telangana between 1946-51 were not 
totally defeated by the State power. Its spirit was carried into the 1950s and 1960s by militant 
cadres of the CP, now split under the CPI, CPI (M) and CPI (ML). The main inspiration for the 
continuance of these militant struggles in these regions and other parts of the country was the 
ideology of Mao Tse-tung which emerged from a growing disillusionment with the 
"parliamentary path" of the CPI and CPI (M). The shift towards adopting a Maoist strategy of 
armed peasant resistance was therefore a logical culmination of these two factors. 
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In 1967 a Naxalbari-o-Krishak Sangram Sahayak Samiti (Naxalbari Peasant struggle 
Assistance Committee) - NKSSS, led by Sushital Roychoudhury, was carrying out militant 
peasant struggles in the areas of Naxalbari and Siliguri in North Bengal, based on the slogan of 
Charu Mazumdar : "Seizure of State Power through Armed Struggle". Communist 
revolutionaries leading these struggles were then still members of CPI(M). Radio Peking in a 
broadcast on June 28, 1967 stated : 
"The revolutionaries of the Indian Communist party, in Siliguri sub-division, who 
advocate the seizure of power through armed struggle, raised the slogans in 1965 
of preparing for armed struggle by arming the peasants and setting up rural 
bases."46 
Dissidents within the CPI (M), many of whom were expelled in the years following the 
Naxalbari peasant uprisings, joined together under the initiative of the NKSSS to set up the 
Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries (CCR) in August, 1967. Key leaders of the 
Darjeeling committee of the CPI (M) viz., Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Souren Bose and 
others, took a leading part in the formation of the CCR. Similarly, dissidents set up CCR's in the 
states of Bihar, Punjab. A Conference was convened of these dissident CCR's in Calcutta in 
November, 1967 where it was resolved to establish the All-India Coordination Committee of 
Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). 
The AICCCR continued to operate as a dissident group within the CPI (M) giving the call 
for an "armed peasant struggle to capture state power." It was after two years that this 
coordination was to give birth to the third Communist Party of India. On April 22, 1969, 
Lenin's birth anniversary, Kanu Sanyal announced the birth of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist-Leninist) - CPI (ML) - at a May Day Rally in Calcutta. The political resolution adopted 
by the new party stated : 
"Indian society was semi-colonial and semi-feudal, the Indian state is the state of 
big landlords and comprador-bureaucrat capitalists, and its government is a lackey 
of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. The Indian revolution at the 
present stage is the People's Democratic Revolution, the main content of which is 
the agrarian revolution, the abolition of feudalism in the countryside. Our chief 
responsibility is that of organising the peasantry and advancing towards seizure of 
power through armed struggle; the basic tactic of the struggle will be guerilla 
warfare.'"17 
The Maoist strategy of peasant resistance originated in two main areas : Naxalbari in 
North Bengal and Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh. Naxalbari is situated in the Darjeeling district 
and is primarily inhabited by tribal peoples viz., Rajbansis, Oraons, Mundos and Santhals. Most 
of them were employed in the 32 tea plantations in the areas, while others laboured in paddy 
fields. The production relations in this areas were based on a system where the landlord 
labourers, who worked the land and also provided extra-economic services to him. The 
labourers were bonded to the landlord through the institution of "free labour", in the following 
manner : 
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(1) The labourer was expected to supply free labour for the landlords kitchen garden. This 
included cultivation of vegetables as well as such other work like erecting fences against 
stray cattle, 
(2) Periodic repairs to the landlord's house was the responsibility of the labourers, 
(3) If any marriage was finalised in a labourer's family the landlord had to be given some 
kind of a presentation in his honour. This could be a goat, rice, dal, or vegetables. The 
gift had to be sufficient in quantity to provide a marriage feast for the landlord's entire 
household. But the family who gave the gift, and other labourers could not attend this 
marriage meal.48 
During 1950s and 1960s peasant struggles and plantation labourers' strikes had been 
prominent in North Bengal. Between 1955 and 1957 the tea plantation workers were organised 
and rallied together with the peasants. From 1958 to 1962 the peasant movement in Naxalbari 
entered a more militant phase when the Kisan Sabha (local peasants' associations) under the 
leadership of the Communists gave the call for the harvesting of crops and their collection by the 
tillers, hoisting of red flags in their respective fields, arming of the peasants for the protecdon of 
their crops, and defence against police attacks.49 
The "Eight Documents" of Charu Mazumdar written during 1965-67 provided the chief 
inspiration to the Communists in North Bengal as they sought to implement its spirit among the 
militant peasants and plantation labourers in Naxalbari, Siliguri, etc. At another peasant 
conference in Buraganj in April-May 1967 these "Eight Documents" were thoroughly discussed 
and the following programme of action was adopted for peasant mobilisation : a) peasants were 
urged to seize the lands of the landlords, b) seize the lands of the plantation workers who had 
purchased land from the poor peasants, c) cultivate lands held under (a) and (b) and retain all the 
produce from lands appropriated from the landlords, but share half of the crop production on the 
plantation workers' lands, and d) where the landlord is engaged in self-cultivation such lands 
should not be seized.50 
There was a rapid escalation of militant peasant action to implement this programme. 
One leader claimed that between March to April 1967, all the villages were organised. From 
15,000 to 20,000 peasants were enrolled as full-time activists. Peasant's committees were 
formed in every village and they were transformed into armed guards. They soon occupied land 
in the name of the peasant's committees, burnt all land records which had been used to cheat 
them of their dues, canceled all hypothecary debts, passed death sentences on oppressive 
landlords, formed armed bands by looting guns from the landlords, armed themselves with 
traditional weapons like bows, arrows and spears, and set up a parallel administration to look 
after the villages.51 When the peasants struggles took a violent turn, it provoked repression by 
the State. The key leaders, were quickly arrested and the peasant organisation was crippled. The 
first attempt to apply Charu Mazumdar's theory of "armed peasant struggle in the Indian 
countryside" had collapsed under the wave of State repression. 
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Meanwhile, in the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh another militant peasant 
struggle was brewing. This area was primarily inhabited by the Jatapu and Savara tribal people, 
or Girijans. Most of them lived in jungle areas and earned their livelihood through shifting 
cultivation. Through government measures to preserve the forests and the extortion of money 
lenders, these people were gradually converted into landless agricultural labourers working for 
poor wages. Their struggle began with resistance against forest officials and moneylenders and 
demands for higher wages. Under the influence of the CPI in the 1950s this struggle took on 
more militant forms. With the CP split in 1964, most cadres of this area joined the CPI(M) and 
sought to further the peasant resistance of the Girijans. The violent revolts of the Girijans 
increased during the period 1964-68 but it also confronted increasing police repression. The 
Andhra Pradesh committee of the CPI(M), however, labeled this initiative as "dissension". 
An "Andhra Document" prepared by the dissidents was rejected by the central committee 
of the CPI(M) but adopted at the Andhra Pradesh State Plenum in January, 1968. Later in June, 
1968 the dissidents Nagi Reddy, Pulla Reddy, D Venkateswara Rao and Kolla Venkayya were 
expelled from the party. This group of expelled CPI(M) leaders convened a meeting of their 
followers in Vijayawada on June 29-30, 1968, and set up a State Coordination Committee of 
Communist Revolutionaries under the leadership of Nagi Reddy. The theoretical inspiration of 
this dissident group came from the Naxalbari peasant armed struggle led by Kanu Sanyal besides 
their desire to revive the Telangana struggle. 
The programme of action adopted by this State Coordination committee called for the 
launching of an armed struggle in the lines of Telangana armed peasant struggle of 1946-51. In 
Andhra Pradesh there were two currents of "peasant revolution" that were propagated : in the 
areas of Srikakulam in the North-east the movement was led by Vempatapu Satyanarayana, who 
was inspired by Naxalbari and called for the immediate arming of the militant peasantry, in the 
areas of the Telangana region, the movement was led by Nagi Reddy who believed in 'a 
combination of legal and extra-legal struggles...in a prolonged preparation, mainly through 
economic struggles, before launching a full-scale armed movement.'52 In the later years, the 
Srikakulam revolutionaries disagreed with Nagi Reddy and his State Coordination committee 
and followed an independent path. The scale of armed peasant resistance in Srikakulam and 
other areas of Andhra Pradesh during this period was summed up in a newspaper report in "The 
Statesman" dated December 14,1968 : 
"Today, the State Government's writ does not run in scores of isolated mountain 
hamlets where tribesmen are being trained in guerilla tactics and use of anns...last 
month the tribesmen were again on the warpath and there were at least four raids 
on landlords in different paths of the tribal reserve, in which property worth about 
Rs 50,000 was stated to have been looted...Special armed police had moved in the 
area last February, but their daily operations have not only failed to check the 
revolt but seemed to have helped the Marxists further alienate tribesmen from the 
government... The failure of the police to round up the ringleaders despite eight 
months of intensive hunt in the mountains is clear enough proof of tribal support 
for them." 
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The concrete experiences of peasant and tribal protest in Srikakulam signified the first 
attempt in the Indian countryside at developing and implementing "guerilla warfare methods". 
But gradually guerilla activity concentrated on "annihilation of class enemies". Nagi Reddy and 
his followers paid much attention to developing guerrilla squads and guerrilla actions in 
Srikakulam. As Banerjee notes: "While Naxalbari branded the words 'Armed agrarian 
revolution' on the sign-post of the Indian revolution; Srikakulam engraved on it the sign 
"Gueirilla warfare" to indicate the tum of the road."53 
(d) The Ideology of the Naxalite Movement 
Cham Mazumdar's Eight Documents laid the basis for the consolidation of Maoist 
politics and strategy of revolution in India. The escalating armed struggle in Naxalbari and 
Srikakulam laid the concrete basis for a strategy of agrarian revolution bas&d on "armed struggle" 
Charu Mazumdar's views on this strategy provided the chief ideological framework for the 
establishment of India's third Communist party i.e., the Communist party of India (Marxist-
Leninist) in 1969. 
The political basis for the formation of the first Maoist party in India was laid in the early 
1950's during the inner-party debates in the then undivided CP on the future course of the armed 
struggle it had launched in Telangana. Communist cadres from Bengal and Andhra Pradesh 
encouraged the CPI and CPI(M) to pursue this course of struggle. Charu Mazumdar gave these 
sentiments a coherent form in this writings in the late 1960s. 
In the initial period of his writings, Charu Mazumdar emphasised the need to build 
underground peasant organisations, seize arms and conduct aimed struggles against the landlords 
and finally to capture state power. Armed struggle, in his view, was the first item on the agenda 
for the Indian revolution. For him, "armed struggle" was synonymous with the "fighting 
consciousness of the peasantry", which, "had to be directed against the State machinery and the 
feudal class". Hence, the struggles in Naxalbari in 1967 were conducted by armed guerrilla 
squads that attacked landlords, confiscated lands and confronted police attacks. Kanu Sanyal 
noted in a Report on Terai Peasants' movement : 
"When all the peasants were aimed and jotedars and other vested interests fled the 
village, we assumed that the base area had been created. We took the armed 
people for an armed force...In one or two cases, we formed small bands and 
snatched guns from the landlords; but we did not make this the main form of 
struggle and assumed instead that a guerrilla force would be built upon the 
spontaneity of the masses. In many cases we were impressed by the militant 
attitude of vagabonds, and made them leaders for building up an armed force..."54 
While the guerrilla squads proved effective in confronting the landlords and confiscating 
lands, they were unable to effect a more broad-based mobilisation of the peasantry. Charu 
Mazumdar expressed skepticism at attempts to mobilise the peasantry under mass organisations 
during this period of struggle. "If everyone starts building mass organisations who is to build up 
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the underground party organisation? Do we expect the mass organisation to organise the 
agrarian revolution ? If such mass organisations are built in the rural areas, such an attempt on 
our part will strengthen the tendency to carry on open movements through those open mass 
organisations inevitably turning us into another set of leaders of revisionist mass 
organisations."55 
Further, Cham Mazumdar's political programme was based on the assumption that the 
Indian situation during this period (1967-69) was "ripe for unleashing revolutionary political 
struggles to capture state power". The immediate strategy of revolution to follow, therefore, was 
the "annihilation of class enemies". This slogan became popular during the Naxalite struggles, 
but it has often been misinterpreted. Charu Mazumdar clarified this strategy in articles written in 
1969 : "... And this campaign for the annihilation of the class enemy can be carried out only by 
inspiring, the poor and landless peasants with the politics of establishing the political power of 
the peasants in the countryside by destroying the domination of the feudal classes."и 
"The annihilation of a class enemy does not only mean liquidating an individual, but also 
means liquidating the political, economic and social authority of the class enemy."57 The CPI 
(ML) was established precisely on this programme and strategy of revolution. Its leaders and 
cadres conducted armed guerrilla actions in different parts of the country. Srikakulam in Andhra 
Pradesh, Korapet in Orissa, Musahari and Muzaffarpur in Bihar, Naxalbari and Midnapore in 
Bengal, Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu, Assam, Tripura and Punjab. "Flames of peasant armed 
struggle have been raging in West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Himachal, Orissa, 
Assam, Tripura states and particularly in Andhra Pradesh," stated the New China News Agency 
on March 27,1970. 
But while the People's Republic of China had earlier hailed the formation of the first 
Maoist party in India in 1969, the increasing emphasis placed on "annihilation campaigns" 
evoked criticism form the CCP's leadership and laid the basis for China's withdrawal of support 
to the CPI (ML). In a comment on the CPI (ML) the CCP stated: 
"The formulation that "the open Trade Unions, open mass organisations and mass 
movements is out of date, and secret assassinations is the only way" needs 
rethinking. Formerly we misunderstood your word "annihilation". We used to 
think that the idea is taken from our Chairman's war of annihilation. But in the 
July 1970 issue of LIBERATION (the organ of the CPI-ML) we came to 
understand that this annihilation means secret assassinations."38 
The First Congress of the CPI (ML) in Calcutta in May 1970 reiterated the need to "carry 
on the annihilation campaigns more firmly and unitedly", and to rely on "conventional weapons 
to release the initiative of the poor and landless peasants". 
By 1970 the escalating armed struggle in Naxalbari, Debra and Gopiballavapur in 
Bengal had a great influence on students and intellectuals in Calcutta city. Charu Mazumdar, 
urged the students to integrate themselves with the peasantry and to go down to the villages in 
large numbers as the first step towards such integration. 
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The CPI (ML) urban strategy had three aspects : 
(1) the cultural side, marked by an organised effort to debunk the intellectual heritage of the 
India, particularly Bengali middle class, 
(2) an attempt to reproduce the annihilation campaign in the cities, the targets being police 
personnel, informers and political rivals, and 
(3) a preparatory move to build up an arsenal by mass-scale snatching of arms.59 
The students who were attracted to reproduce the armed struggle campaign in Calcutta 
city were drawn from some of the most prestigious educational institutions. Their growing 
dissatisfaction with the colonial educational system and lack of opportunities in employment, and 
their feelings of frustration and despair, led brilliant students and intellectuals to join the armed 
struggle campaigns of the CPI (ML) in Calcutta city. Students joined together to destroy statues. 
They painted Mao's slogan "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", on the walls of 
Calcutta. Examinations were disrupted and threatening letters sent to those that exercised 
authority in educational institutions and to police personnel. 
Thus "urban annihilation campaigns" attacked police personnel, informers, politicians, 
and others. All this took place in broad daylight on the streets of Calcutta and struck terror in the 
population, especially the ruling United Front government of the CPI (M). Official government 
figures for the period April 1 to November 12, 1970 indicate that over "36 policemen were killed 
and over 400 injured in CPI (ML) attacks". The police estimated that in November the same 
year, there were over "10,000 to 20,000 CPI (ML) cadres operatinE in West Bengal and about 
half were concentrating their activities in the Greater Calcutta area ! 
The CPI (ML), in a certain sense, had arrived on the Indian political scene in 1969 to fill 
a vacuum created by the failure of the parliamentary Left parties in India to pursue the militant 
struggles of the peasantry. But as the CPI (ML) movement spread across the country, there was 
a tendency, particularly in the First Congress in 1970, to impose a "personality cult" around 
Cham Mazumdar as the "chief theoretician of the Indian revolution". The serious neglect of the 
need for broad-based political education and mobilisation of the peasantry further contributed to 
the CPI (ML) leading a struggle that was characterised by individual annihilation of class 
enemies carried out by small guerrilla squads which exposed the militant cadres directly to the 
repression of the State. 
Charu Mazumdar seemed to have relied on the "spontaneous awakening of the peasantry" 
once such guerilla actions were successful. He even went to the extent of propounding that "by 
1975 the wave of revolution will roll over the country". Such hasty political speculations, led to 
dissension within his party and exposed it to State repression. 
The strength of the police and military forces that were mobilised by the government in 
1970-71 in Calcutta and Bengal gives us an indication of the scale of the CPI (ML) movement 
A main reason for the mobilisation was to ensure a peaceful atmosphere during the March 1971 
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elections. The then Governor of the State, S.S. Dhavan stated: "I cannot give you the exact 
numbers of troops mobilised for this operation, but I can tell you that it is a huge force - larger 
than the forces in any single sector of the battle front during the war with Pakistani aggression in 
1965...There is no parallel in the history of Parliamentary Democracy when the army and the 
police were employed in such large numbers to protect the voters..."61 
There are no accurate figures on the number of CPI (ML) activists who were killed in the 
repression carried out by the police and military in Bengal. "Police sources state that, between 
March 1970 and August 1971, in Calcutta and its suburbs, 1,783 CPI (ML) supporters or 
members were killed, unofficial sources claimed that the figure was at least double. The 
numbers do not include those killed in jails. Between May and December 1971, the police 
opened fire on unarmed prisoners in at least six jails in West Bengal."62 
During the period 1971-73 the State stepped up its repressive campaign to cripple what 
was left of the Naxalites in various parts of the country. It was also during this period that Charu 
Mazumdar's theory and strategy were criticised within the CPI (ML). In order to assess the 
causes for the collapse of the movement, many regional committees of the CPI (ML) began a 
soul-searching self-criticism of their ideology and tactics. 
The Andhra Pradesh State Committee, for example, in March 1971 stated in relation to 
the aimed peasant struggle in Srikakulam : "Our cadres are predominantly petty-bourgeois. Even 
today the villages of poor and landless peasants are not the centres of our activity. Leadership is 
not from the basic classes... This is our fundamental weakness."63 
The serious neglect of mass political education and mobilisation, which was perhaps the 
most serious weakness of the movement, was also noted by the West-Bengal and Bihar Border 
Region Committee : 
"As we ignored ... political and ideological work in respect of peasant guerrillas, 
as we did not entrust them with greater responsibilities in organising the people, 
as we did not help them sum up their concrete experiences, we could not develop 
a greater number of organisers and political commissars from among the poor and 
landless peasant cadres and guerrillas ... We were not able to establish completely 
the leadership of the poor and landless peasants over the campaign for seizure of 
arms..."64 
In 1982, at the Third All-India Congress of the CPI (ML) (Vinod Mishra's group), the 
strategy of the "annihilation line" adopted by the pany was seriously criticized : "In many areas 
annihilation was conducted as a campaign, with a lot of indiscriminate and unnecessary killings. 
It got isolated from the peasants' class struggle so that no resistance could be built up against 
police repression, and our struggling areas were smashed. This happened in those places where 
the party lost its leadership and mass movements and resistance could not be developed."65 
The party recognised it's main mistakes at generalising the "annihilation" form of 
struggle for every corner of India and adopting it as a campaign, failing to develop a consistent 
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and thorough-going policy for combining this form of struggle with mass struggles, in spite of an 
overall orientation and successes at certain points. Even with the appearance of serious signs of 
setbacks, it did not succeed in arranging a planned and orderly retreat from a military offensive 
to a political offensive. 
After such attempts at "self-criticism", serious political and ideological differences 
emerged in the Maoist movement in India. Numerous political factions of the Maoist tradition 
developed in the latter half of the 1970s.66 
(e) Contemporary Maoist Resistance 
In some regions in the country various factions of the Maoist CPI(ML) continue to wage 
a militant resistance against landlord and police oppression. 
(i) The Ryotu Coolie Sanghams' 
(Peasant Labour Associations), Andhra Pradesh 
The Karimnagar and Adilabad districts of the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh have 
been known for its "agrarian militance" since the armed peasant protests between 1946-51. The 
resurgence of this militant peasant movement began in the 1970s with the renewed activism of 
militant cadres of the Maoist CPI(ML) "People War group". Sircilla and Peddpally taluqs were 
the two areas in this region that provided the base for this peasant movement under the 
leadership of the Kisan Sabhas (peasant associations). 
The struggle first started in 1978 from the villages of Ranapuram and Kannala. This 
initially was launched on two main issues : (1) to forcibly occupy the wastelands around the 
villages, that are often illegally grabbed by the landlords, and distribute these occupied lands 
among the landless. Such occupations of illegally appropriated wastelands was an important 
element of the struggle in the entire region. The land thus occupied was either divided equally 
among the landless or cultivated collectively by them, the latter being more common in the tribal 
regions. (2) the issue of "fines" and "fees" that the landlords extorted from the peasants during 
unofficial village council meetings and while settling disputes. During the struggle, the peasants 
demanded a return of these fees and fines. They also demanded donations from the landlords for 
the Sangham (Association/Union) for what had been appropriated from the people. 
The extreme nature of extra-economic exploitation of the peasantry by rich landlords 
provided cause for the organisation of a militant peasant struggle. The forced labour system 
continued to prevail in this region during the 1970s. One source described this situation of 
bondage as follows : 
"The forced labour and exactions, the Vetti system, is widespread in this region. 
Whether it is the peasant or a barber or washerman, they all have to attend to the 
landlord's work first and only after completing it can they attend to others' work, 
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including their own. Each landlord has an army of servants to maintain his 
house ...Every harijan family has to send one man from the family to do this 
Vetti...Besides people have to give a bribe to the landlord whenever a special 
occasion arises in their own houses, which includes not only a marriage, or 
festival, but also death. 
There is also a community bribe which every caste has to give once a year to the 
landlord...The social norms of behaviour which the landlord imposes have to be 
scrupulously followed, whereby a peasant cannot wear white clothes, he cannot 
wear chappals in the presence of the landlord, and cannot send his children to 
school. Defying untouchability is a crime. In many villages of this area a girl still 
has to be sent to the landlord to satisfy his amorous desires, as soon as she attains 
maturity. Though only in a few villages the custom of sending women as a 
substitute to the landlord's bed, if the landlord's wife becomes pregnant, still 
prevails."67 
The peasant movement challenged this vetti system and found remarkable support from 
the poor peasantry and landless labourers. The successes of the struggle to forcibly occupy 
wastelands and distribute them to the landless labourer, enabled the movement to spread to a 
number of villages in this region. The movement also demonstrated to the peasants its social 
responsibility. The money collected from the landlords as compensation for the illegal "fees" 
and "fines" - which amounted to as much as Rs 30,000 to 40,000 per village - were kept with the 
Sangham and used for common purposes like building schools, laying roads, paying teachers and 
getting reservoirs bunded. 
Further, the movement had taken up the responsibility of guarding the hillocks and 
preventing the cutting down of trees. "When the plants are fully grown the movement itself 
supervises the cutting and sale of timber and also undertakes simultaneous replanting. The 
proceeds of this sales goes to the movement which is again used for social purposes". Finally, the 
Sangham has also been successful in increasing the daily wages of the agricultural labourers : 
"earlier daily labourers used to get Rs 3-4 per day, they now get Rs 6-7; farm servants have also 
increased their monthly wage to Rs 100".6' 
These initial successes of the peasant organisation has naturally provoked landlord and 
police repression. With the spreading of the movement, police camps were set up in the 
"disturbed villages" and violent campaigns of repression and harassment of village folk, 
particularly women and children of the movement activists, were carried out. Many leaders have 
been eliminated in staged "police encounters"; the most famous case was the killing of Devender 
Reddy of Ranapuram village, who was one of the founding leaders. The peasants even today 
recall the dedication, integrity, tirelessness, inspiration and leadership of Devender Reddy.6' 
The severe repression in these villages has led to arrests or driven men into hiding. In 
Sircilla, for example, militant Women's Associations have sprung up in about 20-25 villages, 
mostly as a consequence of the severe repression which drove the men away from the villages. 
"Many of the men being either arrested or absconding, the burden of the movement and the brunt 
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of the repression is being borne by the women. With the massive presence of the armed police, 
many landlords who had earlier fled the area, facing social boycott, are now reluming to their 
villages and unleashing terror on the people, particularly the womenfolk."70 Between May 22-
23, 1983 the Second State Conference was marked by a massive rally in which about 30,000 
peasants, agricultural labourers, youth, students, and women participated. 
The peasant movement, while continuing its struggle for survival in the midst of 
escalating police and landlord repression, is also suffering from the lack of support from political 
parties and democratic forces in the cities. 
"The increasing awareness of the problems of the rural poor being shown at all levels 
from academic studies to the stands taken by prominent political leaders is in sharp contrast to 
the actual response and support the peasants have received in their attempts to organise 
themselves. In the final analysis, this sullen silence of democratic opinion may determine, 
perhaps fatally, the fate of this nascent peasant movement."71 
(ii) The Militancy of the Gonds in Maharashtra 
Gadchiroli and Chandrapur districts in southern Maharashtra are inhabited primarily by 
tribal populations : mainly Pradhan Gonds, and Raj Gonds and a small number ofHalbas, 
Kolams and Kawars. The first political stirrings in this area began with the entry of the 
Communist cadres of the "People's War" Maoist group in 1981 who sought shelter in the 
Sironcha forests in this region when they fled from the repression in Karimnagar and Adilabad 
regions, in neighboring Andhra Pradesh. 
The Gonds worked for low wages as subjects of zamindars (landlords). They were 
cheated by money lenders and traders, robbed by forest contractors and bullied by forest 
department officials. 
In the summer of 1982, the CPI (ML) cadres launched a massive agitation demanding 
higher wages for picking tendu leaves which were used for making beedis (local cigarettes). In 
1982 the fixed government rate was Rs 5 for every 100 bundles. With the widespread strikes, 
the wages increased to Rs. 8 and 9. This initial success boosted the image and popularity of the 
CPI (ML) cadres in the area. People in Chandrapur said "the Annas (brothers) achieved in one 
year what other political parties and the government had been unable to achieve in 35 years." 
Senior police officials stated differently. They said : "The Naxalites are "extremely dangerous" 
and "subversive anti-social elements" who are goading the people into making unreasonable 
demands. These are violent elements who are creating a law and order problem by instigating 
people to break the law. Such politics is 'harmful to the very fabric of our society' and must be 
suppressed by the use of force...".72 
However, people have continued to provide protection for the militant "Naxalites". The 
villagers have also organised themselves into local committees which have become the effective 
decision-making bodies at the village level - a veritable parallel administration. Taxes are levied 
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directly from the contractors who operate in forests where the officials and the police fear to 
tread. The previously unrestricted authority of officials, contractors and moneylenders is facing 
stiff opposition and established political parties have lost their popular grip. 
Hanif, a 17-year old boy who works in a teak nursery of the forest corporation described 
the approach used by the Naxalites : 
"They (Naxalites) come in the evenings and nights. Sometimes only one or two 
come. They sing songs in Telugu and Gondi; they ask us about our troubles and 
problems; they explain how we should organise ourselves; they talk to us about 
our rights to the forest and its produce; they talk about the need to oppose our 
exploitation by the forest department and contractors; they also talk about the land 
wrongfully seized by landlords and the forest department."73 
(iii) Peasant Militancy in Bhojpur (Bihar) 
The simmering peasant movement in Bhojpur has its origins in the untiring work of 
"Master" Jagdish Mahto, a science teacher. A son of a poor peasant, Jagdish Mahto had never 
been a member of any communist party. Yet, he rose in popularity among the toiling peasants of 
Bhojpur and emerged as the "Founding Father of the Bhojpur peasant movement". The peasant 
movement originated in Ekwari village where a minority of notorious landlords employed, as 
slaves and semi-slaves, the large majority of the population. Most of the poor peasants and 
labourers belonged to the low castes of Yadavs, Kahars and Harijans. One account describes 
vividly the plight of these lower caste peasants in Ekwari village as follows : 
"He (the poor peasant/labourer) is not considered a human being at all. Bom a 
slave, his life is firmly tied to the spade, the sickle and the landlord's feet. He 
produces everything that the landlord boasts of, and yet his children do not have 
enough to eat. Everyday some landlord takes away his wife and his grown up 
daughters. If his working daughter is not molested in the fields during the day, a 
son of some landlord will break into his single-room mud hovel in the night and 
humiliate her right there; for him the best course is to feign deep slumber.' 
In 1969, the "Master" organised a torch-light procession shouting the slogan : "We will 
fight for a state for Harijans!" Since then, many "incidents" have taken place in this and other 
villages of Bhojpur inspired by the "Master" and other leaders of the peasant movement. With 
the escalating attacks on landlords and their property, the police moved in to charge the "Master" 
and some of his companions with 'murder" and "disturbing the law and order" of the villages. 
But in two years much had changed in the consciousness of the peasantry in these villages. In 
1971 "Master", in a conversation with a fellow-teacher said : "I know brother, that I am going to 
die one of these days. But I will die partly satisfied. For one change that our movement has 
brought about is that the landlords do not dare now to touch the women of the poor. And that is 
not a small change."75 
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Meanwhile, in other parts of rural Bihar, especially the Patna district, the powerful 
landlords set up the Bhoomisena (Land Army)76 between 1972-75 to protect their interests and 
unleash terror against the Harijans. Most of the Harijans castes in Bihar are landless labourers, 
they are all over India. In one village the landlords went on the rampage and wantonly burnt 
down a whole village, threw helpless children in the flames, raped women and butchered men. 
The landless peasants fought back the landlords. The Bhoomisena held a demonstration and 
said, "The crops will be harvested in the fields, and fire will engulf the hut of the striking 
agricultural labourers." 
In response to the Bhoomisena, the CPI (ML) organised the Lai Sena (Red Army) to 
protect the exploited farmers from landlord repression. Today, in rural Bihar, both these groups 
are locked in an intense class and caste war. This war has taken a great toll in peasant likes and 
property of the poor farmers and agricultural labourers. 
"A caste Hindu who has relations with a Harijan woman is merely emphasising his rural 
heritage. Feudal society condones this act. But if a Harijan boy as much as tries to woo a higher 
caste woman and stayed alive after this "sacrilege", it would be nothing short of a miracle."77 
Another peasant organisation that has emerged on the rural Bihar scene is the Bihar 
Pradesh Kisan Sabha (BPKS). The BPKS organised a mammoth demonstration in Patna in 
February 1981 and at present is active in at least 10 districts of the state. The objectives of the 
organisation are : "To unite the peasants and demolish the economic, political and cultural base 
of imperialism and feudalism."78 The BPKS adopted a comprehensive "Charter of Demands" 
which included, the following : 
(1) Implementation of land reform measures, particularly redistribution of surplus and 
unowned land to the landless poor, 
(2) Writing off of debts of farmers owning up to 15 acres of irrigated land or 25 acres of 
unirrigated land, 
(3) Implementation of the Minimum Wages Act, 
(4) Exemption of land revenue in areas where free government irrigation is not available, and 
(5) Protection of civil liberties and democratic rights.79 
In sum, the Maoist tradition in India emerged to fill a political vacuum, but failed to pose 
itself as a radical revolutionary alternative and further the cause of a socialist revolution in India. 
Its dogmatic adherence of "classical Maoism" and the Chinese revolutionary experience exposed 
its impotence to politically articulate such a task in concrete agrarian conditions in India. 
Moreover, Charu Mazumdar's role as a protagonist and ideologue of the Indian peasant 
revolution led him to propagate and promote an extreme agrarian programme far beyond the 
political capability of the CPI (ML) party and the militant peasantry. 
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Political factionalism and dissension was, therefore, inevitable in these circumstances, 
accentuated by particular experiences of party cadres in the various parts of the country. To 
develop an all-India party of the CPI (ML) in a given situation where Maoist resistance was 
generally confined to certain pockets of anti-feudal struggles in the countryside, was therefore a 
futile exercise. In the aftermath of the Naxalite movement, the Maoist tradition reverted back to 
regionalism and localism - where perhaps it has had its most effective impact on party cadres, 
peasants and rural labourers. 
3.5 The Politics of Agrarian Protest from above 
"The logic of populist politics has been that the aspirations and demands of (the 
rich peasant) section have been presented and articulated as those of the whole of 
the peasantry - and indeed of the entire rural society. This is what provided the 
mass basis and muscle to the so- called "peasant power" and its manifestations in 
a variety of forms - in electoral contests and representation, as much as in mass 
agitations." (Balraj Mehta in "Mainstream"; December 6,1980) 
A significant development in agrarian conflicts in contemporary India has been what has 
come to be known as "rich farmers' agitations". This has been a post-Green Revolution 
phenomenon in rural India giving rise to new forces of rural elite who have asserted themselves 
over and above the toiling peasantry. The rich peasant group of fanners in Indian emerged at the 
top of the agrarian social structure because they were the chief beneficiaries of the "Green 
Revolution" programme. 
While the total output of essential food crops did show a marked increase but at the same 
time, the "Green Revolution" further stratified the agrarian social classes, with the "new" rich 
peasant (kulak) class at the top, and an expanding landless agricultural labour class at the bottom. 
"Since all the farmers, with differences only in degree, have introduced new technology, the 
green revolution has put the entire peasantry in the market framework. All the farmers have to 
sell a part (in many cases, a major part) of their output to purchase their inputs. Therefore, prices 
of agricultural produce and inputs are a matter of serious concern to all categories of farmers."80 
It is within such a socio-economic background that we need to situate the emergence of 
"farmers agitations" during the period 1980-82. These "agitations", unprecedented in Indian 
agrarian history, erupted phenomenally in the states of Kamataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, 
Punjab and Gujarat. Based on a review of these farmers' agitations during this period in India, 
the following aspects of its political significance can be highlighted : 
(1) It produced leaders, little known outside the boundaries of their districts or state, to a 
position of national stature, 
(2) All these "farmers agitations" were led by the rich peasant classes, but were able to 
mobilise the middle and small farmers, poor peasants and agricultural labourers, to give 
the agitations a real mass character, 
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(3) The agitations and their leaders have maintained an "independent" political identity, 
without any political party affiliation or influence. Also, their emergence was clearly 
from outside the fold of traditional political parties, left or right, 
(4) A unique feature of these "agitations" is that they successfully united all sections of 
farmers i.e., from the rich to the landless labourer; under their banners, they presented a 
comprehensive charter of demands that tended to transcend traditional caste and class 
divisions in rural India.81 
Let us briefly review the nature of these "farmers' agitations" in some states of India in 
order to probe into the politics behind these seemingly "mass farmers movements" : 
(i) The Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) in Punjab 
Punjab had experienced a rich history of peasant movements during the colonial period 
and in independent India. The agrarian scene in Punjab was revolutionised during the period of 
the "Green Revolution" in the 1960s, resulting in the emergence of a powerful lobby of rich 
farmers (rural capitalists). However, over the years, especially in the aftermath of the "Green 
Revolution", the rapid increase in the prices of inputs, fertilisers and taxation squeezed this 
section of the rural elite. Yet, it was the small and marginal farmers of Punjab who had borne the 
brunt of this burden. A study showed : "24 per cent of small farmers and 31 per cent of marginal 
farmers live below the poverty line in the Green Revolution state of Punjab."82 The necessary 
social conditions for the resurgence of a peasant movement in Punjab - albeit of a "rich peasant" 
variety - lay in the following : 
"The Green Revolution has raised the aspirations of all sections of the peasantry. 
The growing income inequalities are shaking the confidence of the poor peasants. 
Any further attempt to shift the burden of the economic crisis and resource 
mobilisation on this section would enrage them. In this situation, any peasant 
organisation which can provide them the lead will find a favorable response from 
them."83 
It was this opportunity that the powerful rich peasantry identified and exploited to their 
own advantage, through the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU). 
The BKU was constituted in 1980, although it had been in existence since 1972 in 
Punjab. The necessary initiative came from the farmers of Ludhiana - the epi-centre of the 
"Green Revolution" of earlier decades. After successful agitations, the BKU rapidly spread to 
other districts of the state, and by 1983, the Union had elected bodies in all districts except 
Kapurthala. "The Union had its units at 4 levels : village, block, district and state."84 The basic 
character of the BKU can be summarised as follows : 
a. Its demands highlighted the general aspirations of rural Punjab, namely education, health 
and communication facilities in the rural areas, reservations for rural candidates in 
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professional and educational institutions and industrialisation of rural areas. 
b. It demanded : remunerative prices for agricultural produce, concessions on inputs, 
reduction in prices of fertilisers, tractors, diesel, pesticides, cement, abolition of the tax 
on agricultural wealth, pensions for old farmers - all of which directly catered to the 
needs and interests of the rich peasantry. 
c. The Union has also voiced its protest on social issues, such as abolition of smuggling, 
corruption, prohibition and better status for women in society.85 
The "rich peasant" character of the BKU is further reflected in the issues on which a 
series of agitations were launched in the early 1980s : anti-single state food zone (1974), power 
rate for electric tubewells (1974-75), increased water rates, revenue and commercial tax (1975), 
replacement of defective tractors (1977-78); diesel morcha (1979), milk price strike (1981), and 
the present agitation on procurement prices of wheat and tariff rates on electricity.86 
The recent phase of agitations launched by the BKU in Punjab began in 1983 with a 
demand on tariff rates on electricity. Based on a 5-point demand, the BKU further intensified its 
agitations the next year, and in a major show of strength on March 12, 1984, about 50 to 60,000 
farmers gheraoed the Punjab Governor's House. They continued uninterrupted for 6 days. 
"The peasants brought along their own provisions. Milk and vegetables were 
regularly supplied by the farmers of nearby districts. Farmers set up their own 
community kitchens and built thatched huts. It seemed that Punjab farmers had 
taken over the city. Farmers from other states also joined the demonstration." 
After a series of hectic negotiations between the BKU and the administration, an 
agreement was reached on March 18, 1984 and the BKU called off the agitations 
and ghereo. Many political parties approached the BKU with offers of help, but 
the BKU declined assistance from these parties and stood on its own as a non-
party political organisation."87 
In the Punjab countryside the BKU's influence was overwhelming. In April, 1984 it 
shifted its emphasis from electricity rates to that of recovery of loans advanced by cooperative 
and commercial banks. The BKU put up notice-boards in most villages of Punjab which read : 
"Without proper accounting, recovery of loans is illegal! Entry of recovery staff in the village is 
not allowed without permission - By Order : BKU !." Temporary jails were also set up in the 
villages to arrest the officials who violated this order, creating further panic among the revenue 
officials who dreaded entering the rural areas. It was almost as if the union had a parallel 
government in the villages. 
The immense popularity and support of the BKU in rural Punjab has rendered it a non-
party political force to reckon with. Its strong leadership, vested in the hands of powerful rich 
peasants, coupled with its popular economic and social programme of action had encouraged 
large sections of the Punjab peasantry to follow its leadership. Moreover, its capability to reject 
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traditional party politics and present itself as not being interested in electoral aspirations, has 
definitely contributed to its immense effectiveness. The BKU is today posing a serious threat to 
the communist-led Kisan Sabhas of the CPI and CPI (ML). 
(¡i) The Tamil Nadu Agriculturists' Association (TAA) 
The TAA was initiated by Chinnamanna Narayanswamy Naidu in 1968 in Coimbatore 
taluk to protest against the steep rise in power rates. By the early 1970s, the association had 
grown in strength and became an established state-wide union of farmers in Tamil Nadu. 
The basic demands of the TAA included : 
(1) write off the entire loan amount due from farmers with less than 5 acres, 
(2) write off 50 per cent of the loans of those with 5-10 acres, 
(3) write off the interest due on the loans advanced to the fanners with 10-15 acres and allow 
them to repay the loan amount in five installments.88 
Naidu's views clearly provided effective an articulation to the aspirations of the rural rich 
in Tamil Nadu : 
"When I call a meeting, thousands of green-turbened farmers come. Mind you, 
not because of me but due to their enormous problems which they believe can be 
redressed through my movement." 
"I watched how the mill tycoons prospered and how they were pampered by the 
government. So I started telling my brothers...'our hens lay eggs and who eats the 
omelette? It is the city dwellers, the rich ones.'... I told my farmer brothers that 
the workers in the textile mills led successful agitations and often a 30-60 per cent 
bonus because the mills were so prosperous. But the farmers remained the 
untouchable..."89 
The political reasoning, therefore, of the TAA was that the farmers have been deprived of 
their rightful role in the country's prosperity as the economy was basically urban oriented. 
Further, the current problems of farmers in the country were a consequence of the "Green 
Revolution" which mainly benefited the middle-men, traders, manufacturers while the farmers 
continue to toil for a small profit. The widespread popularity of the TAA among the small and 
middle peasants can be seen from one estimate of the class composition of TAA' movement in 
Tamil Nadu : 
a) those with less than 3 standard acres (50%), 
b) those with 3-10 standard acres (30%), and 
c) those with 10-15 standard acres (20%). 
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Nevertheless, it seems clear from the concrete demands posed by TAA during agitations 
that the leadership of the movement is controlled by the rich peasants.90 
(iii) Karnataka Farmers' Association 
The farmers' agitations in Karnataka were led by H.S. Rudrappa, a former minister and a 
big landowner. The initial agitations were peaceful satyagrahas but they were violently broken 
up by the police. The farmers observed the uncompromising attitude of the local government to 
their problems. This directly contributed to increased participation and the spread of the 
agitations to various districts in the state. 
The initial demands posed in Karnataka are strikingly similar to those in other states : 
"Initially in Karnataka, the main issues were abolition of the betterment levy and 
reduction in water rates, abolition of the agricultural income tax, reduction in the power tariffs 
for water pump sets, lower taxes on tractors, writing off of loans taken from cooperatives and 
banks, and raising the minimum support prices of foodgrains. The demands however have now 
significantly gone a step further and include payment of a pension to farmers and agricultural 
labourers, reserving half the seats in all educational institutions and half of all government 
appointments for farmers' children earmarking 80 per cent of the budget for rural development, 
declaring agriculture an industry."91 
It is important to note here that the Karnataka farmers' agitations were confined to area 
where there were irrigation facilities and where commercial crops, like cotton and sugarcane 
were grown. The class of rich farmers, who are commercially-oriented, will directly benefit 
from the demands. Rudrappa himself has reportedly conceded this fact, but said that "we cannot 
divide ourselves into landed and landless farmers and agitate separately, for the agitation then 
will have no strength nor will it carry any weight."92 
(iv) The Shetkari Sanghatana in Maharashtra 
The Shetkari Sanghatana (SS) in Maharashtra was led by Sharad Joshi, one of the most 
intriguing of personalities ever to lead a farmers movement in India. Sharad Joshi, a Brahmin, 
graduated in Economics and Mercantile Law.and passed the Indian Administrative Services 
(IAS) in 1957. He obtained a diploma in computer programming from the "Institute 
Programmex" in Lausanne (Switzerland) in 1974, and worked as Secretary in the International 
Bureau of the Universal Postal Union, Bern (Switzerland). Joshi also founded a Commerce 
college in Kolhapur (Maharashtra). He worked as Assistant Director-General in the Indian Posts 
and Telegraphs and during this period, he was sent to Switzerland on an UN assignment. While 
there, he successfully organized a workers' struggle, even though he was an high ranking officer. 
When working on the Second Development Decade at the United Nations between 1967-76, 
Joshi was exposed to the agrarian scene in India, and studiai its problems. He left the lucrative 
Swiss job in 1977. 
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Returning to India, Joshi took up farming to experience for himself the plight of the 
farmers in the country. He presently stays with his wife, Leela, in Pune - 40 Kms away from the 
16-acre farm he acquired near Chakan, in Pune district. Leela herself runs a small broiler poultry 
farm and Sharad cultivates roses, chilies, paddy, onions, and fruit trees on an experimental 
basis.93 
Joshi's economic analysis, in his own words, is that, "After the Second World War, 
practically every developing country was divided into an internal colony model, of the Rosa 
Luxembourg-type, with the towns choosing an accelerated rate for the growth of industries, on 
the basis of systematic exploitation of raw materials grown in the countryside." This is the 
essence of his theory on "INDIA" vs "BHARAT"! 94 
The early agitations launched by Sharad Joshi in Maharashtra were confined to Nipani 
and Nasik, but soon gained momentum and spread throughout Western Maharashtra. Between 
November 1980 and January 1981 Western Maharashtra witnessed unprecedented mass 
mobilisation and violence. During the course of the struggle, all major roads and rail routes were 
blocked and government officers were "gheroed". Elected representatives were subjected to 
humiliation. 
At the height of the agitation, Joshi threatened that a million people would court arrest 
and occupy government offices to stop work, and force elected representatives to resign. The 
basic demands put forward in the Maharashtra agitations revolved around prices for cash crops 
especially onions and sugarcane. As Sharad Joshi described his goals and plans : 
"We have a single programme: pay higher prices to agriculturists. Step-by-step 
agitations will start, resulting in building up a farmers' union, on trade union 
lines, all over the country. Agitations need strategic planning. With only half a 
taluka backing me, I started the onion agitation and attained maximum impact 
Maharashtra produces 35 per cent of the country's sugar and has the largest state-
to-state transfer. From May 25 we will start a stir for increasing the price of milk. 
By that time we will be ready to launch a stir for higher prices for cereals."95 
Sharad Joshi has also kept clear of party politics, although in the course of the agitations 
many Congress (Indira) M.L.A.'s actively supported the Shetkari Sanghatana. However, Joshi 
was successful in building up an image of an "independent farmers union" distinct from party 
politics. This further boosted the morale of his followers in Maharashtra. 
Most critics have accused Joshi of being an "agent of the big farmers of Maharashtra". 
His response was plain : "So much the better, if they thought I was the spokesman for the poor, I 
might have been shot in an "encounter" by now... It is not that I am not aware of big farmers. In 
rural areas too we have those who represent "India"...(as opposed td his country which he calls 
"Bharat")...people who are India's agents, and who have been the vote banks of India's 
government. But everything will evenout once the farmers get higher prices for their products, 
and be able to stand on their own."96 
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3.6 Peasant Power : The Politics of Competitive Populism 
The recent outburst of (rich peasant) "fanners agitations" have revealed a distinct new 
phase of class struggle in the Indian countryside. This is a marked change from the class 
struggles of earlier decades between antagonistic social classes : landlord-tenant, rich peasant-
agricultural labourer. In contrast, the political significance of these new agitations lie in the fact 
that they reveal a resurgence of "peasant power" - albeit of a rich peasant variety - coupled with 
"competitive populism". The former has expressed itself in the political clout wielded by the 
leaders of these agitations and their class base. The latter, on the other hand, has articulated the 
class interests of the "surplus-producing farmers" as the interests of the whole peasantry, 
consequently, mobilising the bulk of the rural population in the process. It is this unique feature 
of recent farmers agitations that we need to consider seriously. 
In the post-Green Revolution period, the rich peasant strata emerged as the rural elite to 
replace the landlord system of former times. This new class of "rural elite", therefore, came into 
prominence to symbolise commercialisation of agriculture, high technology and increased 
productivity in a largely stagnant agricultural section. Precisely for this reason they were 
patronised by the ruling government at the national and state levels: 
"Its essential and class principle is evasion of commitments on the basis of real 
economic and social differentiation in society. Its striking expression is reckless 
indulgence in welfare gestures and ready support to the demands and interests of 
any group or section, once it becomes articulate and begins to organise itself."97 
In recent years, there has been an increasing differentiation and stratification of classes 
and consequent political realignments. The more powerful upper layers in the economic and 
social hierarchy have begun to exercise, with extraordinary power, influence on political 
formations and to secure their interests at the cost of the lower strata. This politics of 
competitive populism finds its most cynical expression in the rural social and economic set-up. 
Therefore, in an economic situation where the bulk of rural surplus is controlled by a 
narrow strata of rich peasants, and who further monopolise inputs and rural technology and 
infrastructure; the contradictions of class exploitation are posed in a clear "false consciousness" -
a conflict between (urban) "India" and (rural) "Bharat" ! The agrarian cycle (productivity -
market - surplus profits) has a logic of its own and an inevitable contradiction : For increasing 
productivity and ensuring higher prices, the industrial sector needs to modernise (capitalise) 
further, and a profitable local market based on a stable - if not increasing - purchasing power of 
the population, ensured. 
Yet, today India's market and industry is unable to provide the necessary infrastructural 
and technological back-up to agriculture, instead it further appropriates agrarian surplus leading 
to increasing pressures on the rural population - especially the poor peasants and agricultural 
labourers. As one estimate put it : "... a four per cent growth in agriculture is simply not possible 
to sustain under the existing institutional and technological set-up of Indian agriculture, unless 
industrial growth is of the order of at least 10 per cent."''' 
67 
The process of differentiation and growth of Indian agriculture has therefore pitted the 
"rich peasant" class directly in conflict with the monopolistic industrial classes'' : - both 
competing to "share the cake" of India's development and modernisation. All at the cost of the 
vast masses of tenant-farmers, agricultural labourers and landless peasants - who today stand 
marginalised in the process and converted into 'cheap' and "militant" political fodder for the 
rural elites during times of "farmers agitations". 
The political irony of this situation is that the conflict between the rich peasantry (rural 
elite) and industrial monopolists takes place through the medium of Centre-State relations in 
India. In other words, the rich peasantry has come to exercise tremendous political leverage and 
influence on regional and communal parties and political processes to serve their own interests, 
accentuating the tensions prevelant in Centre-state politics, and, more important, giving way to 
fundamentalist forces of regionalism and communalism. It is precisely these political 
developments in recent years in India's agrarian scene that signals the resurgence of "rich 
peasant power", and, as some would like to call it, "Agrarian Fascism."100 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PHILIPPINES 
4.1 History of Peasant Movement in the Philippines 
(i) Peasant Struggles under Spanish and American Colonialism 
For over three centuries (1565-1896) the Philippines was colonised by the Spaniards. 
During this period the Filipino peasantry were subject to domination and exploitation by the 
Spanish colonisers. Spanish rule brought with it an alien religion i.e., Christianity, and new forms 
of political rule and economic systems. The colonisers introduced the "encomienda system", a 
form of plantation system for export production, by which they confiscated large tracts of land 
belonging to the peasantry. They forced the peasantry to work on these lands and produce export 
crops viz., sugar, hemp, copra or tobacco. 
Peasant revolts against Spanish colonialism during this period took the form of 
spontaneous anti-colonial revolts directed against the alien oppressor. Besides, these revolts also 
contributed to the rise of Filipino nationalism culminating in the formation in July 1892 of the 
Katipunan by Andres Bonifacio. This was a secret society of Filipinos whose aims were to 
spread nationalist ideas and to defend the interests of the poor and the oppressed against Spanish 
colonial exploitation, and to gain total independence of the Philippines.' 
By 1899, America replaced Spain as the colonial ruler over the Philippines and 
maintained this control until the Second World War in 1942. During this period, the Filipino 
peasantry consolidated itself and took organisational form with the setting up in 1924 of the 
KPMP (Katipunan Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas or National Peasants' Union of 
the Philippines). This Union attempted to consolidate the existing peasant associations all over 
the Philippines.2 
(ii) Peasant Struggles against the Japanese : The Huk Rebellion : (1942-1945) 
The turmoil of World War II (1939-1945) was also felt deep within Asia. On January 2, 
1942 Japanese forces invaded Manila and declared Martial law in the city. With the evacuation 
of the Americans, the Philippines was subjected to another imperialist power - the Japanese. The 
Japanese took complete control of the whole country and employed violent methods to suppress 
any opposition to their rule. However the PKM (Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid -
National Peasants Union) - a large peasant organisation during the 1940s - intensified its 
campaign for national liberation and democracy, rallying thousands of peasants to confront the 
take-over by the Japanese. Most of the resistance was underground and peasants with old 
firearms joined together to establish effective guerrilla squads to fight the Japanese. The 
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motivation of the peasants who joined the rebellion is reflected in the following statement of one 
of its participants : 
"I had no choice but to fight against the Japanese. I believed that the Philippines 
should be independent. The Japanese had no more right to my land than the 
Americans did. When the Americans came back in 1945,1 welcomed them only 
because they helped free us from the Japanese and because they promised us 
independence in one year."3 
This underground resistance movement was called the Hukbo Ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon 
(The People's Anti-Japanese Army) - more popularly known as the "Huk Rebellion". Its 
program included the following : 
(a) restoration of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, 
(b) liquidation of the enemy, his agents and puppets, 
(c) destruction of his supply bases and lines of communication, and 
(d) elimination of banditry and lawlessness in temtories under the Huk influence.4 
At its birth in April 1942, the Huks comprised of less than 300 persons with 5 squadrons, 
and by the end of the War, its forces exceeded 10,000 persons and 76 squadrons.5 The Huks 
were successful in launching militant actions and establishing control in the provinces of 
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan in Central Luzon. They set up provincial revolutionary 
governments, divided land among the peasants left behind by the landlords, and exercised 
immense power in the areas under their control. 
The Huk Rebellion, therefore portrayed a high level of political consciousness on the part 
of the Filipino peasants. Their underground strategies and guerrilla organisations provided the 
necessary training ground for future struggles to come. During the latter part of the 1940s, the 
Huks were to merge into the Peoples' Liberation Army of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP) and continue their struggles, although many of their key leaders and militant 
peasants were arrested or liquidated. Nevertheless, the struggle continued well into the 1950s. 
In the height of the Huk Rebellion against Japanese aggression, the leadership appealed to 
the American forces in the region to aid the Filipino struggle. Luis Taruc, the Commander of the 
Huks, sent a telegram to General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
Army Forces in the Far East on March 29,1942 which stated : 
"We, the people of the Philippines, loyal to the governments of the United States 
and the Philippines, are determined to offer our lives for the defense of democracy 
and territorial rights of both the Philippines and the United States. We wish that 
you will kindly grant your guidance and support to this newly bom but militant 
force of the Filipino people."6 
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The Americans, however, while eager to provide military, technical and financial aid to 
the Filipino people to drive out the Japanese and regain control over the Philippines, were 
however suspicious of the political and ideological foundations of the Huk rebellion. Among 
others, the main reasons for the differences that emerged between the Huks and the American 
forces (USAFFE - United States Armed Forces in the Far East during World War II) in their 
common war against the Japanese included the following : 
(a) the US considered the Huks as communist-inspired and hence subversive -
"The Hukbalahap is subversive...a radical organisation...(it) is reported to be 
modeled after the communistic organisations in China and is motivated by purely 
personal and political objectives...(it) is Anti-Democratic and Anti-Nippon, 
Communist by party affiliation, and Bolshevist in its tendency."7, (b) the 
Hukbalahap was a popular-based guerrilla movement with political organisations 
in the villages. The USAFFE were opposed to the Huks creating these 'extra-
governmental units' among the people, (c) The Huks aggressively resisted the 
Japanese forces, while the USAFFE 'consciously followed a more retiring 
strategy of collecting intelligence information and waiting for the American army 
to return'.8 
US aid played a crucial role in providing the military and ideological weapons to the 
independent government of the Philippines after the defeat of the Japanese, to crush the radical 
Huk rebellion. Between 1946 and 1950 the US had provided over US$ 700 million to the 
Filipinos to rebuild after World War II and to help finance government armed forces. In 
addition, between 1951 and 1956, the US provided another US$ 500 million of economic 
assistance and US.$.l 17 million of military assistance.9 Overall, the US provided nearly half of 
the funds designated for agrarian projects and the Filipino government's "psych war" against the 
Huks between 1951 and 1955. A Filipino Colonel who fought on the side of the US forces 
against the Huks stated in no uncertain terms that "U.S. aid was very important to defeating the 
HuL·...! 'd say 30 per cent of the credit for stopping the Huks goes to the United States."10 
US strategy to fight the Ник rebels included as well covert counter-insurgency methods, 
first developed by Lt Col Edward G Lansdale, Chief of the Manila station of the OPC (Office of 
Policy Coordination). Tbe OPC was created in 1950 by the National Security Council of the US 
government. In a top-secret document (NSC 68) dated April 1950 the mission of the OPC was 
explained as "covert psychological warfare, covert political action, and covert paramilitary action 
including sabotage, countersabotage, and support to anti-Communist guerilla groups."11 
Lansdale masterminded the US-planned election campaign that helped Ramon 
Magsaysay to become President of the Philippines in the National Elections of March 1953. 
Upon election to office, President Magsaysay provided a free hand to Lansdale and the OPC 
mission in Manila to wipe out the Ник rebellion.12 Lansdale's strategy to fight the Huks 
involved organising Magsaysay's new agrarian and governmental policies to win over the 
peasantry, and, more important, a careful study of the folk traditions and lifestyles of the 
peasants who provided the fighters and support for the Huks. To this effect : 
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"Lansdale ordered a careful study of the superstitions of the Filipino peasants, 
their lore, their witch doctors, their taboos and myths. He then got hold of a small 
aircraft and some air-to-ground communications gear. He would fly the aircraft 
over areas where Huks were known to be hiding and broadcast in the Tagalog 
language mysterious curses on any villagers who deigned to give the Huks food 
and shelter. He actually succeeded in starving some Huk units into surrender by 
these means. The only drawback was that Lansdale could use the operation only 
in the rainy season when the cloud cover hid the airplane from its audience on the 
ground."13 
On July 4,1946 the Philippines was declared "independent" from US colonial rule. This 
was merely a formal gesture on the part of the Americans and did not in any fundamental way 
change the situation of the Filipinos. The various treaties signed between the Americans and the 
local ruling elites, continued to bind the country, economically and politically, to the USA. After 
1946, Philippine government policy hardly deviated from the neo-colonial line of inviting 
multinationals, laying the country's resources open for foreign exploitation, allowing the 
violation of Philippine sovereignty in US military bases, and keeping wages down to suit the 
demands of foreign companies. 
Following independence, various labour and peasant organisations were set up to assist 
the peasantry. These included : the Associated Labour Union (ALU); the Federation of Free 
Farmers (FFF): the National Union of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers (NUPAAW); 
and the Philippine Labour Unity Movement (PLUM). Later many of these were co-opted by the 
rulers to ensure political control over the peasantry. All these formed a loose national 
confederation called the Philippine Council for Agrarian Workers (PCAW). Among these, 
perhaps the more effective peasant organisation was the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF), 
which was bom basically as a reaction to the militant Huk Rebellion of the past. 
The FFF was established in 1953 by a group of Catholic laymen headed by Jeremías 
Montemayor. In the initial stage under a relatively favorable climate, the FFF rapidly grew to 
over 36,000 members by March 1957, most of which were from Central Luzon - the same 
provinces where the Huk Rebellion had its strongest bases. The strong resistance by the landed 
gentry to solve the land disputes taken up by the FFF sparked off public demonstrations by the 
FFF members with strong support from students. 
A spectacular 2-month long picket was launched by the FFF in Manila between Septem-
ber and November 1969. With a younger leadership taking over the FFF and the successes in 
solving land disputes through militant actions, the FFF made a significant shift to a more radical 
approach in addressing the agrarian question in the Philippines. Further, the assassination of 
eight local FFF leaders in the province of Laguna between 1957-1970 increasingly radicalised 
the movement. 
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(Ui) The Peasantry and the Marcos Regime 
On September 21, 1972 President Marcos declared "Martial Law" in the Philippines. 
This severely crippled the FFF which lost most of its militant membership and has today become 
an instrument of government control over farmers in the country.14 
Martial Law was declared on the assumption by the government that tensions and con-
flicts were nearing an explosive situation in the Philippines. By 1970, the accumulated 
grievances of the various sections of the Filipinos against the Marcos regime and the blatant 
exploitation of US interests, escalated into unprecedented mass actions involving about 50,000 to 
100,000 participants - these commenced with the January 26 and 30-31 demonstrations in which 
thousands of workers, peasants, students, intellectuals and others participated. These mass 
actions, which later came to be known as the "First Quarter Storm of 1970" was a historical 
event in the Philippines, because this contributed to the setting up of numerous mass 
organisations of students, workers, farmers, intellectuals, middle sectors, and others, who were 
determined to radically change the entire social fabric of Philippine society. 
Martial law came in the form of institutionalising the Marcos dictatorship. The military 
was called in to control and eliminated the entire opposition and all human rights and civil 
liberties were curtailed and suspended. Trade unions, fanner organisations and student councils 
were banned and all publications were subject to strict censorship by the Martial law 
administration. Unable to persist in the wake of these stringent measures, most of the opposition 
and progressive forces in the Philippines went underground and joined hands with the Outlawed' 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA). 
(iv) The Armed Peasant Resistance 
The present Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was re-established, on December 
26, 1968 - the 75th anniversary of the birth of Mao Tse Tung. It evolved after a split with the 
pro-Moscow CPP. A year later, on March 29, 1969, the New People's Army (NPA), which was 
the guerilla army of the Party was established. In the 1960s and 1970s the CPP's character was 
based on the adoption of Maoist precepts and life-styles. Amando Malay. Jr. notes : 
"Mao jackets, caps, and badges became status symbols, worn as so many political 
statements denoting either adherence to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung 
Thought... Pride in one's 'Asian-ness' as a reaction perhaps to the uncritical 
worship of things Western in the past, was an observable attitude during this 
period and Lin Piao's glorification of the Asian, African and Latin American 
'countryside of the world' certainly reinforced this attitude."15 
The declaration of Martial Law in September 1972 polarised the democratic struggle of 
the Filipinos. Following 1972, the primary struggle was enacted between the Marcos government 
and the Filipino armed forces (AFP), on the one side, and the underground resistance of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), 
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on the other. As early as March 3,1972 it had been estimated that "the NPA had wiped out some 
800 enemy troops; some 900 informers, landlord despots and bad elements, and 22 military 
officers. It had also raided several major enemy camps, including the headquarters of Task Force 
"Lawin" and the Philippine Military Academy. 
In less than 3 years, the number of fulltime fighting squads had increased eightfold, 
exclusive of the more numerous local part-time guerrillas and the people's militia".16 In 
February 1986, at the time of the "People's Power Revolution" which brought Mrs Aquino to 
power - the NPA was still a formidable force in the Filipino countryside : 
"in 62 of the country's 73 provinces and...it controlled or influenced at least 20% 
of the barangays, the basic local political units of the Philippines. It had 
approximately 20,000 full-time armed guerillas in the field and perhaps half that 
number in armed militia units formed for local protection. Communist party 
leaders claimed a nationwide mass base of a million people, most of them farmers 
and workers."17 
In 1970 the alleged Chairman of the CPP, Jose Maria Sison - more popularly known by 
his Party name, Amado Guerrero - presented the main ideological positions of the Party and its 
understanding of the Philippines society, in his major work, "Philippine Society and Revolution". 
This book found widespread popularity among Party cadres and activists in the Philippines, and 
until today remains one of the main doctrinal works of the Party. Since then, however, the 
ideology and strategy of the Party has undergone much review and a lot of new thinking has now 
entered the movement. The prime ideological basis and the strategic program of revolution of 
the CPP/NPA is enunciated in the "10 Point Programme" of the National Democratic Front 
(NDF) adopted on November 12,1977 : 
"We basically rely on the people's armed revolution to overthrow and replace the 
fascist dictatorship with a coalition government of a national democratic form."18 
The 10 Point Programme also highlights the strategy of agrarian revolution of the Party 
and its immediate demands for the peasantry : 
"We advocate for the moment a policy of rent reduction and elimination of usury 
as a realistic step towards the genuine emancipation of the peasantry. We urge 
landlords to agree to this reform as enlightened ones among them have done. We 
advocate the raising of agricultural productivity through simple exchange of 
labour, mutual aid and cooperatives. Fair prices should be arranged between the 
peasants and merchants. In the frontier areas, the national minorities and small 
freeholders should be assured of the ownership of their land. Landgrabbing by the 
big landlords and big capitalists should be firmly opposed. 
In farms run on a capitalist basis, the farm workers should have trade unions and 
should demand better working and living conditions. Farm workers in non-
capitalist farms should organise themselves or join poor peasant associations so as 
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to get fair wages... They should also fight for genuine land reforms... The land 
problem, especially the problem of ownership, can be finally settle throughout the 
country upon the complete overthrow of US imperialist and comprador-landlord 
rule."1' 
Since its inception, the CPP/NPA combined have grown in strength and influence. In 
1980, the Party issued a statement on the 11th Anniversary of the New People's Army dated 
March 29,1980 which claimed : "Our guerilla fronts have a combined population of more than 
10 million. We effectively reach more than half of the people here, and they support the 
revolutionary movement in various ways. The core of this mass base consists of some 40,000 
mass activists and some 800,000 active members of the revolutionary mass organisations."20 To 
quote another estimate : "The radical Left, however, increased its influence in the countryside 
through dedicated propaganda and recruitment activities of cadres of the NPA guerillas... They 
claimed to have guerilla fronts in 43 out of 72 provinces throughout the country. The National 
Defence College recently estimated NPA strength at between 3,000 and 3,500 armed men with a 
mass base of 180,000."2f 
The US Intelligence estimates acknowledged the overwhelming strength and popular 
support of the CPP/NPA. A US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report of 1985 stated : 
"TTie Communist-led New People's Army (NPA) has grown from a minor presence in the 1970s 
to a number now estimated at over 30,000 armed regular and irregular guerillas. The NPA in 
conjunction with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) controls or is contesting control 
of settlements inhabited by at least 10 million people. The military initiative clearly rests with the 
NPA."22 
The effective implementation of a progressive agrarian program is crucial to the future of 
the Left movement in the Philippines. In fact, it is crucial to the very survival of the CPP/NPA, 
as it is basically a movement that relies heavily on the peasantry for support and strength. The 
CPP/NPA's agrarian reform must therefore be able to appeal to the peasantry and mobilise them 
into its mass organisations in the countryside. The majority of the Filipino population lives in the 
countryside, and it is in the rural areas that the violence of State repression and the military 
excesses are rampant. This fact has resulted in a situation where the poor and the exploited 
peasantry have little alternative but to seek shelter and protection from the NPA cadres. The 
NPA has so far been successful in providing this "backup-armed forces" for the peasantry. It has 
also helped them to set up cooperatives to increase agricultural production, self-defence units to 
protect themselves, and so on. As one source puts it: 
"Reflecting the numerical predominance of peasants in the national population, 
however, the vast majority of NPA guerillas are small settlers, poor farmers, 
tenants and landless labourers. Thus, while the NPA's ultimate goal is the defeat 
of government armed forced, this can be achieved only to the extent that the NPA 
succeeds in generating and leading the struggle for revolutionary land reform, 
thereby securing the lasting loyalty of the peasantry."23 
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After more than 20 years of armed struggle, the CPP/NPA claims to be at the "advanced 
sub-stage" of the "strategic defensive of peoples' war". It is said to have shifted from "early sub-
stage" to "advanced sub-stage" of this defensive stage around 1982. Basically, this is a stage of 
consolidation of its forces and increasing coordinated armed struggles against the "enemy". 
Although it has effectively provided the chief opposition to the Philippine government and the 
Philippines Armed Forces, the CPP/NPA has to confront the counter-intelligence and anti-
subversion operations of the Philippine Armed Forces, fanatical right-wing armed vigilante 
squads - like the "Rock Christ" groups in southern Mindanao, and many others.24 And yet the 
fact that the CPP/NPA maintains a de-centralised structure at the base, coordinated by a 
centralised leadership, makes its total repression rather difficult. 
The Philippine archipelago provides the most conducive geographical setting for a 
protracted guerilla war against the government. This geographical factor also explains the 
necessity for de-centralisation and self-reliance of the CPP/NPA. As Jose Maria Sison put it : 
"In the long run, the fact that our country is archipelagic will turn out to be an advantage for us 
and great disadvantage for the enemy...The enemy will be forced not only to the countryside but 
also to so many islands."25 
In the recent past the National Democratic Front (NDF) has been successful in mobilising 
influential international bodies and forming support groups for the Filipino resistance. A 
significant number of Filipino and friendly foreign groups have been established to mobilise 
public opinion and propaganda against the Philippine government and the military repression in 
the country. A clear evidence of this international network was the convening of the "Permanent 
People's Tribunal of the Philippines" in Antwerp, Belgium, between October 30 to November 3, 
1980.26 
Ideologically, however, the CPP/NPA has also been affected by the political turmoils in 
Communist China. Many Philippine analysts claimed that the CPP/NPA made a tactical blunder 
in supporting the Chinese government's Tiananmen Square crackdown against pro-democracy 
demonstrators.27 Perhaps China no longer remains the prime inspirer of the Philippine 
revolution, as perhaps it was in the past. Therefore, the implications of the political changes in 
China have become an important topic of discussion within the CPP/NPA ranks, in order to 
assess their significance and implications for the resistance movement 
Perhaps the CPP/NPA is learning more from the Nicaraguan experience today, than it did 
from the Chinese revolution in the past. These important changes in the international communist 
movement have directly affected the Filipino communists 2e How they would emerge from the 
present state of "ideological confusion" in the international communist movement today, can be 
determined only by the future of elite politics and the revolutionary praxis of the Filipino people. 
4.2 Agrarian Reform under Martial Law 
"Agrarian Reform is the cornerstone of the New Society", proclaimed President Marcos 
in September 1972 upon imposition of Martial Law in the Philippines, and issued Proclamation 
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No.2 declaring the whole country as a Land Reform area. On October 21, 1972 he issued 
Presidential Decree (PD) 27 limiting the coverage of land reform to only the tenanted rice and 
com lands, excluding a large portion of lands devoted to export crops - especially sugarcane and 
coconut. PD 27 which provided the framework and the legal basis of the Marcos agrarian reform 
program, proclaimed "the emancipation of all tenant-farmen" in the country. 
In this section we shall scrutinize some of the more salient projects and programs that 
were part of this agrarian reform, for these efforts were to bring about drastic changes in the 
Philippine countryside in the ensuing years. These were changes that failed to alleviate the 
situation of the tenant-farmers and landless agricultural labourers, who were intended to be the 
main beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program; instead it signaled a new era of agricultural 
boom based on highly capitalist forms of production and heavy foreign (transnational) 
investment in the agribusiness industry and export crop production. Further, we shall see how 
this sharpened the agrarian class conflict in the Philippines and fanned the flames of agrarian 
rebellion in the countryside. 
We need to draw a distinction here between "Land Reform" and "Agrarian Reform" -
Land Reform refers merely to changes introduced in the tenurial and ownership status of the land 
(sharecropping, rent tenancy or owner-cultivator farming); whereas. Agrarian Reform refers to 
the technical aspect of agricultural production that affect the productivity of farming i.e., 
methods of cultivation, seed varieties, irrigation, mechanisation - and changes in the politics of 
land control. 
In the Philippines, the call for a "genuine land reform" by the radical peasant movement 
since the Marcos period in the 1970s has implied a programme to "transfer the ownership and 
control of land". This implies a transfer of economic and political power from the landed elite to 
the landless tenants and agricultural workers. This is how we must define Agrarian Reform and 
that is the central issue at stake in the Philippines today.29 The three pillars of the "Marcos 
Agrarian Reform Programme" included the following : 
(i) MASAGANA 99 
Masagana 99 was basically a program to provide agricultural credit to rice farmers in 
order to enable them to increase the output of rice production through adoption of High Yielding 
Varieties of seeds, and utilisation of modern agricultural inputs, fertilisers, pesticides and farm 
machinery. Since farmers do not always have land to offer as collateral, the government provided 
a subsidy channeled through government and private lending institutions which provided non-
collateral loans to rice farmers.30 The program began in May 1973 and until the completion of 
Phase VI in March 1974, more than Pesos 2.5 billion had been channeled through the Philippine 
National Bank and the Rural Banking system to more than half a million farmers, in the peak 
year of 1974.31 
"Masagana" is a Tagalog work for "bountiful" which was partially achieved through this 
program. In the 8 years since its implementation, the Masagana 99 programme had contributed 
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to increasing rice production. As of 1977, the Philippines had been transformed from a rice 
importing to a rice exportine country. In 1979, rice (palay) production reached a record volume 
of 7.11 million metric tons. 2 However, the Masagana 99 was unable to really alleviate the 
depressed economic situation of the farmers largely due to the institutionalised nature of credit 
provided by this program and the "peasant psychology" to depend on the more traditional credit 
sources viz., landlords and money lenders. 
In fact, for many farmers, the program became increasingly unpopular. This is clearly 
indicated by the rapid drop in the number of borrowers from the credit scheme provided by the 
program during the various phases of its implementation - from 401,461 borrowers in Phase I 
(May-October 1973) with the total grant of Pesos 369.5 million, the number dropped to 85,401 in 
Phase ΧΠ (November 1978-April 1979) with a total grant of only Pesos 158 million - a decrease 
ofover78%.33 
Clearly, for most of the Masagana 99 loan recipients, this was the first experience 
dealing with institutionalised credit. They were threatened with prison if they did not repay 
overdue loans. Thus, either because of psychological preference or economic necessity, fanners 
again turned to the usurer for credit needs. 
Additionally, the Rural Banking system gained considerably through the Masagana 99 
program and rapidly expanded its business. Its gross income doubled from 1972 (before 
Masagana 99) to 1974, the first full year of implementation. By 1975, the net income rose to an 
all-time high of 20% of gross income. "The Rural Banking business became so profitable that 
1974 saw the largest number of new banks opened in the system's history - 76 in all."34 
Moreover, these rural banks were owned by rural families who were to be the 'victims' of land 
reform. They were also the distributors of agricultural inputs in the rural areas, and hence came 
to reap the main benefits of the Masagana 99 program. Rene Ofreneo sums up the main impact 
of Masagana 99 in the following words : 
"Obviously, rural indebtedness remains a serious problem in the countryside. 
Poverty begets indebtedness, indebtedness begets poverty. It is a vicious cycle 
that Masagana 99 and land reform have not altered. What Áe two programs have 
simply achieved are, on the one hand, to increase rice production, and on the other 
to blunt sharp class contradictions by transforming the big feudal lords into a rural 
capitalist and confusing the farmers, who are now more or less independent farm 
operators, as to whom their exploiters are. The multiplicity of lending institutions 
is one major source of confusion. Before, there was only one institution that could 
galvanize the rural masses to action - the feudal lord, who was both the landowner 
and the credit institution in the village."35 
(ii) SAMAHANG NAYON 
The Samahang Nayon (SN) is a barrio (village) unit of a national cooperative structure 
conceived by Dr. Orlando Sacay. This program was established by a provision of the 
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Presidential Decree 27 issued on October 21, 1972 which stated that "membership in a 
cooperative is one of the conditions in the emancipation of tenant farmers" in the country. As 
described in the training package of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the "Samahang 
Nayon" is an organization composed primarily of the fanners in one barrio with the underlying 
concept of mutual aid. It serves as an educational arm, a means of generating savings and a way 
of instituting discipline."36 Membership in the Samahang Nayon was envisaged to provide the 
fanner the following : (i) assistance in his credit needs, (ii) to act as a channel for one package of 
technology, (iii) guarantee his land amortization payments, (iv) assure effective acquisition of 
production and farm supply requirements, and (v) a marketing channel for agricultural 
produce.37 
This program too was far from being successful in the rural areas as studies indicate. It 
has been estimated that as of December 31, 1978 the program had been implemented in only 
27,697 barrios, out of the total target of 55,000 barrios. Also, the Samahang Nayon was a 
program that was strictly imposed from the top. Although they were called 'voluntary 
organisations' based on the free choice of farmers to seek membership, threats were used to 
bring in new members and pressure them to undergo the time-consuming training programs. 
Moreover, there were also false promises, like only those who join the Samahang Nayon will 
receive Masagana 99 loans. 
In terms of membership, there was a discrepancy. The fact that membership in SN was 
open to all members of the rural community, there was the danger of the program ending up in 
the hands of the rural elite, rather than the rural poor. This unrestricted membership policy in a 
way explains why there were lawyers, school teachers, and other professionals leading the 
Samahang Nayon's. Therefore, the numerous landless rural poor, who were financially unable to 
contribute any savings to the Samahang Nayon were conveniently left out. "On the whole, the 
basic weakness of the SN program lies in the fact that there is minimal participation and control 
by the members as well as the rural masses in the planning and implementing the program."39 
(iii) CORPORATE FARMING PROGRAM 
Under the government's "Export-Oriented Industralisation" (EOI) programme, 
Presidential Decree (PD) 1159 provided for the launching of the Corporate Farming Programme 
in 1975. By 1981, it was estimated that over 276 foreign corporations and 95 corporate farms 
had acquired over 86,017 hectares of land. In the southern province of Mindanao alone : "the 
Dole Corporation controlled over 30,000 hectares of prime agricultural lands in South Cotabato. 
The Philippine Packing Corporation (owned by the giant Multinational Del Monte) controlled 
over 24,000 hectares in Bukidnon. Guthrie Palm Oil Plantation acquired over 8,000 hectares of 
land in Agusan del Norte, and finally, the Manila Paper Mills Corporation had amassed over 
45,000 hectares of land planted to falcatta and ipil-ipil."40 
Corporate farms have been defined as "the voluntary grouping of small individual 
cultivated farms of approximately equal productive capabilities into larger units, the aggregate 
are treated and operated as a single farm." This would mean that different farms would be 
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operated as a single farm, under one management, and the produce harvested, processed, stored 
and marketed under a pooled system.41 This program's immediate effect has been the shift from 
rice production to the promotion and increase in the area of export crops planted in the 
Philippines. For example, "more than 80,000 hectares were planted to sugar in the crop year 
1974-75 than just 2 yean earlier. Based on field inspection in some of the areas where such crop 
conversion is taking place .... it seems likely that at least half of that was formerly planted to rice 
or corn. And of that 40,000 hectares at least, half again, was either purchased from cultivators or 
planted to sugar after ejecting or buying out the tenants."42 It has also been estimated that as of 
1976,40 wholly foreign-owned corporations had established corporate farms in the Philippines. 
Some of these were Caltex, Shell, Citibank, Firestone, Goodyear, Ford, Union Carbide, 
International Harvester, Dole, and Del Monte.43 Besides the above (Masagana 99, Samahang 
Nayon and Corporate Farming Program) other projects that were parts of the Marcos Agrarian 
Reform program included the following : fertilizer subsidy, crop insurance schemes, resetúement 
projects, and land transfer. 
To summarise, the agrarian reform program we have reviewed above, hardly introduced 
any fundamental change in the socio-economic problems of the poor fanners in the Philippines. 
In fact, it strengthened the hands of the traditional rural elites and further subjugated Philippine 
agriculture to the control of Multi-national corporations in the profitable agribusiness industry. 
Yet, the preamble of the "Five Year Philippine Development Plan for 1978-1982" claimed 
successes in the land reform program : "Significant achievements marked the performance of the 
agricultural sector in 1973-1976. Self-sufficiency in rice production was attained; credit and 
government resources were mobilised for food production; the Samahang Nayon movement 
which is the biggest farmer institution was initiated; and the rural household income expanded, 
improving the income distribution pattern between the rural and urban areas."44 
On the contrary, national surveys and studies conducted by various non-govemmental 
and voluntary organisations have come up with quite different impressions and findings. For 
example, a National Survey conducted by the Major Religious Superiors in late 1973 concluded 
as follows : 
"Landowners throughout the country resist the implementation of land reform 
program. There have been numerous accounts of harassment and threats, outright 
eviction of tenants in many farms, conversions of rice and com lands to other 
crops.... throughout the 11 regions of the country. Subdividing land among heirs 
and changing the status of tenants to agricultural workers is also fairly common. 
Politicians and government officials are generally not in favour of land reform. In 
some areas, they are the main obstacles to the implementation of the land reform 
program. "4i 
The balance-sheet of the Marcos Agrarian Reform programme indicates that the 
programme was limited to just 22.2% of more than 6 million hectares of rice and com lands, or 
only 13.7% of the entire agricultural land area of the country which is 13 million hectares. 
Besides, the number of beneficiaries was reduced to only 13.1% of the entire farming households 
in the country.4* 
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During the period of Martial Law these programmes brought about significant changes in 
the Philippine countryside. It stimulated new forces of production and control over agriculture 
and a new thrust towards export-orientation. In sum, the significant changes introduced in the 
Philippine countryside through the Agrarian Reform program in 1970s include the following : 
(a) Capitalism in Philippine Agriculture 
The most significant impact of the Marcos Agrarian Reform program in the past decade 
has been the consolidation of the forces of capitalist production in the countryside. In its so-
called attempt to alleviate the poor farmers from the bonds of "feudal" oppression and thereby 
eliminate backward relations of production in the countryside, the Land Reform program 
introduced and further consolidated capitalist forces, particularly through the patronage given to 
giant multinational plantations and export-oriented agriculture. In this sense, the Land Reform 
program modernised the production process in the countryside and thus sharpened the class 
polarisation of the rural Filipino society. 
Opening up the Philippine countryside to foreign investment and multinational 
corporations, also made the peasantry more dependent on imported farm machinery, fertilisers, 
and inputs. The consumption pattern of the Filipino peasantry also underwent significant changes 
with the introduction of the. "Green Revolution" - peasants dependency on fertilisers, pesticides, 
machinery, which tied them more strictly to the capitalist market in the Philippines and the 
international market. According to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), 
total fertiliser consumption rose from 101.2 million metric tons in 1956 to 563 million metric 
tons in 1972. At the same time, between 1956 and 1973, local fertiliser production rose from 
29.3 million Kg. to 348.2 million Kg.47 
Capitalism in agriculture can also be seen in the increasing commercialisation of food 
production. Vast expanses of rice fields have been converted into commercial plantations to 
produce export crops like sugarcane, coconut, banana, and pineapple. Owned and operated 
mainly by giant multinational companies, these plantations are run on a highly capitalist basis.48 
In this manner, the "Green Revolution" has not only shifted agricultural production from basic 
food crops to export-oriented crops, but it has also commercialised food production itself and "in 
the process paving the way for the integration of the traditionally isolated subsistence-oriented 
fanners into the mainstream of the capitalist economy. The small farmers now produce mainly 
for the market...'"19 
(b) The Multinational Corporations and the Agribusiness Industry 
Penetration of capitalism in the Philippine countryside would not have been possible 
without the dominant role played by multinational corporations and international big business in 
the agribusiness industry. By 1980, an estimated 45% of the country's cultivated land was 
planted with export crops for the international market : 
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"The United States imports about 350 million tons of sugar, 315 million tons of 
coconut oil, 95 million tons of canned pineapple, and 22 million gallons of fruit 
juice yearly from the Philippines. The Philippines also exports about $ 80 million 
worth of fish and $ 100 million worth of bananas every year, mostly to Japan. 
While the average Filipino consumes only about 89% of the calories needed for 
an adequate nutrition, the country exports about 800 calories per person per day in 
the form of coconut oil alone."50 
The US, Japan and the major capitalist countries in the West have always expressed keen 
interest in the agrarian sector of the poorer countries, like the Philippines, due to the latter's 
abundance of rich natural resources and human labour, and also the possibility to utilise these 
resources to satisfy the consumption demands of the these developed countries. Therefore, the 
"Green Revolution", invented by the capitalist world, was imposed on the Philippines. As 
pointed out by Ernest Feder : "The Third World countries' national agricultural policies and 
programmes are not anymore of the home-grown variety. They are, on the contrary, conceived 
and hatched by international agribusiness monopoly capital."31 
(c) From Peasantry to Proletariat 
There is evidence that the Agrarian Reform program and the "Green Revolution" in the 
Philippines have accelerated the process of "proletarianization of the peasantry". This is 
particularly true in the vast plantation areas and the mechanised rice production zones in the 
Philippines today. The further commercialisation of agriculture, the role of multinational 
companies and the agribusiness industry, the spread of industrialisation and modem techniques 
of farming, have all contributed to rapidly convert tradition share-croppers and tenant farmers 
into wage labourers and landless agricultural workers. 
In other words, capitalism in Philippine agriculture is gradually destroying the traditional 
"patron-client' relationships and replacing it with a more sophisticated relationship based on the 
capitalist mode of production. As we have seen earlier, this has resulted in the decay of the 
traditional classes in the Philippines and new agrarian ruling elites (rich peasants, capitalist 
farmers) have emerged above the predominant class of rural labourers - the rural proletariat.52 It 
is this volatile class of the rural proletariat at the bottom of the agrarian social structure in the 
Philippines today that possess the ideological potential and organisational weapon to rise up in 
revolt. As one source put it : 
"....The displaced cultivator is most often reduced to sporadic wage labour. His 
bitterness is deep and his propensity to violence, great. All that is needed is 
leadership to tum that violence to political purposes. Thus increased rice, banana 
or pineapple production today may have been bought at the price of widening 
rebellion within the next few years."53 
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4.3 Land Reform as Counter Insurgency 
Far from really tackling the basic socio-economic problems of the peasantry and 
"emancipating" them from the clutches of oppression, the "New Society's" agrarian reform 
program was basically intended as a counter-insurgency program to eliminate growing agrarian 
unrest in the Philippine countryside. As we have seen, in the years following the imposition of 
Martial law in the Philippines witnessed the rapid escalation of peasant resistance under the 
leadership of the New People's Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines (NPA/CPP). 
While the deteriorating economic situation of the poor farmers in the countryside was forcing 
them to join ranks with the NPA/ CPP and opt for armed revolution against the ruling classes, the 
Philippine government and US interests, alarmed at this explosive situation, hatched the 
ambitious land reform program to counteract this threat. To quote an USATO official : 
"Only if US security were threatened would we assist in realizing land reform in 
the Philippines. It would be difficult, but we could pull it off. If the Huks had 
been perceived as more of a threat, we would have done what we did in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan".54 
Since 1960s, USA had evinced a keen interest in the countryside of "under-developed" 
countries, like the Philippines, as the rural sector and countryside of these countries have bred 
and nurtured the most violent armed opposition to the ruling classes and foreign domination. 
Neglect of the agrarian sector would fan the flames of Communist-led peasant revolt - such was 
the firm belief of the USA and the local ruling elites. Counter-insurgency programs and 
numerous researches and studies on land reform and agricultural development, therefore, were 
keenly promoted and funded by the USA in the 1960s. The Philippines was indeed a fertile 
ground for such "counter-insurgency" experiments.55 
Hence, it is not surprising to note that the developments in Philippine agriculture, 
particularly in the 1960s, were very much in tune with the foreign policy of the USA. It was in 
1960 that the US-based Rockefeller Foundation, in cooperation with the Philippine government, 
established the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines to develop High 
Yielding Varieties of rice. Rice, which has been the staple food of the Filipino people and all 
over Asia, was seen as the basic tool to gain control over these countries. This was stated clearly 
by John King, who was closely associated with the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in the 
USA : "There is urgent need for efforts to help the peoples of south and southeast Asia under-
stand that the pretense and prosperity in China is a myth...The struggle of the "East" versus the 
"West" in Asia is, in part, a race for production, and rice is the symbol and substance of it."56 
Thus, the IRRI was established in a predominantly rice-based agrarian economy and in 
itself, this was a political decision of the USA and the Philippine government. "The Philippine 
elite also viewed the selection of its country (as IRRI's headquarters) in openly political terms. 
President Macapagal was quoted as saying that IRRI would "save" the Philippines and other rice-
producing countries the "time, expenses and efforts" in solving technical problems of rice 
production. He also wrote President Kennedy and said : "We consider this Institute as a potent 
weapon in the struggle against poverty and communism in Asia."57 
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The budget for the IRRI primarily came from the Ford Foundation with a contribution of 
US$ 1,229,260 in 1972, Rockefeller with US $ 810,745 and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) with $ i,532,23T.5t Further, funds from various 
multinational corporations, mostly US, were used mainly to finance researches on problems 
related to products, (like fertilisers, pesticides) which these corporations could supply to the 
Philippine farmers. 
Similarly, the "New Society's Land Reform Program" was also very much keeping in 
line with US interests in the Philippines. Consider, for example, the areas specified for land 
transfer. "Out of 144,538 recipients of land transfer certificates as of January 7,1974, as many as 
84,061 come from Nueva Ecija (33,254); Camarines Sur (10,351), Tarlac (9,702); Поііо (8,905), 
Pampanga (7,379); Isabela (7,307); and Cagayan (6,136), seven provinces which had a long 
history of peasant unrest and where there is today the greatest incidence of revolutionary 
activity."59 In fact, in its first Annual Report dated September 1973, the Department of Agrarian 
Reform Planning Service, itself admitted that the selection of land reform pilot municipalities 
was partly based on "the existence of prevelant social unrest." 
The World Bank was another major actor in aiding the counter-insurgency programme of 
the Marcos regime. The Bank participated in the "Integrated Area Development" (IAD) 
programs - ostensibly, a "development package" that offered residents services ranging from 
"security" and medical assistance to road building and technical agricultural aid; but which were 
clearly a military strategy of counter-insurgency against the revolutionary NPA/CPP. 
In the 1970s these IAD programs were implemented in four major areas in the 
Philippines : Cagayan Valley in Northern Luzon, the principal base of the NPA, the Bicol region 
in Southern Luzon, the key expansion area of the NPA in the period 1971-1974, the island of 
Samar in the Eastern Visayas, where the NPA began organising in force in 1974, and Mindoro, a 
large southern island regarded by the authorities as a potential area for NPA expansion.60 
Finally, if we look at the Military Assistance Program of the USA to the Philippine 
government during the period 1972-1978 (which was also the period of implementation of the 
New Society's Land Reform program) we see steady increases as follows : US Security 
Assistance program was 13 million in 1972, 16 million in 1973,18 million in 1975, and 19 
million US dollars in 1978.61 Significant jumps can also be observed in the size of the 
Philippine Military during this period : the size of the armed forces (including paramilitary) 
jumped from 62,000 in 1972 to 120,000 in 1975 (and increase of 94%), and the military budget 
from 131 million in 1972, to $368 million in 1975 (an increase of 181%).ω 
4.4 People's Power and Agrarian Reform : The Continuing Struggle 
The government of Cory Aquino which was swept into power in the aftermath of the 
"People's Power Revolution" of February 1986 which ousted the Marcos dictatorship, faced an 
explosive rural society that was ravaged by the lop-sided agrarian policies of the Marcos regime 
and extensively exploited by local landlord and foreign agribusiness corporations. The problem 
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of land monopoly remained unchallenged through attempts by the Marcos regime at land reform 
- nay, further oppressive creating the necessary conditions for armed rebellion of the peasantry. 
In the 1980s, surveys conducted on the situation of land monopoly across the archipelago 
revealed the following : "in Mindanao...an estimated 80% of the total cropland area (3.1 million 
hectares) are tilled by peasants, leaseholders, freeholding settlers and farmworkers. In the 
Visayas, around 70% of the total cropland area (2.5 million hectares) are not owned by the actual 
tiller-producers. In Central Luzon, despite it being a showcase of Land Reform, 70% of rice 
farmers and 50% of sugar farmers remain landless."" 
President Aquino on coming to power vowed to alleviate the hardships of the majority 
Filipino peasantry by declaring a "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme" (CARP). She 
announced : "the government will expand the land reform program in the country to reflect a true 
liberation of the Filipino farmer from the clutches of landlordism and transform him into a truly 
self-reliant citizen, participating responsibly in the affairs of the nation."64 In the year following 
her installation in power, the Aquino government reviewed a number of drafts of the CARP. 
Finally, on July 22, 1987 President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 131 and Executive 
Order 229 which instituted the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme". The main 
outline and time-frame of the CARP were : 
(a) Programme A (1987-1989) 
* Complete the Marcos programme 
* Distribution of 557,000 ha of rice and com land to 398,000 tenants 
* Enforce fixed rent leasehold of less than 7 ha. 
(b) Programme В (1987-1989) 
* Implement reform on lands sequestered, foreclosed, idle, 
abandoned, expropriated and 'voluntarily offered'; 
* Distribution of 600,000 ha of 425,000 beneficiaries. 
(c) Programme С (1989-1992) 
* Implement reform in landed estates (or haciendas) under 
labour administration and tenanted non-rice and non-com lands. 
* Distribute 1.28m ha to 640,000 beneficiaries. 
(d) Programme D (1987-1992) 
* Implement land reform in public lands suitable for agriculture, 
* Distribute 1.35m ha to 675,000 beneficiaries.65 
The financial costs of this land reform program were collosal, it was projected that the 
total cost up to 1992 would be Pesos 58.7 billion (or US$ 2.87 billion). This enormous cost 
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would be covered during the 1987-1992 period through three potential sources : (i) l/5th from 
budgetary support (i.e., Pesos 5.8 billion or US$ 283.6 million), (ii) 3/5th from the sale of non-
performing assets (i.e., Pesos 20 billion or US$ 978m), and (iii) l/5th from foreign borrowing 
(i.e.. Pesos 6.5 billion or US$ 317.8m). This left a gap of about US$ 1.29 billion to be covered by 
additional foreign borrowings.66 
The World Bank, which had always taken a keen interest in the rural development 
programmes of the Philippines through its massive technical and financial assistance to the 
Marcos regime in the 1970s, was once again invoked to assist the CARP of the Aquino 
government. Since the 1970s the World Bank laid particular emphasis on "rural development" 
having formulated this strategy in the early 1970s under Robert McNamara.67 
The World Bank's rural development program in the Philippines was one of the largest in 
the Third World - "between 1973 and 1981, the Bank committed about US$ 1 billion - or over 
40% of total lending to the Marcos regime - to rural development.. (and).. the Bank played a 
major advisory role in the government's key programs, land reform and the Masagana 99 credit 
program."68 
The World Bank expert, Mr Roy Posterman, the chief architect of the Land Reform 
program implemented by the US in South Vietnam, and El Salvador, visited the Philippines in 
1986-1987 to advise the Ministries of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform on the content and 
implementation of the new Land Reform programme of the Aquino government. Among others, 
Posterman proposed : (a) land reform be continued in rice and corn through "Operation Land 
Transfer" (i.e., the continuation of the Marcos Land Reform program), (b) land foreclosed and 
sequestered be redistributed, (c) financial sources for subsidising the land reform program be 
taken from foreign aid - especially under the new provisions of Section 620 (g) of the US 
Foreign Assistance Act, (d) compensation for peasants to be based on their capacity to pay or by 
lowering exorbitant prices for land, and (e) land distribution or co-partnership (land sharing) with 
farmworkers and peasants in sugarlands be immediately encouraged.69 
However, within a year the World Bank's assessment of the progress in the CARP 
became skeptical of the political will of the Aquino government to undertake any fundamental 
restructuring of land ownership and control in the countryside. In 1987, the Bank sent a team of 
experts to the Philippines which submitted a "confidential report" to the government, which 
concluded, among others : 
(i) "the most damaging to the ultimate goals of the land reform" are the plan to 
phase in the reform over a period of several years and the high ceilings on the 
acreage current landowners would be allowed to retain. The Bank suggested all 
phases of the CARP be simultaneously implemented. 
(ii) The step-phased strategy would give landowners the opportunity - even 
encouragement - to transfer parts of their holdings, usually to relatives, in order to 
evade the reform and thereby substantially reduce the amount of land available for 
redistribution to tenants and farmworkers. "Such an outcome would virtually 
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preclude any genuine and orderly land reform in the Philippines in the foreseeable 
future" (para 20, pp.6-7) 
(iii) in relation to "just compensation", the report noted that "successful agrarian 
reform programmes have always included a confiscatory element". 
(iv) "external funding is unlikely to be available for the purposes of land compen-
sation to landowners and budgetary allocations would not be sufficient" 
(v) The Bank recommended : lowering of overall costs of the land reform 
(through lowering the compensation paid to landowners), reallocating existing 
government resources, domestic borrowings and raising taxes (para vi; pp.72-74) 
(vi) Finally, the report implicitly criticized the government for a centralised, top-
down approach by recommending "local-level participation in all aspects of the 
agrarian reform." (para 19, p.vi; pp.72-74)70 
Inspite of this critical assessment of the World Bank as well as increasing opposition 
from the militant peasant movement in the Philippines, the Aquino government bowed to 
pressure from the landlord lobby in Parliament to push through with its CARP without making 
any fundamental change in favour of the poor peasants and farm workers. Certain US interests 
also played a role in influencing the Philippine Congressmen in order to protect the interests of 
US transnational agribusiness corporations in the country. To quote one source : "...the United 
States, has reinforced the inherent bias within the landlord-dominated Philippines Congress 
against a truly redistributive agrarian reform programme. This is in marked contrast to the United 
States' earlier sponsorship and support for successful redistributive land reform in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan."71 
The Aquino government's "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme" (CARP) was 
basically flawed especially in the following three areas, which were the main areas in which the 
intense debate between the pro-landlord lobby and the militant peasant movement took place 
after CARP was introduced as legislation : 
(a) in its Program A phase, it basically attempts to complete the "lop-sided" Marcos Land 
Reform programme. It thus addresses only the issue of tenancy and not that of inequity. 
By postponing until 1989 the coverage of the land reform on non-rice and non-corn lands 
i.e., the major sector of agricultural lands planted to export crops and large haciendas, the 
programme aims to bow down to pressure from the World Bank/International Monetary 
Fund (WB/IMF), Thus, lands under foreign plantations and large estates controlled by 
local landowners will thus remain relegated to the background, 
(b) the programme is centred on land redistribution per se, and does not include the provision 
of adequate support services (e.g., education, credit, infrastructure or irrigation) for the 
intended beneficiaries of the CARP. In this sense, it is repeating the same fundamental 
errors of the previous Marcos Land Reform programme, and 
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(с) the large chunk of financial expenditures under the programme are estimated to be 
payments for land compensation to landowners. As much 98% of the total costs of the 
CARP are envisaged to go for land compensation, as the CARP assures "just 
compensation at fair market value" for the lands it purchases from landowners. 
Furthermore, the government has approached multi-lateral institutions for funding for the 
CARP - the World Bank has been requested for an initial funding of US$ 500 million which is 
intended to serve as the "seed money" for the planned Land Reform Fund.72 As noted by 
Gerardo Bulatao - who worked 4 years with the Aquino government in the area of Agrarian 
Reform and later resigned : 
"If it is just a stone thrown into a comer rather than the cornerstone or if it is 
centrepiece only in the sense of a decorative vase on a side table, it will have little 
impact on national development. But if it is the key program of Government 
around which other programs are designed or the core of countryside 
development requiring adjustments in other programs affecting the rural areas, 
then agrarian reform can make a difference in national development."73 
The "National Peasant Movement in the Philippines" - Kilusang Magbubukid ng 
Pilipinas (KMP) - which was formed in June 1985 comprising of all local and regional peasant 
unions and associations, especially in the Central Luzon province, provided the leadership to the 
peasant protests against the CARP. The KMP, in fact, had submitted a "Proposal for Genuine 
Agrarian Reform in the Philippines" to President Aquino herself as early as June 5,1986 which 
urged the new government to, among others : 
(i) Implement a genuine land reform programme, (ii) Promote a nationalist, independent, 
scientific agricultural orientation. Stop foreign monopoly and control in agriculture, (iii) Reduce 
the cost of production to a level that can be afforded by the peasants. Guarantee fair prices for the 
peasants' produce, (iv) Create a support program that will truly improve the livelihood of the 
peasants, and (v) Uphold the democratic rights of the peasants to collective, free and meaningful 
action as well as participation in decision-making and to stop repression in the countryside.74 
The KMP further outlined a "Five-Year Program for Genuine Land Reform" which 
proposed the following : 
Phase 1 : "Confiscation and Distribution of lands owned by the deposed dictator 
and his crony fascist landlord-compradors (2 years); 
Phase 2 : The expansion of free distribution to all croplands (late quarter of the 
first phase up to the fourth year); 
Phase 3 : The nationalisation of transnational agribusiness plantations and the 
total abolition of feudalism (fifth year)".75 
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Anticipating formidable opposition from the pro-landlord lobby in Congress and the lack 
of political will of the Aquino government to undertake a radical land reform programme, the 
KMP launched its own initiative to implement its "Programme for Genuine Land Reform" in the 
country. Jaime Tadeo, the vocal leader of the KMP, declared in no uncertain terms within a year 
after KMP announced its own Land Reform program : 
"The KMP has its own program for genuine land reform, and it is actively 
implementing it. We made a promise before which we are making good now. We 
have promised that if the Aquino government fails to implement land reform, we 
will implement it ourselves. And we are doing just that...At present, our local 
organisations have taken over more than 50,000 hectares of unproductive, idle and 
abondened lands nationwide, more than 20,000 hectares of which have already 
been made productive by the peasants...in areas where the KMP farmer-members 
have remained tenants, we work for the reduction of land rent, and as far as 
possible, the abolition of usury."76 
By 1988, the opposition against the CARP consolidated with the convening of the "Multi-
Sectoral Conference for Genuine Agrarian Reform" between January 25-26, 1988 which adopted 
a "People's Agrarian Reform Code - PARCODE". Participants included over 600 delegates 
representing a broad spectrum of peasant organisations, sectoral and cause-oriented groups, non-
governmental organisations and political alliances, as well as leading agrarian reform advocates 
and supporters. PARCODE called for : (i) Land to the Tiller and complete abolition of absentee 
landownership/absentee proprietorship, (ii) Comprehensive coverage of all types of arable lands, 
water resources, (iii) Progressive and selective compensation to landowners, (iv) Inclusion of all 
previous land rentals and unpaid labour as direct payments for the land, (v) Full participation of 
beneficiaries in decisions-making and implementation, (vi) Preferential option for cooperatives 
and collectives, (vii) Recognition of the rights of women to land ownership, (viii) Revision of 
Filipino control of all lands presently covered by multinational corporations, (ix) Recognition of 
the rights of small fisherfolk towards greater access to and use of water resources, (x) 
Recognition of the ancestral land rights of tribal communities and indigenous settlers, (xi) Use of 
local resources for financing agrarian reform, and (xii) Implementation of just labour conditions 
for farmworkers.77 
In March 1988, AMIHAN, a peasant-based women's organisation, and GABRIELA, a 
national coalition of feminist organisations, adopted a Draft Program on "Women on Land 
Reform" which, among others, called for : (a) redistribution of the wealth and power of 
landowners to actual tillers and producers - the peasant men and women, (b) to uplift the status 
of rural women by recognising their right to own and rent land, promoting the equality of men 
and women in decision-making, (c) promote national industrialisation and to channel agricultural 
surplus to national industries rather than foreign controlled markets, and (d) to build real 
democracy bypromoting the ability of men and women to determine the direction of their own 
development. 
The Aquino government, however, paid no heed to the radical call of the KMP and other 
peasant organisations and NGOs for an effective "pro-peasant" agrarian reform programme. In 
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fact, it has intensified its military operation against the militant peasant movement and alleged 
"front-organisations" of the New People's Army/Communist Party of the Philippines.7' 
Furthermore, the fact that ownership and control of land in the Philippines is largely vested with 
private (both local and international) interests further explains the hesitancy of the government to 
upset the given rural political balance of power. As Tadem notes 
"Private lands lie at the heart of agrarian reform because it is here where the 
highest incidency of social injustice occurs. Intense conflicts between private 
landowners on one hand, and tenants of farmworkers on the other, have 
characterised history of the Philippine countryside. Performance in this sector is 
therefore the real test of political will and sincerity of government."80 
4.5 Peasants and National Liberation 
The Philippines has experienced a history of consistent peasant resistance against local 
domination and foreign exploitation. This history enables us to trace a process of growth and 
consolidation of a radical peasant movement supported by an armed communist movement in 
opposition to the ruling government. This history enables one to talk of a peasant movement in 
the Philippines, particularly in the post-World War II period. 
Peasant resistance in the Philippines was initially sporadic and localised. There were no 
formal organisations or movements to coordinate or lead it during their early stages of resistance 
against Spanish colonialism, except perhaps in the South with the Moro resistance where once 
can find some level of coordination in their fierce fight against the Spaniards. Indeed, from the 
very beginning, peasant resistance was violent and protracted in the Philippines. The basic 
motivation behind peasant resistance during this period was the fact that they feared the sudden 
appearance of a foreign power to control and dominate their otherwise peaceful life in the 
country. 
Despite defeats and setbacks, peasants learn their lessons from their own history. History 
taught the Filipino peasants that they were considerably weak, both militarily and in tenms of 
organisational strength, to resist the colonisers. Yet, the organisations they initially formed 
lacked a clear political direction and understanding of the nature of the socio-economic changes 
that were sweeping the countryside during the time of American colonialism. 
The aftermath of the Philippine Revolution and the coming of the Americans did permit a 
relatively more liberal atmosphere for the peasants to equip themselves and build up their own 
organisations. But these attempts too failed to really alleviate the peasants from their oppressive 
situation. Therefore, they needed a more radical organisation with a radical program of change 
in the Philippine countryside. 
The Huk Rebellion (1942-45) was to provide the Philippine peasantry with this radical 
ideology and strategy for change. It was through this rebellion that the peasantry learnt its 
organisational capacity, strategy for resistance and coordination of its forces. Moreover, the 
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successful armed guerrilla warfare launched by the Huks against the superior Japanese forces set 
the stage for a new phase in the history of peasant resistance in the country. From that point 
onwards, it was to be armed guerrilla warfare that was to be the means of effective resistance 
against the Philippine elite and foreign domination. 
The formation of the new CPP and the NPA in 1968-69 was another landmark for 
peasant resistance in the Philippines. This enabled peasants, as well as other sectors (e.g., 
workers, students, intellectuals and tribals) to join forces together under a national political 
coordination, with a definite political ideology and organisational structure. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SRI LANKA 
5.1 The Colonial Context and Introduction of a 
Dependent Export Economy in Sri Lanka 
Traditional Ceylon was characterised by three main kingdoms : the Jaffna kingdom in the 
North, the Kandyan Kingdom in the central highlands and the Kotte kingdom in the south-west. 
Ceylon experienced a long history of colonial rule : the Portuguese first conquered the Maritime 
provinces in 1505 and later the Dutch ruled Ceylon for over two centuries. However, it was only 
with the annexation of the Kandyan kingdom in 1815 by the British, that the entire island came 
under one administrative rule under the colonial power. 
It was under the British that the economy experienced fundamental changes. The British 
opened up vast areas of lands in the central highlands to introduce coffee plantations. In order to 
gain access to needed land for the expansive plantations, the British introduced various laws : the 
"Crowns Lands Encroachment Ordinance" (1840)1 under which over 260,000 acres were 
alienated from the peasantry and sold to the British coffee planters at a ridiculous sum of "5 
shillings an acre". In 1856, the "Temple Lands Registration Ordinance" was enacted by the 
British to take over "chena lands" ("slash & bum" or shifting cultivation) and rice lands which 
were under the control of temples. 
The plantation economy itself was developed along modem capitalist lines : high capital 
investment and the use of advanced management techniques to facilitate production for export. 
Additionally, to provide the cheap and indentured labour required by the plantations, the British 
imported Indian labourers from Tamil Nadu in neighboring South India. This immigration, 
which began with about 3,000 workers in 1839, reached 72,000 by 1844. Housed in miserable 
living conditions {"line houses") and working under semi-slave conditions, this alien workforce 
provided the necessary labour on these plantations.2 Shanmugaratnam describes the economic 
scenario at the end of die 19th century and early 20th century as follows : 
"The plantation system itself was implanted at a time when Sri Lanka's internal 
development had not yet thrown the conditions for a capitalist transformation. The 
nature of the plantation system was such that it did not, and was not intended to, 
serve as an exogenous factor to transform the pre-existing mode of production."3 
The precise impact of the British colonial policy and the introduction of the plantation 
economy on the prevailing agrarian context in Ceylon, is the subject of an intense debate among 
Sri Lankan social scientists. Some argue that Ceylon emerged as a classical case of a "dual 
economy" defined as : 
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"The domestic agricultural sector was primitive, tradition-bound, un-organised, 
non-capitalist and engaged in subsistence production. This sector contained about 
85% of the land area and 72% of the population. The export plantation sector was 
capitalistic, factory-based, centrally managed, hierarchically organised and 
'modem,."', 
Others, like S.B.D. De Silva have strongly argued that the plantation economy itself 
indicated signs of "relative backwardness" and therefore, unable to provide the "capitalist pull" to 
agriculture. However, inspite of academic debates on the nature of the colonial economy under 
British rule, it is evident that the British colonial policy patronised the plantation economy at 
every stage of its development, while at the same time, taking adequate measures to "preserve 
the peasantry". Thus, by the early part of the present century, the imposed plantation economy 
indicated some specific features : 
(i) British ownership and management of most estates, 
(ii) provision of finance by British banks and agencies, 
(iii) large-scale factory-type operation using massive forces of immigrant Indian 
labour especially imported for the purpose, 
(iv) control of import-export trade by the British, 
(v) complete reliance on imported supplies of capital equipment, estate supplies, and 
even food for the labour force, 
(vi) complete reliance on foreign - especially British markets for the product.6 
The rapid expansion of the plantation economy, however, necessitated the development 
of infirastructural facihties. By the mid-19th century, the British had established a vast network of 
roads and communication links between the plantations and the main port city of Colombo. This 
was possible because of the labour provided through "corvee" (the traditional "Rajakariya i.e., 
free service to the State) by the natives. It was evident that the roads and railways constructed by 
the British were primarily intended to make the plantations the main beneficiaries of the new 
communication system.7 
The most severe impact of this British colonial policy on the Ceylon peasantry was the 
numerous taxes introduced during this period. The British assumed that the peasantry must share 
in the high costs of the plantation development. The "Grain Tax" was introduced as an attempt 
to draw the peasantry into the cash economy. The peasantry was thus forced to take up to cash 
crop cultivation or sell their labour in order to pay this tax. Moreover, the tax burden also 
resulted in land alienation and land transfer. The peasantry was forced to mortgage their small 
holdings or sell them off to absentee landlords, in order to meet the tax demands imposed on 
them. Data available covering this period clearly indicate the extent of impoverishment of the 
peasantry under the burden of the grain tax : 
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"According to the data recorded by the district administrators of the time, in the 
Udukinda division of Uva, for example, evictions and sales between 1882 and 
1885 affected 2,930 heads of households; this number implies that 14,650 
persons, or, 49% of the total population in the division were dispossessed of their 
paddy lands either in full or in part. It has been recorded further that about 20% of 
the number so dispossessed were compelled to leave their homes and that a 
majority of them became tenant cultivators."8 
The heavy tax burden which was a result of the patronage policy of British colonialism 
on the plantation economy, imposed tremendous hardships on the subsistence-based peasantry. 
As Bandarage notes : 
"..the incompatibility of the interests of capitalist export agriculture and that of 
peasant subsistence and smallholder production. It resulted in a conflict between 
opposing modes of economic production, a conflict in which the plantations were 
victorious because they had the support of the colonial state at every tum."9 
Apart from this primary economic contradiction of British colonialism, a further cause of 
increasing discontent among the traditional Kandyan peasantry was the British policy towards 
Buddhism. When the British annexed the Kandyan kingdom in 1815, they assured the Kandyans 
of state patronage for the Buddhist religion. However, with increasing pressure from Christian 
missionaries to convert the natives, the government began to disassociate itself from Buddhism, 
and provided a free hand to the missionaries. Increasing discontent and resentment among the 
Kandyan peasantry, therefore, witnessed several outbursts of popular revolt against the British 
colonisers in the 19th century. The two most important rebellions during this period were the 
Rebellions of 1818 and 1848, which we will discuss in the next section. 
5.2 The Colonial Period : Peasant Rebellions 
in 18th and 19th century Ceylon 
The long period of colonialism that Ceylon experienced during the three centuries it was 
under the Europeans viz., Portuguese, Dutch and the British witnessed some of the most 
significant developments that have a bearing on the country's economy and polity even today. 
Colonialism brought capitalism to Ceylon in the form of the plantation economy which was 
imposed on a traditional subsistence peasant economy. The logic of this development was such 
that the peasantry in Ceylon had to bear the brunt of the high costs of the development of the 
plantation economy through taxation. Besides, British colonialism brought to the island an alien 
religion and lifestyle which disrupted the traditional social fabric of the existing society. 
In the circumstances, therefore, the native population rose up in revolt on many occasions 
against the alien coloniser. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Ceylon witnessed numerous armed 
revolts and rebellions that shook the power of British colonialism on the island and nearly 
brought to an end colonial domination of Ceylon, if not for the betrayal of these rebellions by the 
feudal aristocracy and chiefs in the Kandyan region. 
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CO Popular Revolts in the Maritime Provinces 
Popular revolts in the maritime provinces occurred as early as the 18th century against 
the Dutch colonisers. These revolts erupted among cinnamon peelers who were of the Salagama 
caste. They were obliged by the Dutch authorities to peel a certain quantity of cinnamon in lieu 
of a poll tax and in return for grants of land.10 
In 1723, the cinnamon peelers revolted complaining of "excessive burdens laid on them." 
Again, in 1734 some peelers who were sent to the Seven Korales refused to work because of 
exactions by officials in the form of extra cinnamon. They are said to have been joined by peeler 
from other districts. In 1760, a general rebellion took place among the cinnamon peelers in the 
Maritime provinces and this time they were supported by the Kandyan king. They "set fire to the 
cinnamon they had collected and fled to the Kingdom of Kandy."11 
Soon after the British took over the maritime provinces from the Dutch, they imposed the 
"coconut tax" in 1796 whereby coconut growers were obliged to pay one silver fanam in cash on 
every coconut tree on property where there were 50 or more trees. Further, they abolished the 
service lands which had been earlier given on tenure, for which occupiers had to work free for 
the government for some day. These lands were then taxed at the rate of half the produce. 
These taxes were greatly resented by the people, which was accentuated by the 
harassment suffered by them from the "Indian" tax-collectors the British recruited to collect taxes 
from the people. These tax-collectors were known to have used very harsh methods to collect 
the taxes and thereby evoked the resentment of the native people. 
The revolts that erupted against these taxes lasted for one and a half years, and spread to 
the Northern, Eastern and South-westem parts of the maritime provinces.12 The initial protests 
began in Jaffna in September 1796 and by December, had spread to coconut growing areas of 
Rayigam Korale where the rent collector was seized when he tried to collect the tax. In many 
districts, the rebels carried out armed guerilla-type actions against British troops who were 
dispatched to quell the rebellion. According to one account of the 1797 revolt: 
"A body of Sinhalese took up arms and retired into the woods at the distance of a 
few miles from Colombo; several of the corles and districts at the same time 
declared openly in favour of the rebellion. A detachment of Sepoys was sent 
against them; several severe combats ensured; and it was not till a considerable 
loss of men on both sides that the insurgents were completely subdued."13 
In the wake of this spreading rebellion, the British abolished the coconut tax in 1797. 
However, they used their superior military power to crush the rebellion. Many of the leaders of 
these revolts were hanged and by March 1798 the rebellion had ceased. 
In 1800 another wave of violent revolts erupted on the issue of the imposition of the "Joy 
Tax" by the British. This tax was imposed on "joys" (jewelry and trinkets) made of gold, silver, 
pearls, ivory or bone. Any person wearing such an ornament had to pay a tax to the renters.14 
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The revolt against this tax began in June 1800 in Mannar, where "Colonel Barbut fired on 
3,000 insurgents who threatened to kill the renter, killing one man and taking ten prisoners."15 
Resistance to this tax also took violent forms in Matara, Moratuwa and other areas. However, 
these sporadic outbursts of violence were easily crushed by the British troops. 
Although these revolts were limited to certain pockets of resistance on the island and 
failed to become widespread, they nevertheless laid the basis for the more organised resistance 
that followed in the 19th century, particularly in the Kandyan region against British colonialism. 
The revolts we have discussed above were directed primarily against the tax-collectors and 
government officials and were led by spontaneous leaders who were able to gather together a 
band of fighters using traditional weapons. 
The Dutch and the British colonisers were, however, alarmed at the prevailing discontent 
and fearing the spread of violent rebellion against their rule on the island, used their superior 
military might to crush these sporadic revolts. However, the spirit of resistance of these revolts 
against the alien rulers were not subdued. They were to emerge in a more organised manner in 
the later years and pose considerable opposition to British colonial power on the island. 
(Ü) The 1818 Rebellion Against British Colonialism 
Besides the numerous tax burdens and exactions imposed on the Kandyan peasantry by 
the British, some historians have argued that the loss of the "Kandyan pride" among the chiefs 
and Buddhist clergy in particular, provided the immediate cause for the rebellion of 1817-1818. 
As we have noted, the disassociation of the government from the Buddhist religion deeply hurt 
the religious sentiments of the Kandyan nobility and peasantry. It is for this reason, besides 
others we have considered earlier, that the Kandyan nobility and clergy provided leadership and 
legitimacy to the peasant rebellions of 1818 and 1848. 
A specific characteristic of the peasant rebellions of this period was the important role 
played by "pretenders" to the Kandyan throne. Claiming to be successors of former noble 
families, these "pretenders" were successful in mobilising the masses of peasantry in political 
opposition to British rule, seeking in the process, the restoration of the monarchy in the Kandyan 
region. Thus, a class-alliance is seen in these revolts between the nobility and the Buddhist 
clergy (the traditional ruling class hierarchy of the Kandyan kingdom) and the peasantry. They 
joined together to expel the British rulers and restore the feudal hierarchy of the traditional 
society. 
In July 1817 it was reported that Vilbave, "who claimed to be a member of the deposed 
Nayakkar royal family named Doraisvami, made his appearance at the religious centre of 
Kataragama where he announced that God Skanda has designated him to be King."16 Together 
with a band of bhikkus (Buddhist monks) he moved around Velassa armed with bows and 
arrows. It was precisely in these areas that the peasants rose up in revolt between September 
1817 and January 1818. In many instances, the armed peasantry clashed with British troops and 
were subdued with heavy loss of life. 
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Geographically, the rebellion was widespread in the Kandyan region i.e., from Velassa 
and Valapane to Uva, Dumbara, Hawaheta, Mátale, Nuvara-Kalaviya, Sabaragamuwa and the 
seven korales. Barring a few small regions of the Three and Four Korales, the Kandyan regions 
were all under the control of the rebels.17 The rebels were said to have used guerilla tactics to 
fight against the British troops. "They were armed with bows and arrows and muskets and used 
charcoal, nitre and sulphur to manufacture their own gunpowder." 18 
The British, however, were quite unprepared to confront an escalating aimed rebellion of 
this sort. With the flames of rebellion spreading all over the Kandyan region, the British 
summoned more troops from neighboring India to quell the rebellion. Obviously, the British 
were faced with an imminent threat to their political power on the island, and in fact, expressed 
this alarm quite vividly. 
The Governor stated in April 1818, while making an urgent appeal for troop 
reinforcements from Madras: "the spirit of the Rebellion still continues unbroken ... with 
unfortunate consequences for British national Honour and Interests", and that a successful 
Kandyan rebellion would threaten "the safety of the British Empire in India" and the reputation 
"of the invincible power of... British Arms.' 
It was only with the arrival of reinforcements made up of several battalions of troops 
from India, that the British were successful in defeating the rebel forces. The superior strength 
of the British troops and the vast numbers of British soldiers who marched into the Kandyan 
region from Colombo, Batticaloa and Trincomalee, were far too strong for the ill-equipped rebel 
forces. By October 1818 the rebels were defeated and the British captured and executed the 
leading rebel chiefs, Kappitipola and Madugalle, and another 25 chiefs and headmen were exiled 
to Mauritius. Fearing further reprisals, the British imposed Martial Law on November 21,1818. 
This rebellion - the first major attempt at armed resistance against British colonialism by 
the Ceylonese peasantry - has come to be known as the "Great Rebellion of 1818". In some 
ways, this rebellion was also a nationalist revolt, as it gave expression to their lost religious and 
social identity vis-a-vis the dominant Western and Christian social life imposed by British 
colonialism. As Bandarage observed "The 1818 rebellion was also a nationalist revolt. The 
nationalist sentiments shared by the feudal overlords (nobility and clergy) and the peasantry 
based on their common Sinhalese Buddhist ethnic identity came to the fore in their attempt to 
drive out the European Christian intruder."20 
However, it must be noted that this "nationalist consciousness" had not crystallised 
sufficiently to lead to a more broad-based nationalist movement. In fact, the contradictions of 
British colonialism in the Kandyan region itself did not permit such a development. The 1818 
Rebellion, therefore, was in essence a spontaneous revolt against the evils of foreign domination, 
and merely attempted to restore the pre-colonial feudal order in the Kandyan region. 
Between 1820-1846 there were numerous other incidents of armed revolt against the 
British in various parts of the Kandyan region. All of these followed the general pattern of the 
1818 Rebellion : they were provided necessary legitimacy by a "pretender" and some Buddhist 
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monks and Veddah chiefs, went about the villages arousing the peasantry into revolt. In nearly 
all these cases, the rebels were armed with traditional weapons and adopted guerilla-type tactics 
to attack the British troops. 
The British, having learnt the lessons of the 1818 rebellion, and were quite aware of the 
widespread resentment to their oppressive rule in the Kandyan region deployed massive 
contingents of troops to violently quell these revolts, arrested and executed its leaders and exiled 
others to Mauritius. However, these attempts to crush the rebellions failed to dampen the spirit 
of resistance that had developed among the Kandyan people. By 1848 the British were to 
confront one of the most turbulent rebellions in the history of colonial Ceylon, which nearly 
brought to an end their control over the island. 
(Hi) The Great Rebellion of 1848 
By 1840s the heavy tax burdens imposed on the Kandyan peasantry by the British was 
providing cause for increasing resistance to colonial rule. The factors that had a direct causal 
influence on the rebellion of 1848 were primarily economic in nature viz., the expansion of the 
plantation economy and its intrusion into peasant agriculture, the extraction of "forced labour" 
for road construction to serve the plantations, the various taxes imposed on the peasantry, and 
the disruption of the traditional way of life of the Kandyan by the imposition of a Western 
Christian lifestyle. Further, the numerous occasions of violent revolts, albeit in vain, against the 
British in the earlier decades provided stimulus to the Kandyans to once again rise up in revolt 
and attempt to overthrow British rule. 
The 1848 Rebellion, however, in some significant ways was different from the earlier 
revolts. While the events of 1848 do reveal that the same sectors of traditional Kandyan society -
bhikkus, chiefs and the peasantry - joined together in revolt as on earlier occasions; the rebellion 
of 1848 also witnessed the participation of sections of the urban workers from Colombo and 
elements of the middle classes and the Sri Lankan bourgeoisie, who were also in antagonistic 
relationship with British colonialism. It is this fact that contributed to the wider impact of the 
1848 rebellion in the Kandyan countryside, and in fact, all over Ceylon. 
The resistance against the taxes began in July 1848 in Colombo where protest meetings 
were held and petitions were circulated in the city and elsewhere, calling on the people to resist 
the new taxes and join the protest movement. On at least two occasions, violence erupted during 
these protest meetings in Colombo and aimed clashes with policemen were reported. 
In the Kandyan areas, the rebellion was more widespread. On July 6,1848 about 3,000 
people demonstrated outside the Kandy kaccheri (city hall) against the taxes. ' After this event, 
the rebellion took more organised forms under the leadership of Gongallegoda Banda, Purang 
Appu and Dingiri Rala. As in previous rebellions, one of the leaders, Banda was "crowned 
King" in a "coronation ceremony" on July 26. In the following days the rebels banded together 
and attacked many government offices, magistrate residences, stores of coffee planters, jails and 
even a chapel of the Baptist missionaries. The Governor reporting on the rebellion stated : "the 
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houses and bungalows upon the Estates, upon the neighbouring hills were plundered and the 
whole country was in a state of teiror."22 
Once more, the British sought reinforcements from India to crush the rebellion and 
declared a state of Martial Law in Kandy on July 29,1848 and extended it to the Seven Korales 
on July 31. The rebels attacked Kandy on August 1, and about 4,000 strong are said to have 
attacked Kurunegala the same day. This rebellion too was brutally crushed by the superior 
forces of the British who unleashed a wave of repression against the Kandyan people in the 
aftermath of the rebellion. 
The repressive policy followed by the colonial administration to crush the 1848 rebellion 
was denounced by other British nationals who were generally sympathetic to the plight of the 
Kandyan peasantry. In fact, a key role was played by Christopher ElUot, editor of "The Colombo 
Observer" wrote a letter on July 3, 1848 criticising the colonial taxation policy and its 
detrimental impact on the peasantry, and called upon the people "to follow the example of the 
French (in 1848) to refuse to pay the new taxes and to agitate for the establishment of a radical 
democratic society based on racial equality and universal suffrage."23 
This letter of Elliot was translated into Sinhalese and circulated among the Kandyan 
peasantry, and it is said to have had some impact on the events of 1848. In the aftermath of the 
rebellion, the British Parliament constituted an Inquiry Committee to investigate into the causes 
of the rebellion, and recalled Governor Torrington to London. Historians have expressed 
difficulty in ascertaining the precise character and background of the leaders of the 1848 
rebellion. However, K.M. De Silva provides a general description of these leaders as follows : 
"They were all men of peasant stock, some of them hailing from the low country. 
Their aim was a return to the old Kandyan system with its traditional values, 
which - somewhat naively perhaps - they aspired to cherish by making one of 
their number King. Theirs was a blind protest against the changes and 
uncertainties brought by British rule, and they yearned for the old society, the 
only one they knew and understood. They had the support of a substantial section 
of the population and some at least of the bhikkus, though the aristocracy stood 
aloof from their movement."24 
Civ) Traditional Nationalism in the 19th Century 
Rebellions : Its Origins and Consequences 
The wave of armed resistance that erupted in 19th century Ceylon against British 
colonialism reveals a consciousness of "traditional nationalism" on the part of the Kandyan 
chiefs, bhikkus and the peasantry. While the overriding consciousness of popular protest was 
expressed in terms of the restoration of the traditional Kandyan kingdom with the expulsion of 
the British, the revolts brought together the specific grievances of the various strata of the 
Kandyan society to a meeting point of open revolt against the foreign aggressor. A revealing 
insight is provided into these specific grievances in a report dated July 8,1848 filed by a Sinhala 
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Inspector of the Police Court of Kandy, based on interviews he carried out with about 1,000 
individuals who lodged complaints against the British government's policies : 
"Every single person interviewed had a complaint against the new taxes...Some 
had misgivings about the Buddhist policy of the government...The plantations 
figured prominently in these complaints., other complaints concerned the system 
of administration and the courts... 
The Kandyan chiefs and aristocracy were by far the most disgruntled section of Kandyan 
society with the consolidation of British rule. While sections from among them had earlier 
capitulated to the British in signing the Kandyan Charter of 1815, on the whole, they were 
deprived of all their traditional status and rights in the Kandyan region. In particular, the 
abolition of the Rajakariya system by the British in 1833 deprived this class of the traditional 
forced labour exploitation of the peasantry. 
Besides, the imposition of a cash crop economy in the Kandyan highlands based on a 
western-oriented administrative set-up and an immigrant labour force severely disrupted the 
traditional feudal order. In this situation, the Kandyan chiefs resented their loss of authority and 
privileges with the coming of the British. Hence, their participation in the 19th century 
rebellions can be seen as an attempt to overthrow the intruder and re-establish their traditional 
authority in the Kandyan region. The anti-colonial consciousness of the Kandyan chiefs, there-
fore, was not a progressive element in the rebellions. On the contrary, they represented the 
traditional feudal consciousness of a deprived aristocracy. 
However, we must note that this elite strata of traditional Kandyan society was divided on 
its attitude towards British colonialism. While many Kandyan chiefs played an active role in the 
rebellion of 1818, others feared the repressive policies of the colonial power and stood aloof 
during the Great Rebellion of 1848. Perhaps they were also aware of the political power of 
colonialism and hence preferred to ally with the more powerful side in the conflict. 
The British, on their part, were quite conscious of the fact that generalised rebellion in the 
Kandyan region, especially among the peasantry, would not be possible without the leadership of 
the aristocracy. In the aftermath of the 1848 rebellion, therefore, they made serious attempts to 
win over a section of the aristocracy on their side. As Bandarage noted : 
"By incorporating the native chiefs into the colonial political economy at 
subordinate levels, the British ensured that the chiefs did not join the peasantry in 
the nationalist struggles. Thus, the 1848 rebellion was the last major upheaval 
against the British in Sri Lanka in the 19th century."26 
The Buddhist bhikkus also played an important role during the 19th century revolts. By 
far the most important cause for their resentment against the British was their total neglect and 
violation of the Buddhist religion. The bhikkus had always enjoyed a privileged place in the 
traditional kingdom under the political patronage of the aristocracy. Further, the fact that one of 
the most important relics of Buddhism - viz, the Tooth Relic - was located in Kandy, gave their 
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religion a certain sacredness in the Kandyan kingdom. It is for this reason also that we find the 
attempt to legitimise the 19th century rebellions by the "pretender lung" claiming possession of 
this relic. 
The bhikkus were not only leaders and inspirers of the rebellions, they were also some 
among them who were active militants of the revolts, taking to aims to oust the British from their 
land. Surely, the imposition of a Western religion i.e., Christianity, and the frantic work of 
Christian missionaries for conversion, added further cause to suspicion among the bhikkus of 
losing their traditional religion. The restoration of the traditional Kandyan kingdom would have 
ensured the reinstitution of the lost status of Buddhism. This is precisely what motivated the 
bhikkus to lend support and participate actively in the rebellions. 
In the final analysis, it was the Kandyan peasantry who expressed the most genuine 
aspirations against colonialism. К M De Silva observed : "As for the Kandyans, by 1848, their 
real grievances against the coffee industry was not the physical presence of the plantations -
these had existed for over a dozen years now and the peasants were sufficiently realistic to 
understand that they had to co-exist with the plantations - but the incidental inconveniences 
which arose from that presence." 2 7 Besides the heavy tax burdens imposed on the peasantry 
and the loss of their "chena" lands to the plantations, the presence of an alien labour force in their 
midst also caused some concern among the peasantry. Thus, the loss of the traditional Sinhala-
Buddhist identity was most felt by the Kandyan peasantry in these circumstances. 
Unable to posit a clear alternative to this imposed British rule and oppressive economic 
policies, the peasantry pledged their support to "pretenders", bhikkus and chiefs during the 
rebellions. It is not clear as to what extent the Kandyan peasantry were aware of the political 
aspirations of these feudal elites. Nevertheless, insofar as it provided cause to a relentless 
opposition to the taxes imposed by the alien rulers, the peasantry was determined to join in 
rebellion. The Veddahs, a warrior tribe from the eastern part of the Kandyan region were hunters 
by profession and renowned for their bravery and skill in traditional warfare. 
It is this group that provided the armed militia for the 19th century rebellions. On many 
occasions their skillful methods took the British troops completely by surprise. Evading capture 
and attacking the enemy in small bands at the most inopportune moments, the Veddahs were 
truly the guerilla fighters of the 19th century rebellions. Since the rebellions, little is known of 
this tribe in Ceylon. 
To sum up, the rebellions of the 19th century in Ceylon, for the first time, brought to the 
fore a nationalist consciousness on the part of the Ceylonese against British colonialism. 
However, we must qualify this statement by asserting that this nationalist consciousness, in an 
incipient stage, was actually a form of Kandyan nationalism. Its nature was as follows : 
"Kandyan Nationalism was essentially conservative - the product of a long historical 
development. It was nationalism of men rooted in the soil, men with 'a hierarchy of allegiances' 
to their village, to their district and to their country."28 
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It was this consciousness that prevailed, to varying degrees, among the Kandyan people 
which provided the necessary strength and direction to the 19th century rebellions. During this 
period, traditional nationalism displayed certain specific features which help us to understand 
and explain latter-day nationalist consciousness in Ceylon during the 20th century : 
(1) It was territorial-specific i.e., confined to the Kandyan region. Except for the 1848 
rebellion, all the other revolts were located in the Kandyan region and drew its par-
ticipants nom the same area. 
(2) The important status of the Buddhist religion and the role of the bhikkus in the protest 
movements. 
(3) In the protest movements of the 19th century, we also find the conflicts of interests 
between the Kandyan peasantry (Sinhala-Buddhist) and the immigrant Indian labour 
(Tamil-Hindu). In the later decades, particularly in the 1950s, this conflict developed 
into more aggressive ethnic conflicts within the labour movement in Ceylon. Thus, the 
incipient forms of this "Sinhala-Buddhist" identity vis-a-vis aliens, were visible in the 
19th century itself. 
(4) The negative impact of this traditional nationalist consciousness was expressed in the 
attempt to restore the old Kandyan feudal order by driving out the foreign ruler. In the 
process of the rebellions, the use of these feudal symbols i.e., pretender Kings, coronation 
ceremonies - was essential to legitimise this consciousness among the Kandyan 
peasantry. 
As the events of the 19th century rebellions indicate, the ideological conflict between 
traditional nationalism and modem imperialism was an unequal relation. The successive defeats 
suffered by the rebels under the military power of the Europeans, severely weakened this 
traditional nationalist consciousness. Further, the post-1848 situation in Ceylon and the spread 
of industrialisation and the export economy, resulted in new class formations and alliances. The 
1848 rebellion therefore, remained as the most significant and the last brave rebellion of the 
Ceylonese people against British colonialism in the 19th century. 
S3 Agrarian Policies and Change in Independent Sri Lanka 
At the time of independence in 1948 Sri Lanka portrayed features of a classical export 
economy thriving on a stagnant peasant agricultural base. The three main export crops viz., tea, 
rubber and coconut accounted for over 95% of export earnings for the island, of which the prime 
export crop i.e., tea alone accounted for 60%. More than 40% of the country's GNP came from 
agriculture with the plantation crops accounting for more than half. ^ 
The agrarian policies and programmes implemented by successive governments after 
independence merely attempted to accommodate and realign class contradictions and 
differentiations, rather than alter them in any significant way. In other words, they left intact the 
102 
structure of the colonial economy, only introducing changes that were necessary for increasing 
agricultural output and intensifying agricultural production to meet the needs of the local and 
international market. Before we survey the agrarian policies and reforms introduced in the 
country by the various governments, it is important to understand the agrarian class structure that 
development in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of colonialism. 
British colonialism created a dependent merchant capitalist class in Ceylon that failed to 
emerge as a classical national bourgeoisie like in other countries. The contradictions of colonial 
economic policy, that we have reviewed earlier, did not allow for such a development. On the 
contrary, this class of merchant capitalism which was based on liquor trade and invested its 
profits in coffee, coconut, rubber and urban property, remained 'ideologically backward' with the 
limited possibilities for expansion and growth under the colonial economy. 30 Thus, the class 
structure that developed in Sri Lanka in the post-independence period, which had its origins in 
the 19th century itself - has been summarised by Newton Gunasinghe as follows : 
1. The Traditional Bourgeoisie 
This class had its origins in the mid-19th century, in the aftermath of the Great Rebellion 
of 1848. It developed basically as an appendage of British colonialism and proved to be its loyal 
ally. It therefore took to British values and lifestyles, and expressed its desire for the 
continuance of colonial rule on the island. This class comprised of two main sections : 
(a) The Plantocracy and Traditional Landowners 
They composed of both Sinhalese and Tamils, drawn mainly from the landed higher 
castes viz., the Goyigama and Vellala respectively. In terms of their values and lifestyle, they 
were traditional and feudal. However, many of them became early converts to Christianity and 
were faithful to the British. A section from among them were drawn from the traditional 
Kandyan aristocracy. Their ideological orientation is evident from the following : 
"Most of us are planters. Our interests are in many respects identical with those 
of the (European) planters. It is true that many of them have shown us the way 
and they deserve the credit for having brought capital into the country and shown 
us the path along which we may all win prosperity. We have followed in their 
footsteps and our interests are now the same."3 
(b) The Merchants and Professionals 
This is the class of enterprising merchants and traders who made productive investment 
of their capital and accumulated wealth basically through the liquor trade under British 
colonialism. But they lacked the interest and the initiative to channel this investment in industry 
or import/export trading. Many of them were drawn from non-agricultural groups from the 
coastal areas of the country. 
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2. The Petty-Bourgeoisie 
This class also developed under the patronage of British colonialism. This group 
comprised of those employed under the colonial administrative service and the plantation 
economy - clerks, minor bureaucrats, shopkeepers and traders. They expressed their opposition 
to excesses of colonial policy and often supported social reform movements. Among diem, "a 
group of the salary earner, who enjoyed job security, the office workers were highly unionised 
and were frequently engaged in industrial strife with their employers and the regime."32 
3. The Working Class 
Since the mid-19th century the working class had developed principally around the 
Colombo port, railway and transport services under the British. In later decades especially in the 
1930s and 1940s they carried out militant actions under strong organised trade unions of the 
Marxist parties. In the plantation sector, the Tamil labour force also became unionised around 
this time and were to play a crucial role in trade union politics soon after independence. Thus, 
the two distinct sections of this class were the following : 
(a) The Plantation Workers 
Comprised basically of an immigrant labour force providing indentured labour on the 
plantations, this class continued to be the most subservient during colonial time and after 
independence. However, in the 1940s the plantation labour force became strongly unionised and 
gained franchise rights which they used decisively in electing Tamil representatives to the 
legislature with active support from the Marxist parties. The government's policy of 
disenfranchisement and curtailment of the voting rights of this predominant labour force in the 
country has reduced them to a semi-slave labour force, isolated from the political/democratic 
process and Left politics in the country. 
(b) The Urban Working Class 
Having its origins in the 19th century the urban working class in Sri Lanka by far 
expressed the most potential for militant trade unionism and Left party politics. Their experience 
of intense trade union activity in the 1920s and 1930s for economic demands had brought them 
under the influence of the newly established Marxist parties in the late 1930s and 1940s.33 
Today they continue to be strongly unionised, although highly fragmented under the various 
political parties and tendencies in the country. 
4. The Rich Farmers 
Of recent origin, this class forms a thin layer at the upper strata of the cash crop economy 
and peasant agriculture in Sri Lanka today. It reaped the main benefits of the Green Revolution 
strategy adopted by the government and the resettlement programme in the 1960s. It is 
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composed of primarily non-agricultural classes drawn from school teachers, retired government 
servants, and merchants, who took to agriculture adopting modem production techniques, capital 
and wage labour. In recent years, this class has shown remarkable potential and enterprise in 
cash crop production and marketing. 
5. The Rural Petty-Bourgeoisie 
Originating from the pre-capitalist economy and strongly rooted in the local religion 
(Buddhism) and language (Sinhala), this class has exercised significant control and influence in 
the peasant sector. It consists of small landowners, artisans, craftsmen, small traders and petty 
producers. "The rural petty bourgeoisie's ties with land were close and firm, its prejudices 
relating to caste, rituals and other archaic notions were strong. But its very identification with 
aspects of Sinhalese culture, language, Buddhism, Ayurvedic medicine and above all, its role as a 
rural intelligentsia held forth for it the potentiality of a dynamic force."34 This class was, 
however, not exclusively an agrarian class for it contained within its fold sections drawn from 
outside the peasant society but who had interests tied to agriculture. 
6. The Peasantry 
The peasantry in Sri Lanka comprise primarily of small-holding peasants many of whom 
are owner-cultivators holding small parcels of land which they cultivate themselves using family 
labour with occasional use of wage or hired labour. This class can be sub-divided into the 
following : 
(a) The Middle Peasants 
This section of the peasantry "cultivate their lands primarily with the use of family 
labour, with occasional recourse to wage labour or exchange labour .... find themselves 
productively employed in their land most of the year, which furthermore generates sufficient 
income. They are not obliged to hire themselves out."3 
(b) The Poor Peasants 
They work the land primarily with family labour but often hire themselves out as wage 
labourers to supplement family income. Some of them would be owner-cultivators, but many are 
tenant-cultivators. 
7. The Agricultural Workers 
This class has grown rapidly since independence especially with the land alienation 
policy of the governments in power and through losing their small plots of land to big 
landowners and moneylenders due to their inability to productively engage in agricultural 
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production. Now transformed into landless wage labour force, they are employed as farm 
labourers in the lands of the rich peasants and middle peasants. Particularly in the Jaffna 
peninsula this class also belongs to the lowest caste, most of whom remain unorganised. An 
estimate in 1982 put the number of landless agricultural workers in Sri Lanka as approximately 
800,000.36 
Successive governments of Sri Lanka have implemented a variety of agrarian reform 
programmes and policies since independence. These can be categorized into the following 
periods : (i) Peasant Colonisation and Green Revolution : 1948-1971, (ii) Land Reforms and 
Nationalisation : 1972-1977, (iii) The Open Economy: 1977-1985. 
Since independence, there has been a determined policy of the various governments to 
strengthen their respective social bases in the agrarian sector and consequently enact 
reforms/policies to conserve the interests of certain sections of the rural populace. Thus, every 
attempt at Land Reform and government policy to 'preserve the peasantry' have been politically 
motivated to serve the needs of the ruling regime in power. In the process, these policies have 
triggered a process of class differentiation in the rural society resulting in the emergence of non-
agrarian classes to positions of power and influence in the Sri Lankan countryside. The lack of a 
strong and independent peasant movement in the country, therefore, strengthened the hands of 
the rural rich and relegated the peasantry to the backstage of peasant politics and agrarian reform. 
(i) Peasant Colonization and Green Revolution : 1948-1971 
The problematic of peasant agriculture in Sri Lanka had long been viewed by the State as 
one of landlessness in the Wet Zone due to the high population density, when compared with the 
sparsely populated Dry Zone which indicated possibilities of agricultural expansion in paddy 
cultivation. Hence, in the 1930s the State adopted a strategy of setting up "Peasant Colonization 
Schemes" in the Dry Zone ostensibly to relieve the pressures of the Wet Zone peasants. 
However, it was under the first independent government of D.S. Senanayake of the United 
National Party (UNP) that this strategy was adopted as a major agrarian policy involving massive 
finance and resources. The stated objective of this policy was "to create a class of peasants 
owning 8 acres and a cow."37 
The Government assumed that by bringing virgin jungle lands in the Dry Zone under 
intense cultivation through state-sponsored irrigation facilities and credit institutions; paddy 
cultivation could be increased rapidly. Further, this would also ease the pressure on land and 
production in the Wet Zone and provide for possibilities of intensified agricultural production 
through the use of modem inputs and subsidies/incentives from the State to the peasantry. The 
Dry Zone colonisation scheme, therefore, addressed itself to the following objectives : (a) to 
protect the peasant farmers as a class, (b) to solve the growing unemployment problem in the 
Wet Zone, (c) to increase food production, and, (d) to establish new settlements as dynamic 
growth centres. 
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This ambitious programme was implemented at collosal costs to the State - in 1947, for 
example, there were already 12 major Dry Zone colonisation setdements established at the cost 
of over Rs 30 million and having about 3,000 settlers. In 1949, the most pompous programme of 
all under this scheme - the Gal Oya Multi-purpose project - was launched at a cost of over Rs 
910 million. While inaugurating this programme, D.S. Senanayake stated on August 28,1949 : 
"Gal Oya has become almost a house-hold word. It is symbolic of the New 
Lanka. May it obtain fulfillment speedily and herald the progress of our march 
towards self-sufficiency."38 
In the later decades the amount invested by the State per colonist setded in the Dry Zone, 
particularly for land development and irrigation facilities, increased rapidly - from Rs 9,000 prior 
to 1956 to Rs 16,000 in the 1960s and by the 1970s it had risen three times more.39 Far from 
protecting the farmers interests and increasing food production, the Dry Zone colonisation 
schemes basically resulted in transferring the problems in the Wet Zone to the new colonised 
areas of the Dry Zone. Although the government tried to ensure that the incentives and subsidies 
provided would benefit the peasant colonisers, in actual fact it could not prevent these incentives 
from passing from their hands into the hands of a selected few. 
It was observed that in these schemes the more enterprising farmers with some capital at 
their disposal and who could productively exploit the benefits of credit and irrigation, who 
accrued power and influence in the area. On the other hand, a large section of farmers became 
dependent on traditional sources of credit (moneylenders) because of inaccessibility of 
governmental sources. 
In the above process many lost their lands to the moneylenders through mortgage and 
became tenant cultivators or worked as hired hands on the lands that once had belonged to them. 
Gradually the structure that prevailed in the Wet Zone earlier began to be reproduced in the 
newly-colonised areas of the Dry Zone. As Gunawardena notes : "...a small category of rich 
farmers operating large extents of paddy land came into existence side by side with a large group 
of small subsistence farmers, tenants and increasing number of landless labourers. 
Superimposed on this structure was the rich group of absentee landlords, merchants, 
moneylenders, tractor owners and a cadre of officials of state institutions, who also contributed 
to the emergence and perpetuation of a stratified agrarian structure in the Dry Zone colonies."40 
The rich farmers who appropriated the benefits of the colonisation schemes naturally 
became loyal supporters of the UNP government. The large mass of small and poor peasants, 
including landless labourers,failed to emerge as an enterprising class of "peasant proprietors" as 
envisaged by the State. Although this programme did bring about an increase in paddy 
production during this period, it was in essence a patch-work solution to the more fundamental 
problem of class differentiation and landlessness in peasant agriculture. Thus it was noted by 
Richards and Gooneratne in an ILO study : "... a politically more neutral solution to the problem 
of landlessness in the Wet Zone then, for example, land reform, which could have been less 
costly but more sensitive."41 
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In May 1956 a new coalition government came to power composed of the SLFP, VLSSP 
and the Sinhala Bhasa Peramuna which claimed to advocate "socialism for Sri Lanka". Its 
agrarian strategy stood in sharp contrast to the UNP government earlier, in that it advocated 
intensive cultivation rather than extension of the area through colonisation. Philip Gunawardena, 
Minister of Agriculture in the new МЕР government stated this policy in clear terms : "I am not a 
believer in peasant proprietorship because I do not think that the prosperity of agriculture in this 
country can be built on peasant proprietorship."42 
In 1958 this government formulated the Paddy Lands Act which was intended to provide 
security of tenure to cultivators (ande), abolish joint-ownership systems (thattumaru and 
kattimaru) and the setting up of cultivation committees to fix the share of produce between the 
landowner and the cultivator.43 The Act's lofty aims were stated as follows: "to emancipate the 
peasant farmer from the condition of impecuniour servitude and insecurity and bring into 
existence the climate and environment which stimulate the progressive outlook and enthusiasm 
essential for increased production."44 
The Paddy Lands Act of 1958 is said to be the first serious legislative attempt to regulate 
share tenancy in Sri Lanka. Its main features comprised the following : 
(a) To confer permanent and heritable tenancy rights on share croppers. The tenants were 
empowered to name their successors. Eviction were thus made an illegal and punishable 
offense. Landlords were given the concession of resuming cultivation on a maximum 
extent of 5 acres after meeting valid claims for compensation by the tenants affected. 
(b) To restrict rents to a maximum of 25% of produce or 12 bushels per acre, whichever is 
less, or a minimum of 2 bushels per acre or one-eighth of yield whichever is less, the 
variation being related to yield differences in different areas. 
(c) To regulate interest rates and hire charges for implements and draft animals provided by 
landlords or tenants. 
(d) To organise cultivation committees which would: (i) act as village level instruments for 
implementing the reforms, and (ii) undertake the organisation and development of paddy 
cultivation. 
Numerous studies undertaken to assess the effectiveness of this Act have revealed that in 
most cases the provisions of the Act were not realised in practise. The tenant cultivators could 
not ensure security of their tenure or stop eviction from powerful landlords who exploited the 
loop-holes of the Act. 
Thus, during the first ten years of the implementation of the Paddy Lands Act, recorded 
evictions alone numbered SS.AóS.46 A survey undertaken in Poolanaruwa as part of a country-
wide study stated : "In Poolanaruwa, where more than 50% of the sample cultivators are tenants, 
it has been observed that the constitutional safeguards provided by the Paddy Lands Act for safe-
guarding the interests of the tenants have proved ineffective. 'Some of the landlords in the 
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village had omitted names of their tenants from certain official records, such as the Paddy Lands 
Register, which they themselves prepared as the officials concerned. This enabled them to have 
complete control of their tenants.'" 47 The same study has also shown that in most cases the 
average rate of rent paid by tenants were far in excess of that stipulated by the Act. In the 
Poolanaruwa, Ussapitiya and Minipe colonies, "tenant cultivators still continue to pay 50 per 
cent of their crop by way of rent...(which) has been found to be much in excess of that fixed 
under the Paddy Lands Act."48 
The Cultivation Committees were to be composed of elected groups of farmers' 
representatives to take care of paddy cultivation and allied activities in the villages. Its main 
responsibilities were to include : (i) to maintain a Paddy Land Register and record area under 
cultivation, yield, names of cultivators, (ii) to maintain and develop minor irrigation works and 
ensure the distribution of water for cultivators, (iii) to deal with incidents of crop damage by 
trespassing animals, (iv) to fix wages for farm workers employed by cultivators, and (v) to settle 
problems of dispute regarding tenurial arrangements.''9 
While this was a noble idea of introducing cooperative efforts in the cultivation of paddy, 
in reality, these committees ended up as tools in the hands of landowners to ensure their control 
and domination on paddy agriculture. They were able to exploit the functioning of these 
committees to serve their own interests and prevented the tenant cultivators from playing an 
active role in making them effective at the village level. 
The UNP government which returned to power in the general elections of March 1965 
adopted a rigorous policy of import substitution in agriculture. It formulated the Agricultural 
Development Proposals 1966-1970 which constituted a 'package programme' under the Green 
Revolution adopted by many countries during the same period. Like in other countries, in Sri 
Lanka too this strategy intended to rapidly increase paddy production - from 50 million bushels 
in 1964 to 70 million in 1970. This package programme included incentives such as : a) High-
yielding varieties of seeds, b) chemical fertilisers and pesticides, c) tractors and agricultural 
machinery, d) agro-chemicals, e) extension services, and f) agricultural credit institutions with 
inputs. 
During this period the Sri Lankan government provided a range of incentives and inputs 
to stimulate peasant fanners to rapidly increase rice production. Thus, between 1960 and 1970, 
more than 5,000 four-wheel tractors were imported with another 5,000 two-wheel tractors every 
year thereafter which was made available at subsidised rates to the farmers. In the 1966-67 
season, it was estimated that 84% of cultivators in Amparai, 74% in Poolanaruwa, 73% in 
Hambantota and 69% in Vavuniya districts were using tractors for ploughing land.50 
Paddy production witnessed a sharp increase with the adopting of these advanced inputs 
during this period. Between 1966-70 it showed an increase of over 55% over previous years. To 
some extent at least, the set targets for paddy output were realised. However, the consequences 
were far beyond expectations and stated intentions. Without sufficient security of tenure the 
small cultivators had become increasingly dependent on rich farmers and business interests in the 
rural areas who controlled the incentives provided by the State. To quote Neville Jayaweera : 
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"The subsistence fanner cannot now return to the use of the buffaloes. He is 
caught in a vice-like grip of the tractor-owning affluent farmer...In the tractor 
owner, who is invariably an affluent farmer, the subsistence fanner has acquired a 
new oppressor, more intractable than the feudal landowner. A new feudalism of 
technology has grown up around the tractor owners. The Paddy Lands Act 
notwithstanding, the small-holder subsistence farmers are slowly losing 
operational control of the paddy lots to the tractor owners."51 
To sum up, in the period under review (1948-71) a range of agrarian policies and 
strategies were implemented by the governments of Sri Lanka. All of them were basically 
oriented towards increasing paddy production and making the country self-sufficient in food 
production. However, this implied further dependence on foreign imports by the governments in 
power besides providing the necessary conditions for strengthening the hands of the rich fanners 
in the countryside. 
While such efforts did bring about some significant changes in the agrarian sector -
especially increased production of rice, adoption of new techniques and technology, expansion of 
the area under paddy cultivation - its main consequences, however, were quite detrimental to the 
real intentions of the governments and the expected recipients of these programmes. By far the 
most important consequence of these agrarian policies during this period was the emergence of a 
new strata of rural elite composed of rich farmers, absentee landowners, moneylenders and 
merchants, who directly benefited from these programmes and accumulated capital by exploiting 
the state subsidy and incentives provided. It was this class that became loyal supporters of the 
government and ensured their political and economic hegemony by dominating and effectively 
controlling the village-level distribution of resources and incentives. 
Moreover, it was precisely this class of rich farmers - many of them drawn from non-
agrarian groups - that were preserved and promoted by the agrarian policies adopted by the 
government during this period. In short, the agrarian programmes we have discussed above 
inspite of their stated noble intentions of reducing inequalities in rural society, actually resulted 
in the further polarisation of the agrarian classes in peasant agriculture in Sri Lanka. 
(ii) Land Reform and Nationalisation : 1972-1977 
In April 1971 the elected government confronted a serious armed opposition - the JVP-
led youth insurrection which attempted the capture of State power through an armed uprising. 
The insurrection was a result of numerous problems and accumulated grievances of the youth, 
particularly in the rural areas. The economic policies followed by the various governments were 
unsuccessful in checking and controlling inflation and high unemployment among the educated 
youth. Moreover, the pretentious socialist slogans of Left parties in parliamentary coalition 
created a great amount of disillusionment and frustration among the rural youth who sought 
immediate remedies to their long-standing problems. 
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While the 1971 insurrection was largely a youth phenomenon, it also witnessed the 
participation of sections of the rural population and was an occasion for them to vent their 
grievances against the State after independence. This insurrection was put down with brutal 
force by the ruling United Front government (composed of the SLFP, LSSP and CP, all variants 
of the Left tradition), with an estimated 5,000 youths or more killed and many thousands more 
detained for several years. In assessing the causes for the widespread rebellion of April 1971, 
the UF government concluded that rural unemployment and landlessness were by far the main 
ones. It therefore attempted to address itself to these problems by enacting the Land Reform 
Law of 1972. 
The preamble of the Land Reform Law No. 1 of 1972 stated its aims as follows : 
(a) To establish a Land Reform Commission (LRC) in Sri Lanka, 
(b) To fix a ceiling (25 acres for paddy lands and 50 acres for other lands) on the 
extent of agricultural land that any person may own in Sri Lanka, 
(c) To provide for the vesting of lands owned in excess of the ceiling in the LRC, 
subject to a statutory leave in favour of the former owner, 
(d) To prescribe the purpose and manner of disposition of lands vested in the LRC by 
the law in a manner so as to increase productivity and employment, and 
(e) To provide for payment of compensation to persons deprived of their lands under 
the law and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.52 
Under the first phase of the Land Reform Law of 1972, over 563,411 acres of private 
lands were vested in the LRC. However, the land reform did not cover the lands owned by 
temples and public companies in this phase of its implementation. The second phase was 
enacted in 1975 which provided for State take-over (i.e., nationalisation) of large estates owned 
by public companies. Under this phase of the Law, over 395 tea and rubber plantations with a 
total extent of 417,975 acres were acquired by the LRC. Of this, 56.8% of the area consisted of 
tea plantations and 22.5% of rubber plantations.53 
The management of these acquired estates were handed over to state corporations 
specially created for the purpose, namely, the Janawasama (People's Estate Development 
Board), the Usawasama (Upcountry Cooperative Estate Development Board), the State 
Plantation Corporation. Studies conducted on the functioning of these state corporations after 
nationalisation have revealed that they have not significantly changed, either in productivity or 
management-labour relationships on the plantations. 
The Land Reform Law of 1972 and 1975 were clearly aimed at the Kandyan peasantry 
which had suffered tremendous hardships since the advent of the plantation economy under 
British colonialism. Further, there were also a number of other factors that necessitated this 
Land Reform Law. These included :"(the) concern about the plantations; fragmentation of paddy 
in 
holdings; emergence of insecure and unproductive land tenure system in the peasant sector; 
growing unemployment among rural youth; neglect of estates by management in fear of 
nationalisation and the desire to speed up the repatriation of Indian estate workers."54 While 
these problems had prevailed in the Sri Lankan countryside ever since independence, it was with 
the 1971 insurrection that they were for the first time brought to the fore of the country's 
economic policy and priorities and demanded the urgency for adequate reform. 
The Land Reform Law failed to alter drastically the agrarian social structure in that it did 
not touch the sensitive paddy lands and temple lands. The temple lands, which were 
concentrated in the Kandyan region, remained outside the purview of the Law and intentionally 
so promulgated by the ruling government. Similarly, the Act failed to alter the land ownership 
patterns prevelant in peasant agriculture. As Poonambalam notes: "...it is in the ownership of 
paddy lands that the economic and political power structure in the villages is based. In this 
sector the Land Reform Law failed to touch even the fringes of land concentration."55 
Besides, rural unemployment was indeed one of the serious problems for the UF 
government. The Land Reform Law attempted to tackle this problem through utilising 
cooperative programmes for youth. In 1971, it was estimated that there were over 3,998 
graduates unemployed in Sri Lanka, which increased to over 5,500 to 6,500 in 1975 with the 
large majority of them from the rural areas. The Law provided for the setting up of youth 
cooperatives to provide incentives to educated unemployed youth to take to peasant agriculture. 
In 1973, for example, 18 youth cooperatives covering an acreage of over 5,240 acres and 
consisting of about 1,161 newly-recruited members was established. By the end of 1976, 200 
youth cooperatives covering an area of 50,000 acres and a membership of 143,000 existed in Sri 
Lanka.56 This programme was only partially successful as the educated unemployed youth 
were more keen on finding employment in the urban areas and the cities, rather than take to 
agriculture in the rural areas. Like other initiatives, therefore, the youth cooperative movement 
also fell under the influence of the landed rich and merchants in the countryside. 
In the final analysis, therefore, the Land Reform programme failed to make a dent in the 
unequal pattern of land ownership in the countryside, nor did it succeed in the equitable 
distribution of nationalised lands to the landless. Its total impact was, in the circumstances, 
inadequate and detrimental to the interests of the small-holding peasantry and particularly the 
landless. As an ILO study pointed out : 
"... despite its extent, the rural social and economic structure was hardly changed. 
Firstly, the ceiling, which was probably ineffectively some 70 acres on average, 
left the larger village-based landlords untouched. Popular participation was 
discouraged in favour of indirect participation through, and direct control by, 
political representatives. Largely as a result of these facts, estates and villages 
were no more integrated afterwards than before ... One might indeed say that the 
State was insufficiently prepared for land reform and for the inevitable demands 
which would be made by the local politicians on the government side."57 
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Although intended to be the main beneficiaries of the Land Reform programme, the 
peasantry were left powerless to take advantage of the benefits and were therefore silenced into 
submission. The Land Reform programme, in other words, was yet another miscalculated State 
policy towards peasant agriculture which diverted the benefits to the already-rich and powerful 
landowners and merchants in the countryside. In this situation, the peasantry was but a mere by-
stander, as Newton Gunasinghe notes : 
"There was no land reform in Sri Lanka till 1972 as there was no independent 
peasant movement in the country that demanded it. When the reform finally 
arrived in 1972, it bypassed the peasantry, as the peasantry subjected to the 
ideological domination of the rural petty bourgeoisie was powerless to intervene 
and benefit from it."58 
(iii) The Open Economy : 1977-1985 
The return of the UNP to power under the leadership of J.R. Jayawardena with an 
unprecedented majority in the general elections of 1977, commenced an economic policy that 
stood in sharp contrast to that of the previous government. The UNP's economic policy was 
based on private enterprise and liberal foreign investment. It, therefore, sought to liberalise 
imports, attract foreign investment and generally throw open the economy to the forces of 
international capitalism. This policy was clearly spelled out by its Finance Minister, Ronnie de 
Mel, when he addressed the British press in October 1977 : 
"My government welcome trade, aid and foreign investment. These are the 
cornerstones, the very foundations of our economic policy. It is our objective to 
maximise foreign investment in Sri Lanka by giving foreign investors the 
necessary incentives and the necessary guarantees and safeguards consistent, of 
course, with our national sovereignty and economic goals. We expect aid and 
support from the World Bank and the IMF and also from the countries of the Aid 
Group ... We shall give the private sector its due place in our economy... The 
basis of a free and just society, in my opinion, is a free and just economy. We 
will accordingly move away from restrictive policies and controls of the last 
seven years to a more liberal economic policy."59 
This liberal economic strategy was keeping in line with the dictates of the World Bank, 
the IMF and various other international financial and business institutions. Since 1977, 
therefore, all these interests came to play a dominant role in determining the economic policy 
and programmes of the UNP government. The government, on its part, provided the necessary 
safeguards and guarantees consonant with this liberal policy: abolition of food subsidy, 
devaluation of the rupee, lifting price controls, and tax reductions for imports. In its bid to attract 
foreign investment the government also imposed strict regulations on workers and trade unions 
and made every attempt to suppress dissension, in order to provide a cheap and controlled labour 
force for exploitation by private interests and Multinational companies. 
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The main programmes launched during the initial phase of the Open Economy policy was 
the acceleration of the Mahaweli Ganga Development project, the establishment of Free Trade 
Zones and the setting up of institutions for promoting foreign investment and local infrastxuctural 
development, such as, the Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC). Further, the 
government announced a "five year tax holiday" to foreign investors and companies engaged in 
food processing, industry and deep-sea fishing. 
Turning to the agrarian sector, the Open Economy policy sought to provide incentives to 
private investors in agricultural production, horticulture and animal husbandry. The basic 
strategy was to promote export-oriented agribusiness industry through multi-national 
collaborations. These areas were declared as 'Agricultural Promotion Zones' (APZ). The main 
provisions of this policy towards agriculture included the following : 
(a) to promote public investment in land and irrigation infrastructure and land settlement, 
(b) rehabilitation of export crops (in plantation and peasant holdings) including subsidies for 
replanting, fertilisers, 
(c) liberalisation of internal trade in farm products and changes in price policy, 
(d) intensification of administrative control over the peasant sector through the new Agrarian 
Services Law, 
(e) changes in land policy to enable the flow of private capital and enterprise into agriculture 
and agro-based industries to produce for the local and foreign markets, 
(f) involvement of the private sector in the management of land settlement projects in the 
Mahaweli areas, and 
(g) special incentives like tax-holidays for non-traditional exports and for the processing of 
sugar, milk and milk products, livestock production and fisheries.60 
The accelerated Mahaweli Development programme was "the centrepiece of the present 
government's development strategy both in terms of public investment and agricultural 
modernisation."61 Besides creating the necessary political base for the UNP's politics in the 
rural sector by meeting the aspirations of the class of rich farmers who directly benefited from 
this programme, the liberal economic policy also enabled more direct foreign interests in the 
Mahaweli project. The government decided to lease out over 24,000 acres of irrigable land in 
the Mahaweli area to a foreign company for oil palm cultivation and another 8,000 acres to a 
sugar company for sugarcane cultivation.62 Moreover, incentives were provided to non-peasant 
groups to take to a more technologically-oriented cultivation in an attempt to supplement peasant 
production in these areas. This policy was therefore clearly one of providing the necessary 
conditions for non-peasant and foreign interests in a stagnant agricultural situation that could not 
keep up to the expectations of the economic planners in Sri Lanka. 
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In recent years a number of foreign collaborations have been signed for the development 
of agro-business industry in Sri Lanka, opening up the agrarian sector to foreign interests and 
multinational corporations.63 Some examples of foreign collaborations are : 
(a) Lankem (Ceylon) Ltd has been involved in the manufacture of fertilisers and agro-
chemicals, in joint collaboration with Shell Company. 
(b) Ceylon Tobacco Company (CTC), a subsidiary of the British- American Tobacco 
Company, extensively involved in tobacco cultivation in over 8,000 acres, has now been 
granted permission to extend its operations to sugarcane cultivation, orchids and 
vegetables. The government has further allocated about 5,600 acres in the Mahaweli 
Scheme (H9 area) for the CTC to take to sugarcane cultivation. 
(c) The Guthrie International - a British-owned Malaysian company - was granted 24,000 
acres in the highlands for palm oil cultivation. But this contract was later suspended. 
(d) Three districts declared as "Agricultural Promotion Zones" have seen a number of foreign 
collaborative efforts. Three multinationals have been invited for sugarcane cultivation in 
Monaragela, Pelwatte and Nakkala. 
(e) Nestle Ltd. has been granted a Rs 4,450 million project to develop diary fanning (for 
milk and milk products) in three districts - Kurunegala, Puttalam and Anuradhapura, 
involving over 40,000 farmers. 
This opening up of the agrarian sector to international private enterprise was seen as a 
strategy to promote export-oriented production of primarily non-food crops. It was clearly an 
attempt to tum to the rural sector when similar initiatives in the urban centres has failed to meet 
the required targets set by the government. After an initial period of boom, the country found it 
stagnating under heavy foreign debt and balance of payments. 
The sudden liberal economic policy with its heavy and near total dependence on foreign 
private capital and technology, resulted in unproductive consumerism and speculation by local 
economic interests instead of any determined attempt to accumulate capital and productively 
invest in the economy. This also brought in a gluttonous market for second-hand commodities 
and luxury items which met the rising aspirations and desires of the urban middle classes. Quite 
in contrast, the rural areas remained largely untouched by this urban economic boom. 
The consequent stagnation of the economy and fear of capital withdrawal by Multi-
national companies and foreign governments in the context of an unstable political climate 
marked by violent racial conflicts, pressurised the government to tum to new sectors to attract 
foreign investment and assure a conducive atmosphere for investment opportunities. Necessary 
political legislation were thus enacted to provide this climate and the government vowed to 
ruthlessly suppress "terrorism" and "violence" and provide the required political stability to 
ensure foreign investment in the country. 
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In this regard, the government offered to provide lucrative investment terms for agro­
business industries development with foreign aid and assistance. In 1983 this offer paid off well, 
in that an estimated Rs 4.14 billion were invested in agricultural, fisheries and animal husbandry 
sectors, out of a total of Rs 7 billion in 102 projects.64 
Besides opening up the rural sector to foreign companies, the UNP government also 
launched a series of Rural Development Programmes aided by the international banks and 
institutions. For example, in 1980 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) formulated a US $ 39.6 
million project consisting of irrigation schemes, livestock development, agricultural services and 
infrastructural development. This project which was located in the Dry Zone district of 
Anuradhapura, was jointly funded by the ADB, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and the Swiss Government.65 
To sum up, the period of the UNP government's Open Economy policy was characterised 
by extensive liberalisation and foreign investment both in the industrial and agricultural fields. 
This policy commenced a new phase in Sri Lanka's history of economic growth, from which 
time onwards it has become totally dependent on foreign aid and investment under the dictates of 
the World Bank and the IMF. The country's foreign debts has soared in the past few years 
further resulting in its dependence and subjugation to the power of international capitai and 
MNCs.66 
Inspite of this policy's detrimental impact on local industry and food production, the 
government continued to invite foreign interests in those sectors where local initiatives have been 
lacking. In March 1981, the Minister of Land, Land Development and Mahaweli Development, 
while speaking at a symposium on "Foreign Investment Opportunities in Sri Lanka" reiterated 
this invitation in the following words : 
"...we would invite you to take a good look at the down stream development 
patterns of Sri Lanka, the potential for land development, the investment 
guarantees offered and if possible, join us to undertake the development not only 
of an economy but of a people, because here in Sri Lanka, we have a manageable 
population. " 6 Г 
The UNP government in the process of liberalising the economy and inviting foreign 
investment, also launched a programme of creating village-level institutions for administration, 
rural development and agriculture, which were basically meant to strengthen its political base in 
the rural areas. The benefits of the Integrated Rural Development Programmes under the new 
economic policy were meant, not for the weaker sections of the rural population, but for the 
middle class groups who constituted the power base of the UNP government. 
Thus, the traditional 'village headman' system was abolished and replaced by the 'Gram 
Sevakas' who were normally political appointees of the UNP, and carried out its dictates and 
programmes. The local Members of Parliament (M.P.) were given extensive powers to decide 
and implement the rural development programmes and ascertain their benefits to the rural 
people. Further, they introduced ihejob banks system to provide employment to village youth 
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and were to approve the re-registration of Rural Development societies and select settlers in 
agricultural settlements. 
All these functions significantly augmented the local power and dominance of the MP.'s 
over the rural population and they used it for party supporters and sympathisers. In the 
circumstances, nearly all village-level societies and institutions created for the purposes of 
facilitating rural programmes and agricultural development were controlled by the UNP cadres. 
Thus, any individual or group known to be non-supporters of the ruling party found it extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain services from such institutions and thereby exploit the 
benefits of the agrarian programmes under the liberalised schemes introduced by the 
government. Therefore, obviously, the political implications of the new economic policy in 
agriculture were clearly towards strengthening the UNP's base and enabling its party officials to 
wield the power bestowed in their hands ruthlessly and arbitrarily. 
The impact of the new economic policy on the agrarian class differentiation was quite 
apparent, in that its benefits went to the emerging class of rich farmers and middle peasants. 
Taking advantage of the liberal economic policy the rural petty bourgeoisie emerged into 
prominence in the agrarian social structure. It is precisely they who took to mechanisation and 
intensified agricultural production, the use of fertilisers and chemicals, tractors and farm 
equipment. This class, therefore, in the aftermath of the New Economic Policy since 1977, has 
come to dominate the rural society and provides the necessary political base for the ruling UNP 
government. 
In this situation, the poor peasant, tenant cultivators and landless labourers unable to 
complete with the new forces in the market, had to remain content with the menial benefits of 
these programmes and foreign investment. Moreover, in their struggle to eke out a living from a 
stagnant agricultural economy based on paddy agriculture, these lower strata of the Sri Lankan 
countryside have no other option at their disposal but to work as hired hands on the projects and 
plantations in the process losing their lands to moneylenders, merchants and the rising petty 
bourgeoisie. Those that were successful in evading the appropriation of their lands by these 
groups, however, were unable to resist government decision to parcel off their lands for so-called 
"land development programmes" or "intensified agricultural development schemes". 
Finally, as Shanmugathasan has noted, the absence of a "pull" from industry and 
capitalist agriculture which inevitably leads to a process of "proletarianization", the reality of the 
small-holding peasantry in Sri Lanka is one of "pauperisation" : "pauperisation operates as a 
vicious circle within the agrarian structure in the traditional village and the new settlement 
alike."68 The new economic policy of the UNP government, in essence, was a strategy of 
patronising a rising rural petty bourgeoisie at the cost of a pauperised peasantry. 
Impact of the Open Economy on the Jaffna Peasantry 
The UNP's post-1977 agrarian policy was based on free import of onions, chilies and 
potatoes. This severely affected the Jaffna peasantry who, until recently, had virtual monopoly 
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of sales of these cash crops all over the island. "To the Jaffna farmers, the free import policy had 
a depressing effect on prices, particularly of chilles and onions, partly because of the ill-timed 
imports that often tended to continue with the harvests. The disincentive effects made cultivation 
less remunerative - of chilies, in particular." Thus, between 1977-78 and 1979-80 the acreage in 
chilies in the Jaffna district dropped by nearly 20%.a 
In such circumstances, there was a tendency in this region to give up cash crops and 
revert back to traditional subsistence crops, especially those that can also be marketed locally. 
The main grievance of the Jaffna farmers, therefore, is that "they were unable to obtain a 
remunerative price for their produce in the context of imports and buflfer stock programmes (and 
the way this policy has been implemented)."70 It is in this sense, that there are clear indications 
in the region of a process of retardation of capitalist relations in agriculture in recent years. 
The economic impact of the ethnic conflicts, especially in the post-1983 period, has been 
severe on the Jaffna peasants. The militarisation of the Tamil areas and the virtual encapsulation 
of the Jaffna peninsula by the armed forces have crippled the movement of goods and produce 
from the North to the predominant market in the South. The goods that have been sent to 
markets in the south included onions, chilies, tobacco, potatoes, cement, and asbestos. And in 
return, goods imported into the North included groceries and textiles. 
This has also meant very low prices for goods and produce in the North when compared 
to the South. For example, tomatoes were Rs 3 per kilo in Jaffna compared to Rs IS in 
Colombo, grapes at Rs 8 to 10 per kilo are sold at Rs 30 in Colombo.71 Further, cultivation of 
many cash crops which earlier fetched high prices in the country's market, mainly in the south, 
have fallen due to the lack of access and sales in the south. The Central Bank of Ceylon Review 
of Economy 1984 indicated that production of red onions in Sri Lanka (nearly all of which is 
produced in Jaffna) was in 1984 at only 12.2% of its 1983 level, because there was a 67.8% fall 
in area sown and a 60% fall in yield.72 
The plight of the Jaffna peasant today is well summed up by one peasant : 
"We used to pray for a good harvest. Now we have to pray that we can get it to 
market too."75 
5.4 International Capital and the Sri Lankan Peasantry 
The problematic of peasant protest in modem Sri Lanka can be presented in the following 
manner: Right through colonial history and after independence from the British, the Sri Lankan 
peasantry have been subjected to a variety of welfare measures and State-sponsored resettlement 
schemes. The basic objective of this policy on the part of the Sri Lankan state was one of 
increasing agricultural production without fundamentally altering the agrarian relations in the 
countryside. 
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Superimposed on this economic policy was a system of hierarchically-ordered 'patronage 
system' over the peasantry which conditioned peasant response and ensured the effective 
incorporation of the peasantry into the State policy and programmes. The result was a scenario 
in which the peasantry was unable to rise up against lopsided Government policy and land 
concentration in the hands of a few rural entrepreneurs; and relegated to the backstage of the 
country's politics. Even the militant Left movements in the years immediately before and after 
independence in 1948, were unable to break this 'ideological bloc' of patronage imposed on the 
peasantry in Sri Lanka. Thus, the occasional outburst of peasant protest were basically restricted 
to peasant response to issues detrimental to their immediate interests, and were clearly devoid of 
any long-term perspective to pressurise the State to implement radical land reforms for the 
benefit of the peasantry as a whole. 
This situation was based on a predominantly small-holding peasantry (petty commodity 
producers). The lack of sharp class differentiation in the agrarian countryside in Sri Lanka 
further enable the patronage system to entrench itself, economically and ideologically, over the 
peasantry. In the post-1977 period of "Open Economy" of the present UNP government, the 
process of integration of this small-holding peasantry into the world capitalist system developed 
on a rapid scale. 
The commoditization of petty production of the peasantry and increasing integration into 
the world market was an inevitable consequence of State's agrarian programme. The most 
important consequence of this new strategy of economic development was the systematic 
breakdown of the traditional patronage system, and the successful penetration of more 
sophisticated domination of the peasantry by local and international capital. 
While the Sri Lankan peasantry is clearly differentiating under the various new schemes 
and programmes of the UNP government - which is merely a continuation of earlier State 
policies - the differentiation on a class basis is not seen sharply as yet. The process of State and 
international capital penetration into the countryside in recent years merely reveals a process of 
new forms of incorporation of the peasantry into the world market - a process in which the 
peasantry retains some of its traditional characteristics but more directly serves the needs of the 
market and produces within a predominantly capitalist system. Therefore, inspite of increasing 
landlessness and land concentration among the newly-emerged rural rich, the peasantry and 
landless agricultural workers remain in a state of ideological passivity exemplified by their 
continuing "survival consciousness". 
By far, the most significant development in the Sri Lankan countryside in the post-1977 
period has been the penetration and control of agricultural production and the peasantry by 
international capital, that is, through the intervention of TNCs. In the earlier section we looked 
at the Open Economy policy of the present government and highlighted the extent of integration 
of agriculture into world capital through the numerous TNC operations in the country today. 
Thus, the precise impact of TNCs on Sri Lankan agriculture, and the peasantry in particular, is of 
great significance in order to understand the process of transformation in the agrarian systems of 
Sii Lanka. 
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We shall briefly survey three cases of international capital penetration in Sri Lankan 
agriculture in recent history, in order to highlight this process. The three cases include the 
following : (i) The Mahaweli Development Scheme, (ii) Tlie Ceylon Tobacco Company, and (iii) 
Sugar TNCs in the Agricultural Promotion Zones. 
(i) The Mahaweli Development Scheme 
With the acceleration of the Mahaweli Development Project (MDP) by the present 
government, the programme is now composed of three main components: (i) the headworks 
projects at Victoria, Kotmale, Maduru Oya and Randenigala, (ii) the downstream engineering 
and irrigation works, and (iii) peasant settlement and agricultural production. The MDP has been 
described as one of the biggest investment ventures by the Sri Lankan state, which accounts of 
approximately 35% of the government's budget. 
The original cost estimate in the early 1970s on this 30-year project was about Rs 7 
billion, which was later increased to Rs 15 billion. The costs again skyrocketed by 1984 when 
over Rs 25 billion had already been spent and another Rs 16.5 billion was due to be spent in the 
next 5 years. Undoubtedly, therefore, the MDP was "the most ambitious scheme ever to be 
undertaken on the island and has been the keystone of the government's development 
programme since 1977."74 
The MDP was originally intended to irrigate over 900,000 acres of land and develop 15 
multi-purpose projects, 4 trans-basin diversion canals and several power stations with a total 
capacity of over 500 megawatts. Moreover, it was envisaged to settle over half a million people 
who would earn their livelihood in the area by involving in agricultural production under 
direction of the project. Nearly all the required capital to finance this huge operations came from 
international sources. Sri Lanka obtained funds for the MDP from the USA, Canada, United 
Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Japan and international funding agencies, like the Asian Development Bank and the 
World Bank.75 
A major aspect of the MDP, about which we are concerned here, was the settlement of 
landless farmers from the south west and central areas in the MDP areas. The project provided 
these settlers with land and irrigation facilities to induce them to take to high-yielding varieties of 
crop production. Later, the project attempted to develop 'cluster settlements' whereby a number 
of hamlets were grouped into a village, and several villages in turn, were linked with a 
township.76 
Various studies on these resettlement schemes have revealed that these cluster settlements 
did not solve the problem as envisaged by the State and the MDP policy makers - that 
resettlement would enable shifting of pressure of population from the heavily-populated Wet 
Zone areas and open up productive new settlement in the Dry Zone. Besides the difficulty of 
convincing the peasant settlers to take up dwellings in unfamiliar areas, the resettlement 
programme created new tensions between the resettled farmers and the local farmers in the areas. 
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Critics of the MDP have cited the following as the salient reasons for the failure of the 
project to deliver the goods : (i) Government's attempt to achieve physically impossible goals 
within the given technology, (ii) lack of necessary resources, (iii) total dependency on foreign 
assistance and expertise, (iv) lack of understanding and knowledge on the part of the government 
on its role, the means available and the possible consequences of the MDP. Thus, the most 
ambitious agrarian programme of the UNP government suffered from lack of foresight and 
realistic assessment of its potentials and capabilities. 
The UNP's attempt to accelerate the MDP seems to be intended to carry through the 
dictates of powerful international institutions and allow for the free interplay of international 
capital in Sri Lankan agriculture, in keeping with its Open Economy policy. In the 
circumstances, the MDP is perhaps the classical example of "a wrong step towards development, 
and a costly one at that."77 
The significance of the MDP, however, was the attempt to introduce commoditízation in 
the predominantly petty production agriculture in Sri Lanka. This policy was aimed at enticing 
the resettled farmers to take to modem techniques of cultivation by offering them the necessary 
incentives and assuring them of a market for their produce. By laying the necessary conditions 
for TNC involvement in peasant agriculture, the MDP witnessed largescale transfer of policy 
decisions and management control to experts from TNCs and foreign agencies. Consequently, 
agricultural production and the ordering of relations in the MDP area was basically determined 
by these foreign personnel at the dictates of TNCs. The resettled farmers and the peasantry were 
merely a passive participant in this sophisticated international strategy to dominate Sri Lankan 
agriculture. 
The policy of Land Settlement which has been followed by the Sri Lankan State for many 
decades has revealed clear political options vis-a-vis the peasantry. Resettlement of the 
peasantry from the Wet to the Dry Zone was seen as an easier option on the part of the State, 
than the programme of radical Land Reforms which would imply altering the prevailing agrarian 
relations, land ownership and control patterns in the countryside, particularly in the Wet Zone. 
As Piyasiri Wickramasekera notes : "The creation of a class of independent peasant proprietors 
who would represent a 'stable element in the social order' was regarded as a desirable objective. 
The possibilities for opening up of unutilised crown land in the Dry Zone meant that the agrarian 
structure in the Wet Zone could remain intact."78 
The process of Land Settlement sponsored by the State was also an effort to contain 
peasant unrest. The increasing agrarian tensions in the Wet Zone, sparked off by growing 
landlessness, unemployment, land transfer to non-peasant groups, was stifled by shifting the 
landless to the Dry Zone and offering them lucrative incentives, including land, for agricultural 
production. It is perhaps for this reason that the policy of Land Settlement of the State has 
continued uninterrupted with no opposition from the peasantry. We shall return to this point 
later in this chapter. 
A classical example of TNC incursion into peasant agriculture in the MDP is the case of 
the Ceylon Tobacco Company. This company was perhaps the first to be invited to participate in 
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the MDP and coordinate agricultural production through introducing modem techniques and 
regulating cultivation and marketing. 
(ii) The Ceylon Tobacco Company 
The Ceylon Tobacco Company (CTC) - a subsidiary of British American Tobacco - is 
one of the 5 major tobacco TNCs that account for about 80% of all tobacco manufacturers in the 
capitalist countries. CTC first started its operations in Sri Lanka in 1900, and by 1954 was 
converted into a public limited liability company, with complete monopoly over tobacco 
production and cigarette manufacture in Sri Lanka.79 
As elsewhere on the island, CTC introduced the system of 'contract farming' in the 
Mahaweli areas. CTC was granted about 5,600 acres in the H9 Mahaweli area in 1979. This 
area was settled by about 2,000 families, each granted 2.5 acres of irrigated land and 0.5 acres of 
highlands. The CTC introduced the crop-rotation scheme whereby the peasants cultivated paddy 
during the Maha season and subsidiary food crops and vegetables in the Yala season. CTC has 
defined its role in agricultural production as follows: 
"the Company provides the farmer with all agricultural inputs, arranges fanner 
credits through the Bank of Ceylon and the People's Bank, organises and 
motivates the farmers to produce high-yielding crops. The farmers are supervised 
throughout the cultivation period and the repayment of bank credit is carefully 
watched by the Company staff. The farmers are also given the guarantee of 
purchase of all their produce at market prices."80 
In this manner, the CTC retained complete monopoly of peasant production through the 
contract farming system. С Abeysekera points out two significant aspects of this strategy of 
CTC towards peasant agriculture in Sri Lanka : (a) a TNC is stepping into a role hitherto 
performed by the State and its agencies. In other words, a private sector takes over all the roles 
of the various government departments, state agencies, banks, and marketing services. 
Consequently, insofar as the peasants are concerned, the TNC in effect replaces the State, and (b) 
it is an alternative attempt to transform peasant agriculture into large agglomerates run on 
basically capitalist lines, and with very little "freedom" left to the peasants in terms of choice of 
crops, cultivation practices, marketing, etc.81 
The contract farming system is indeed a new strategy of TNCs towards agriculture as 
shown in the role of CTC in Sri Lanka today. Its nature is well summed up by its very 
proponent, the British American Tobacco Company, as follows :" 
"We as a Company do not grow tobacco. It is not our policy to own plantations. 
What we do is to encourage and assist farmers to grow the crop. Our field staff 
then go in and show the farmers what to do · how to plant and tend the crops, 
what fertilisers to apply and so on, a complete extention service...When the 
122 
farmers' crop is ready, he brings it to us and we buy it direct from him; as you can 
expect, we pay him promptly. 2 
The overall impact of this new strategy of TNCs has become apparent in the Mahaweli 
area where the peasant settlers have become completely subservient to the control and 
management of these international institutions. The attempts of TNCs, like the CTC, to take to 
"contract fanning" is clearly intended to overcome the limitations of widespread plantation 
agriculture. In many Third World countries, like Sri Lanka, labour on the plantations operated 
by TNCs have been the hotbed of unrest and labour agitations. Moreover, it has become 
economically and naturally impractical for extensive plantation agriculture and the employment 
of a vast labour force. 
With fertile lands and cheap labour increasingly becoming a rare commodity in many 
Third World countries, TNCs are now turning to alternative strategies of controlling production 
and marketing, without direct ownership of land and labour. While this approach regulates 
production and distribution in the local economy, it facilitates the continued exploitation of 
natural resources and the appropriation of the produce by the TNCs from peasant producers. It is 
precisely this new strategy of international capital and TNCs that is transforming the small-
holding petty commodity producers in Sri Lanka today. 
(Hi) Sugar TNCs in the Agricultural Promotion Zones 
Here, we shall review the nature of TNC operation in one of the Agricultural Promotion 
Zones viz., the Pelwatte Sugar Co. set up on a collaborative agreement between the Government 
of Sri Lanka and Booker Agriculture International Ltd., a British owned TNC. This company 
was the first to commence operation of a sugar factory and regulate sugarcane cultivation in the 
APZ under the government's declared policy of opening up the APZs for foreign investment and 
international capital. 
According to the agreement signed between the Government of Sri Lanka and Booker 
Agriculture International Ltd., dated May 24, 1984, the Government made a commitment to 
contribute a basic equity of Rs 184 million for the period 1982-1985 together with another Rs 33 
million as grants for settlers, social infrastructure, road construction.83 Booker Agriculture 
International was granted a 10 year Tax holiday and duty-free import facilities of machinery, and 
exemption from income tax. Annex 1 (h) of a letter from the Government of Sri Lanka to 
Booker Agriculture International stated in clear terms its commitment that "payments of interest 
and principal to foreign lenders, of dividends to foreign investors and of management fees may 
be made free of any withholding or other tax."84 
What is perhaps significant regarding this agreement is the concept of 'outgrowers' 
introduced by the TNC in sugarcane cultivation. The various aspects of the operation of this 
TNC through the Pelwatte Sugar Co. is as follows : (a) an area of 7,600 hectares of rain-fed 
sugar cane cultivation, comprising of a nucleus estate of approximately. 4,500 ha, and a 
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settlement area of approximately 3,600 ha to be cultivated by "outgrowers", (b) establishment of 
a sugar factory with a total capacity of about 2,800 tonnes of cane per day, which could be 
expanded to a capacity of over 4,000 tonnes of cane per day. 
The land area that comprise the location of the Pelwatte Sugar Co. was drawn from two 
main sources: (i) State Lands : that is, areas that have been deemed as Crown Lands, on which 
the factory and the nucleus estate are located, including Crown lands that will be taken over by 
the company for settler ("outgrowers") sugarcane cultivation; and (ii) Private Lands: that is, land 
belonging to the Ruhunu Maha Kataragama Devale and other private owners. The total area thus 
taken over by the Pelwatte Sugar Co. include approximately 9,500 hectares of State Land and 
2,000 hectares of Private Lands.85 
The outgrowers system introduced by the Pelwatte Sugar Co, under direction from the 
TNC - Booker Agriculture International, is another form of 'contract fanning'. The peasants in 
the settlement area would produce sugarcane under a "contract" to the sugar factory and provided 
with the necessary incentives, which includes guarantee of full purchase of their produce after 
harvesting. However, according to this 'contract' the sugarcane fanners will not be permitted to 
sell the produce to any other buyer or market. In addition to providing necessary resources and 
incentives, the Company also ensures the levels of production and regulates inputs and credit 
facilities to the settler farmers. 
The outgrowers system is a new experience for the local fanners in the area. In many of 
the APZ areas in Sri Lanka, the cultivation of sugarcane had been traditionally undertaken by the 
local farmers for many years on a small scale. Under the SLFP government in the 1970s, the 
import of sugar was restricted which was a boost to local small-scale production of sugarcane as 
there then prevailed a good market for jaggery. During this time, sugarcane cultivation was 
undertaken on uncultivated lands by the local farmers themselves and could earn as much as Rs 
10,000 to Rs 20,000 from just one acre of sugarcane produced.86 
The SLFP government provided necessary assistance for sugarcane cultivation through 
easy credit facilities, and permits for sugarcane cultivation. It was only in 1977 with the UNP 
government's Open Economy Policy that this situation was drastically altered with the 
liberalisation of imports on sugar. This led to a sharp fall in local sugarcane production as 
farmers abandoned its cultivation no longer able to obtain necessary facilities from the new 
government. 
The country then became totally dependent on imports of sugar. The incursion of TNCs 
into sugarcane cultivation and sugar production in Sri Lanka came with the declaration of the 
government in 1982 for opening up three districts to foreign private capital and TNCs, as 
"Agricultural Promotion Zones". Thus, sugarcane production in the country was virtually 
handed over to the TNCs to manage and produce for the local market. The issues thrown up by 
this government's strategy are the following: 
(a) Traditional sugarcane cultivation has provided more employment to fanners than 
the TNC-operated sugar factories and "outgrowers" system, 
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(b) Profit repatriation from sugar companies will not allow capital accumulation in 
the area or the country from sugar production, 
(c) It has been argued that "small-scale sugarcane cultivation" is found to be more 
suitable to the country's needs, which also ensures control over production and 
marketing by the peasants themselves, 
(d) With improved credit facilities, building-up a good local market system and 
arrangement, credit facilities and irrigation the farmers in the declared APZs 
could viably produce sugarcane for local consumption without being dependent 
on TNCs and international capital.87 
It is, however, too early to assess the precise impact of the Pelwatte Sugar Company or 
other sugar TNCs in the APZ. What seems clear at this stage is that the contract farming (out-
growers system) method of TNC operation in the APZ would significantly change the prevailing 
pattern of agricultural production and peasant farming in Sri Lanka. While the issue of 
defending the peasants land from TNC incursion provides necessary stimulus to escalating 
peasant protest against TNCs, what is of more significance would be the changes being 
introduceid by TNCs in agriculture and peasant production in the Sri Lankan countryside, and its 
long-term effects on the agrarian economy. 
The operation of the Sugar TNCs in Sri Lanka today, perhaps provides us a good case-
study of new strategies of TNCs to dispossess petty commodity producers of their land and gain 
control over production and marketing, and in the process, incorporating them more firmly into 
the world capitalist market. Increasing TNC penetration into the Sri Lankan countryside would 
reveal the successes and limitations of this new strategy of international capital towards peasant 
agriculture in countries like Sri Lanka. 
SS Agrarian Protest : The Politics of a Marginalised Peasantry 
The agrarian policies and programmes we have reviewed above brought about drastic 
changes in agricultural production and consequently had a detrimental impact on the fanners. 
The opening up of the agrarian sector to foreign agribusiness interests in particular, aroused the 
peasantry of Sri Lanka who saw this as an effort on the part of the government to favour foreign 
interests to their own. The grievances of the peasantry found expression through the All-Lanka 
Peasant Congress (ALPC). 
(i) Brief History of the All-Lanka Peasant Congress (ALPC) 
The Samastha Lanka Govi Sammelanaya (All Lanka Peasant Congress) was established 
around 1942 and is perhaps the only peasant organisation that has existed in Sri Lanka with 
branches spread over the various districts across the island. The ALPC claims to have led 
numerous militant struggles of the Sri Lankan peasantry against the European colonisers, and 
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provided a platform for the peasantry to express and assert their grievances against colonial 
exploitation. The ALPC further has a national organisational setup which enables it to channel 
the grievances and demands of the peasantry. 
The main motivation and initiative for the formation of the ALPC came from the then 
undivided Communist Party which attempted to organise the peasantry around issues that were 
so blatantly neglected by the colonial government. The cadres of the ALPC were largely drawn 
from this political party, while others emerged from and were strongly influenced by the militant 
trade union movement that developed in the country during the 1940s and 1950s. The methods 
of organisation and strategies of struggle adopted by the ALPC were, therefore, very much 
similar to that of the trade union movement in the country. 
The ALPC suffered a major setback in 1971 during the JVP-led insurrection. Some 
members of the ALPC joined the JVP movement, and suffered arrest and detention for many 
years. JVP politics had a strong influence on the ALPC, although the Peasant Congress was 
critical of the clandestine nature of the JVP movement. With the repression of the JVP 
insurrection, many activists who were very disillusioned with the JVP-style politics, joined the 
ALPC. It is only in 1976 with the release of some key leaders from prison that the ALPC could 
revive itself. The ALPC has described itself as a peasant organisation that seeks to bring about 
the economic, social and cultural upliftment of the Sri Lankan peasantry. Its main objectives 
have been stated as follows : 
(a) To bring about unity among the peasants in the country by organising them in the 
ALPC, 
(b) To struggle for the demands and rights of the peasants and to orient peasants towards 
such struggles, 
(c) To create awareness among the peasants on democratic rights and on national 
liberation, and 
(d) To work towards worker-peasant unity in order to progress towards a new society.88 
While these broad objectives have provided the necessary guidance for the ALPC, the 
organisation has specifically been concerned with issues that effect the poor peasantry. The 
ALPC states that in taking up these specific issues affecting the poor peasantry, their over-all 
objective is to strive for a socialist society in Sri Lanka. The ALPC's programme and 
methodology of work has attempted to impart this vision through concrete issues confronting the 
peasantry in Sri Lanka. Its programme includes an educational aspect which is aimed at 
exposing the peasants to the exploitative nature of the capitalist system. 
In order words, this implies mass mobilisation of the peasantry around issues that come 
up from time to time, and launching non-violent protests to bring pressure on the government 
and officials. The methods of protest adopted by the ALPC have included demonstrations, 
signing petitions, picketing, satyagrahas and public rallies.89 Further, the programme of 
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recruitment and training adopted by the ALPC has comprised of a theoretical and a practical 
component. The theoretical component former included a series of lectures and discussions that 
covered broad areas of enquiry into the country's economic and political systems and 
government policies towards peasant agriculture. The major themes covered in this theoretical 
component included the following : 
(a) The national history of Sri Lanka, 
(b) History of the All Lanka Peasant Congress, 
(c) The Constitution of the ALPC, 
(d) How the agricultural policies of the government affect the peasantry, 
(e) The legislations that are relevant to the peasants, 
(f) Services performed by various government departments, 
(g) The religious and cultural aspects of peasant organisation, and 
(h) Orientation on the programmes of work among the peasants. 
The practical component of the ALPC's training programme seeks to build up a cadre of 
politically-advanced people to study the specific issues confronting the peasantry and to organise 
them into peasant organisations based on these issues. The plan of action to follow is based on 
the following guidelines: (i) those that can be solved by the sharing of labour 
(i/zarmûdflna),exchange of labour among the villagers themselves, (ii) those that can be solved 
by negotiating with officials and power groups, (iii) those that require collective pressurising 
agitations, (iv) those that require solutions at national level through nation-wide pressure and 
agitations, and (v) those that could only be solved by a change in the social system. 
Since its revival in 1976 the ALPC has been able to set up its branches in various parts of 
the island, including the districts of Anuradhapura, Kurunegala, Trincomalee, Polonnaruwa 
Hambantota, and Galle. In the Tamil-dominated areas of Jaffna region, the ALPC has 
maintained links with the Rural Labourers' Union (RLU) for many years. This has resulted in 
the ALPC establishing a nation-wide organisational setup and can, therefore, be termed as the 
only national peasant organisation in the history of modern Sri Lanka. On the other hand, since 
independence various Left political parties (e.g., CP, LSSP, SLFP) have also set up their own 
respective peasant unions. But these, however, are confined to particular pockets in the country 
and so far been unable to develop a nation-wide organisational structure. 
The ALPC has maintained a consistent critique of the various government policies 
towards agriculture and its impact on the peasantry. These views have been regularly expressed 
during the annual conventions of the ALPC, and have been turned into slogans to rally the 
peasantry under the banner of the ALPC for various agitations and protest meetings. For 
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example, the 36th Annual Convention of the ALPC held in 1979 adopted the following 
resolution on the UNP government's economic policy towards agriculture and its detrimental 
impact on the peasantry : 
(i) The All Lanka Peasant Congress registers its vehement protest regarding the 
aggravation of the oppression of the people, decreasing the subsidies subtly under 
cover of introducing food stamps in place of rice coupons, increasing price of 
goods by devaluing the rupee and exactly executing the advice of the World 
Bank, 
(ii) While the prices of tractor hire, fertiliser, farming tools, etc. is increasing rapidly, 
the peasant is heavily burdened with the new water tax and indebtedness. 
Therefore this conference demands that the peasant also should be provided for 
crop cultivation, such as tea, rubber and coconut.91 
In the following sections we shall review two recent peasant struggles led by the ALPC 
in Sri Lanka. They are : (a) The Water-tax struggle which is based on a recent levy by the 
government to tax farmers for using the facilities of the country's irrigation systems, and (b) The 
militant peasant struggle in Monaragela district against foreign sugar multinational companies 
that are taking over the lands of the peasants for plantation cultivation of sugarcane. A 
discussion of these two peasant struggles would perhaps enable us to critically review the 
strengths and weaknesses of the ALPC and also highlight the potentials of modern peasant 
protest in Sri Lanka. 
f ii) The Peasant Struggle against Water-Tax 
In 1983 the UNP government imposed a "water-tax" levy, which it termed the 
"Maintenance and Management Charges" for farmers who cultivated lands under major 
irrigation schemes. The imposed levy was to be Rs 100 per acre every year, which was to be 
increased by Rs 20 every year thereafter up to five years, until the amount reached Rs 200 per 
acre. Farmers who were unable to pay this tax were to be charged for violation and brought 
before the court. This sudden tax imposition on the peasantry led to widespread resentment, and 
the ALPC took up the issue to mobilise the farmers for a nation-wide agitation against the water 
tax. It initiated the formation of regional and district-level peasant committees to rally the 
farmers together. Such committees were formed in the districts of Anuradhapura, Polonnamwa, 
Kurunegala, Ratnapura, Hambantota, Monaragela and even Colombo.92 Under the leadership of 
the ALPC the struggle gradually intensified into widespread agitations and protest gatherings. 
In Batalaguda village, for example, the peasants sent a petition and met the local Member 
of Parliament to protest against the tax. In two weeks time they collected over 4,000 signatures 
from farmers who were opposed to the levy. In this and many other villages, numerous cases 
were filed against offenders who refused to pay the tax. In response, the farmers organised 
protest rallies outside the courts during the hearings. 
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In Siembalaguma village where similar cases were filed against 7 offenders, more than 
1,500 farmers including about 75 Buddhist monks demonstrated.93 In a year's time, the peasant 
agitations against the water-tax developed into a nation-wide upsurge of the peasantry led by the 
ALPC. Some opposition parties like LSSP, SLMP, CP also issued statements supporting the 
farmers agitations against the unjust water-tax imposed by the government. 
The ALPC saw the imposition of the water-tax as a discriminatory policy against the 
peasantry while, on the other hand, it had opened up its agricultural sector to the exploitation of 
MNCs who were exempted from such taxations. The 12th Congress of the ALPC held in April 
1984 adopted the following resolution on the current water-tax agitations : 
"Foreign companies invited for agriculture and agro-business industries have been 
offered large tax concessions and they are allowed to take away their profits 
without any taxes. But the small farmers (local population) who benefit from 
irrigation facilities have been asked to pay a water tax of Rs 100 per acre at the 
beginning which is to be increased to Rs 200 later.... 
We strongly oppose these unjust taxing of the poor and appeal to the people to 
unite in the struggle against them."94 
The escalating opposition to the imposition of the water-tax was unheeded by the 
government. In its desire to carry out the dictates of the IMF, the government adopted strict 
measures to ensure payment of the tax by the farmers. Failure to do so were dealt with sternly, 
with the offenders being dragged to courts and charges filed against them. Such harsh measures 
on the part of the government further aggravated the situation, with the result that the agitating 
fanners found increasing sympathy and support from many quarters including opposition 
political parties. For its part, the government in fact admitted that during the first year of its 
imposition, the collection of the water-tax had been largely a failure. 
While the ALPC was spear-heading the nation-wide agitation against the water-tax the 
issue of the invasion of Monaragela by sugar multinational companies was also raised. The 
ALPC and other peasant organisations came together to form the "Joint Committee of Peasant 
Federations" to better coordinate the struggle on these two issues. This Joint Committee brought 
together the following peasant organisations : a) Govijana M aha Sabbawa, b) Jathika Govt 
Sammelanaya (CPSL), c) Samastha Lanka Covi Sammelanaya, d) Sr/ Lanka Krushikarmiyinge 
Maha Sangamaya (LSSP), e) Govijana Sammelanaya (NSSP), f) Sri Lanka Mahajana Govt 
Sammelanaya (SLMP), g) Sri Lanka Nidhahas Covi Sammelanaya (SLFP), h) Heladiaa Covi 
Sammelanaya (МЕР), and i) Samajawadi Govijana Sangamaya (JVP)9S 
The formation of the JCPF was definitely a major step in the attempt to revive the peasant 
movement in modern Sri Lanka, especially because it has brought together most of the major 
opposition political parties into one coordinated front to provide leadership to the developing 
peasant struggles in the past years. The JCPF set up two issue-oriented fronts viz., the 'Jathika 
Jala-badhu Virodhi Kamituwa' (the People's Anti-Water Tax Front) which coordinated the anti-
water tax agitation, and, the 'Monaragela Govijana Sahayogitha Kamituwa' (the Monaragela 
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Peasants United Front) to coordinate the peasant struggle against the granting of lands to sugar 
multinationals in Monaragela district. 
The resurgence of peasant struggles around these two issues in recent years has brought 
the peasant movement in the forefront of the country's politics. In the process these peasant 
struggles have been able to mobilise support from urban centres and various national peoples 
organisations. However, the apparent weakness of these struggles has been that they remain 
confined to specific area in the country and coordinated by exclusive peasant organisations (like 
the ALPC) which in fact has posed limitations in broadening the struggles into wider national 
and political protest movements. Critics of these current peasant struggles have pointed out that 
the main weakness lies in the fact that these struggles are primarily issue-oriented and imply a 
vain attempt to preserve the encroacher small-peasantry in Sri Lanka. 
(Hi) The Peasants' Struggle against Sugar TNCs in Vellassa 
The location of the recent peasant struggle against sugar MNCs in Monaragela is a region 
known as Vellassa. Vellassa literally means "a hundred thousand paddy fields" to signify the area 
where, it is believed that, "a large population who worked and lived from generation to 
generation for the past 2,000 to 3,000 years of the island's civilisation", until the time that the 
British destroyed this area during the militant peasant struggles against the colonisers in 1818. 
The Vellassa peasantry is said to have risen in armed revolt against the British invaders in 1818 
which initiated widespread protest that spread to other areas of the Kandyan Kingdom. 
Among the many peasant leaders thrown up during the 1818 peasant revolts, Bulare Rala, 
Kohnkumbure Rala, Polgahagama Rala, Madugama Rala and others came from Vellassa. In the 
aftermath of this rebellion, Vellassa was virtually in ruins. The British massacred its population, 
burnt its crops and destroyed almost all its irrigational works and hamlets. Thousands of 
Vellassa people are said to have died of starvation and hunger during the repression. It is clear 
that this armed revolt of the Vellassa peasantry shook the power of British rule on the island. 
The above was evident from the urgent appeal from the then Chief Administrator of Uva, 
John D'Oyly, to the Colonial Secretary at London which stated that "this defeat suffered by the 
British in the Golden Age (sic!)of British military history which started with wars with 
Napoleon, will encourage and instigate even the people of India for insurrection and ultimately 
can lead to the loss of British possessions in the East.*6 
The repression unleashed on the Vellassa peasantry was followed by the region being 
administered under Martial Law by the British from 1818 to 1844. Moreover, as in other parts of 
the Kandyan Kingdom, the British took over the lands of the peasants through arbitrary laws and 
handed them over to private British capitalists to set up plantations and take to cultivation of 
export crops. 
The recent peasant struggle against sugar multinationals (including British) in this region 
of Vellassa has evoked memories of this earlier history of armed peasant conflicts with the 
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British invaders. Under the Open Economic Policy of the UNP government, the three districts of 
Monaragela, Vavuniya and Mannar were declared as Agricultural Promotion Zones. In 
Monaragela, three giant multinational companies set up local sugar companies in joint-
collaboration with the Sri Lankan government, ostensibly as a disguise to facilitate the 
exploitation of local resources and to gain legal credibility. The three sugar companies set up for 
this purpose were the following: 
(a) The Pelwatte Sugar Co. Ltd 
This company has established sugar plantations in the Wellawaya area and has already 
begun to construct a giant sugar factory. It was formed by the following partners: Booker 
Agriculture International of U.K., Commonwealth Development Corporation of U.K., Kerry 
Engineering Ltd. of Hong Kong, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Standard 
Chartered Bank of U.K., and the Government of Sri Lanka and the Bank of Ceylon. The Sri 
Lankan ownership in this company is estimated to be around 60%. This company is also the 
largest agricultural project in the country with a total capital of Rs 2500 million. The company 
has been granted a total of 24,000 acres of land to establish its factory and plantation - this would 
include about 17,000 acres for the Central Zone and a peripheral zone of about 7,000 acres. 
(b) The Monaragela Sugar Co. Ltd 
This company was set up as a joint venture between the Government of Sri Lanka and 
Metha International - an Indo-African multinational company based in Bermuda. The 
Monaragela Sugar Co. has been granted over 52,000 acres in Siyambalanduwa A.G.A. Division 
of Monaragela district to establish its factory and plantation. The central zone of this plantation 
is estimated to cover about 10,000 acres and the peripheral zone about 42,000 acres. The factory 
will have a capacity of processing over 2,200 tons of sugarcane daily. 
(c) The Nakkala Sugar Co. Ltd 
Another joint venture between the Government of Sri Lanka and a Dutch Multinational 
company - H.V.A. International Ltd. This company has been granted about 6,000 acres in the 
Nakkala region for sugarcane cultivation and for setting up a factory to produce sugar. 
The basic strategy adopted by these multinational sugar companies would be such that 
each of them will set up its own sugar plantation in the specified central zone with a giant factory 
and an administrative complex. In addition, there will be a peripheral zone of private small 
farmers which will consist of the surrounding areas cultivating sugarcane with advice and aid 
provided by the company, with the fanners selling the total produce to the factory at a price fixed 
by the company. The peripheral zone will also be administered by the company unhindered by 
the regulations of the government.97 
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The establishment of these three sugar companies was a result of prolonged discussions 
between the Government of Sri Lanka and many multinational companies since January 1981 on 
the possibility of setting up sugarcane plantations and giant sugar factories in the three 
Agricultural Promotion Zones. But it was only towards the end of September 1982 that the 
ALPC and other opposition political parties became suspicious of the plans and intentions of the 
government and the multinational companies and its consequence for the Vellassa peasantry. 
In the same month the ALPC and some opposition parties signed a petition which was 
handed over the President protesting against the intentions of the government to hand over 
irrigated lands in the Mahaweli project, APZs to foreign companies. This petition found no 
response from the government or the companies themselves. The ALPC continued to press the 
issue and published articles in its organ - Goviya- titled "Vellassa to Foreigners" exposing the 
government's plans. 
It was through these articles that the peasants in the region became first aware of the 
plans drawn up by the government and the MNCs to take over their lands and set up sugar 
plantations. They, therefore, sent many delegations to meet Members of Parliament to seek more 
information on the precise plans drawn up for this purpose, but found the M.P.'s denying any 
knowledge of such plans. The suspicions of the farmers were confirmed when in early 1982 the 
Grama Sevakas' of the affected areas were ordered by the Government Agent (GA) to conduct a 
survey of certain villages, collect data on the people, property, lands, crops, and resources. It 
then became certain that the peasants would lose these lands to the foreign companies. 
In 1983 Metha International began clearing operations in Monaragela to set up its nursery 
in the central zone. In a short time the company began to work its way into the fields of the 
peasants and expand its central zone. It cut through trees, peasant gardens and uprooted the lime 
and orange shrubs that belonged to the farmers. This initial operation was stunted when the 
peasants began to protest and intervened to stop the further expansion of the nursery in the 
central zone. 
The company officials who first met the peasants stated that all the land in the area had 
been handed over to them by the agreement with the government, and they showed a map to the 
peasants which indicated the precise location of the sugar factory and the plantation. Two Indian 
engineers with the A.G.A. acting as an interpreter - explained to the peasants the contents of the 
map as follows : the central zone would enclose about 10 villages with a population of about 
3,000 people cultivating about 1,500 acres of lands. The temple lands of about 60 acres will also 
be taken over, and the central location of the company will be about 600 acres in the Haddawa 
forest reserve which had for so long been maintaining the ecological balance of the whole region, 
and was now to be replaced by the sugar factory.98 
One peasant woman in Kivaleyaya village in Monaragela district explained this first 
interaction with the company officials in the following words : 
"We first came to know of the company through newspapers and the ALPC 
activists in 1982/83. Then the company officials came to make boundaries by 
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cutting through our gardens. They explained that they wanted to survey the land 
and conduct soil tests to make soil maps. These officials were accompanied by 
the Grama Sevakas. The officials had a map of the area where the precise 
location of the company was marked out. They told us that the factory will be set 
up on State lands. But we knew that sugarcane cannot just be cultivated without 
using the private lands belonging to us in the area. They told us: "We are only 
doing a survey, but we won't take lands. We are from India, but we are not 
Tamils." We responded: "We have no special anger with India, but we are angry 
with you because you are taking our lands."99 
This peasant women went on to explain that the next day the company officials returned 
with the AGA and spoke to the assembled farmers. They claimed to develop hospitals, schools, 
and roads in the villages. The fanners merely responded : "We do not believe this. We only 
want to be left alone to cultivate our lands for our children." 
Under the initiative of the ALPC the peasants in Monaragela organised themselves into 
peasant action committees to protest the intrusion of the sugar multinationals. On July 28, 1984 
the ALPC organised a Press Conference in Colombo which brought together various opposition 
parties and peoples organisations to rally support for the Monaragela peasantry. ALPC leaders, 
Buddhist monks and politicians addressed this conference. At this conference, Appuhamy, an 
elderly peasant leader from Madugama, described the situation he had to encounter, as quoted by 
Camini Yapa: 
"..the company had ordered him to leave a part of the land which he had 
cultivated for nearly 40 years. When he refused to do so the officials of the 
company had the audacity to lodge a complaint at the AGA's office to the effect 
that he was encroaching on the Company's property. Regarding this he met the 
Monaragela GA at the latter's office on July 23 and there had been a heated 
argument between them. At the end, the same officer who the previous week 
categorically denied the intention of taking over the property of the peasantry had 
told him that he had received instructions to remove all those living in the Central 
zone to make way for the company and the bulldozers."100 
An important outcome of this Press Conference was the formation of the 'Monaragela 
Peasants Solidarity Committee' which consisted of representatives of various peoples 
organisations and pressure groups in the country. 
The government, however, continued to tum a deaf ear to the protest of the Monaragela 
peasants. In fact, it went about explaining the benefits of multinational companies operations in 
Sri Lanka. One politician elucidated this as follows : 
"The sugar companies coming here will plough your land for you. They will give 
you saplings. Will give you fertilisers. Will give you credit for cultivation. All 
you have to do is to sell the yield to the sugar company and pocket the money. Is 
it a hard thing? In the past people bought oranges calling them Bibile oranges. In 
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a short time they would buy sugar calling it Monaragela sugar. Then who would 
be proud of that? Those who distribute pamphlets are defeated political groups. 
They are lying. They are not telling you peasants the truth. This is for your 
benefit."101 
Such was the extent of ridicule that the government and its politicians could go to justify 
their economic policy and the intervention of multinational companies in Sri Lanka. 
The ALPC, on the other hand, in its 12th National Congress resolution in April 1984 had 
stated in no unclear terms its total opposition towards the government's policy of throwing open 
agricultural areas to multinational companies and to foreign private investors. The Resolution 
stated: 
"Monaragela, Vavuniya and Mannar districts have been named as "Agricultural 
Promotion Zones" open to foreign and local companies for export-oriented 
agriculture and agro-based industries. They are offered large tax benefits and 
other incentives similar to those in the Free Trade Zones We express our 
opposition to these moves and emphasise that no country that permits multi-
national companies to have control over such a wide range of activities could 
protect its national sovereignty, a democratic rule, and independent economy and 
its cultural values. We appeal to the people to organise themselves to protect our 
valuable land. Do not sell our land and the people (peasants) to foreign 
companies!"102 
The legal conditions of land holdings in the Monaragela area is still a point of bitter 
debate between the government and the peasants. The government, which is said to have used a 
1948 map of Sri Lanka during the process of allocating lands to the sugar multinationals, holds 
that the area is "state property" as this particular map showed the area as "reserved forests" at 
that time. The peasants, on the other hand, claim that for many years they have settled on these 
lands and cultivated it through chena cultivation and possess some legal rights to their holdings. 
It is therefore important to look more closely at the legal conditions of peasant holdings in this 
area which remains a crucial point of dispute between the government and the peasantry 
(a) By 1930 the Land Settlements Department had demarcated the boundaries of the old 
villages declaring them as areas belonging to the people settled there. In such area, the 
government possessed only those lands that were allocated to schools and government 
buildings. The rest of the area - about 200 acres - were claimed as the village lands by 
the chiefs. Apart from this, there are other lands outside the village which had not been 
settled between the government and the people, 
(b) With increasing population the people cleared the land and built their houses and 
cultivated perennial crops. After 1950 this land was also marked out and given to the 
possession of the people. This area of about 800 acres then became the property of the 
villagers and they even paid their Surveyor's fees for these lands, 
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(c) The government also gave some villagers about 2 acres each under the Land 
Development Ordinance on a 99 year lease. They were also given housing. Land 
kaccheries were also held for this purpose. The acreage obtained on this 99 year lease 
was about 200 acres, 
(d) Still other lands have been settled by people resident for over 10 years which they had 
continued to cultivate without any authorisation. People expected that these lands would 
be legally given to them in the future by the Land Settlement Department following the 
earlier practise. Such lands include about 1,000 acres, 
(e) There are others too who had settled permanently on land that they obtained on annual 
permits, which is extended every year. They have also cultivated permanent crops. This 
acreage is about 200 acres, and 
(f) Lastly, there are those who have settled in lands but have not renewed their annual 
permits. They occupy about 800 acres in this region.103 
The formation of peasant action committees in Monaragela together with the 
establishment of the Monaragela Solidarity Committee to mobilise nation-wide support for the 
struggle against the MNCs, began a process of militant opposition against the sugar companies. 
In October 1984 a statement was brought out expressing concern over the transfer of lands in 
Monaragela to three multinational companies : "By arranging for the destruction of both the 
villager and the temple, the damage caused to the cornerstone of the traditional religious way of 
life to the peasantry is immense. Not only that. Hotels and holiday resorts for the rest and 
recreation of the foreigners will make their entrance. The havoc caused by the destruction of 
culture, evident in areas dominated by foreign companies and around tourist hotels, will visit this 
area too." 
Among the prominent people who were signatories to this statement included the 
following : about 35 Buddhist monks, 10 Catholic and Anglican priests and nuns, prominent 
politicians like Dinesh Gunawardena MP, Vijay Kumaratune (SLMP), Bernard Soysa (LSSP), 
K.P. Silva (CP), several trade unionists, representatives of peasant organisations and well known 
academics like Professor Sarachachandra. Professor Carlo Fonseka, Professor Kumari 
Jayawardena and Professor Wiswa Wamapala. 
In November 1984 Metha International commenced clearing operations in the Haddawa 
forest area to set up its factory. The company's plans was that "600 acres of the central forest is 
to be cleared to erect the giant factory of the sugar company milling 2200 tons of sugar cane per 
day and its office complex. And water for the factory has to come from Heda Oya."105 The 
peasants, on the contrary, had argued that when Heda Oya dries up after the Haddawa forest is 
cleared, the factory will have to utilise the water facilities of Muthukandiya, thereby depriving 
them of water resources. 
Further, it is feared that the clearing of the Haddawa forest area would seriously effect the 
ecological balance of the whole region. The Haddawa area had been divided into 10 plots and 
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ten contractors were granted permission to fell and remove the timber and clear the area. When 
this work began, the peasants made enquiries and discovered that Metha International had 
employed the contractors for the job. 
On November 7 the peasants marched to the office of the Government Agent in 
Monaragela to lodge a complaint and discuss the matter with the GA. This delegation included 
over 250 peasants and several Buddhist monks, headed by the leaders of the Monaragela 
Solidarity Committee and members of the ALPC. In the discussions with the GA it was revealed 
that the GA himself was not aware of the situation and he assured the peasants that no permits 
were issued to anyone to clear the Haddawa forests. The GA then visited the area and ordered all 
the contractors to leave the area immediately. However, a few days later, the State Timber 
Corporation entered Haddawa with a government permit claiming to merely thin down the 
overgrowth in the forest. The peasants, however, kept up their vigilance to prevent the 
destruction of the forest reserve. 
Meanwhile, the peasants had sent a petition letter to the Parliament Petitions Committee 
demanding the immediate stoppage of eviction of farmers lands by the sugar company. The 
letter called for an immediate and thorough enquiry from the Ministry of Agrarian Research and 
Development into the operations of the company. In its reply, the Parliament Committee stated 
that only 19,000 acres of land were proposed by the government to be given to the sugar 
company which they would cultivate directly, while the rest would be cultivated by the farmers 
with necessary assistance provided by the company. Further, the Commissioner of Parliament 
requested the petitioners to come to Parliament office on January 15, 1985 to discuss the issue of 
the sugar multinationals in Monaragela. 
This meeting of the peasant leaders and the Parliament Committee was the highest level 
of discussions that took place on the issue of the sugar companies in Monaragela. The peasants' 
delegation included Mr. Ananda Weerakoon and the Organising Secretary of the ALPC, Patrick 
Fernando; who met the Commissioner and his assistants, the Monaragela GA, and a top 
government official incharge of affairs with the sugar companies.106 
During the deliberations that followed the G A admitted that the attempt to clear Haddawa 
was made without his knowledge. He admitted to declaring about 350 acres of Haddawa as 
forest reserves and that valuable timber had been shifted before his order was promulgated. 
None of the government officials, however, seemed to possess any knowledge as to who sent the 
illegal lumberjacks to fell trees in Haddawa earlier, exactly at the same location where the central 
office and factory of the Monaragela sugar company was to be set up.107 
With the peasant protest in Monaragela developing into a widespread upsurge, guided by 
the ALPC, support and solidarity actions were carried out by various urban-based pressure 
groups and peoples' organisations through the National Solidarity network. Many delegations 
and representatives of women's groups, workers, Buddhist monks and others paid visits to 
Monaragela to meet with the farmers and express their support and solidarity for the struggle 
against the sugar multinationals. 
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In March 1985 twelve women's organisations in Sri Lanka issued a joint statement of 
solidarity with the Monaragela peasantry in which they appealed to the people of the country to 
oppose the MNC. The signatories included the women's fronts of various political parties 
Mahajana Paksha, Ceylon Merchantile Union, LSSP, NSSP - and independent women's groups 
viz., Voice of Women, Negombo Women's Committee, Women and Media and Progressive 
Women's Front. 
It is essential to emphasise the important role played by peasant women in the 
Monaragela struggle. The Progressive Women's Front (PWF) took the main initiative to form 
peasant women's organisations/societies in Monaragela to enable to participation of women in 
the peasant struggles. The strategy adopted by the PWF was to use the issue of MNC 
intervention into Monaragela to conscientize the women to actively involve themselves in mass 
organisations. However, as the struggle developed and the ALPC set about organising peasant 
societies in the various villages, these women's groups gradually dissolved into the peasant 
action committees. The reason for this was that the women did not feel the necessity any longer 
for separate women's organisations, but to join the general movement of peasants to fight against 
the sugar companies. 
Women, however, played a key role in the struggle - in one village for example over 30% 
of the women were involved in the peasants struggle, most of them coming from families from 
which other members (fathers, brothers and relatives) were already active in the movement and 
in peasant societies. This issue of sugar MNCs in Monaragela has greatly helped in raising the 
general consciousness of the women in the area and to provide a platform for them to express 
their own identity and grievances and to participate in equal terms in the peasants struggle to 
defend their lands.108 
The Monaragela struggle has also been able to mobilise the Buddhist monks - who are an 
influential group in the country's political process and particularly in the village set-up - onto 
their side. In June 1985 a delegation of over 150 Buddhist monks visited Monaragela to express 
their support for the struggle. Moreover, Buddhist monks have also participated actively in the 
various demonstrations organised by the ALPC and the Solidarity Committee against the MNC 
and the government's policy towards peasant agriculture. 
The Monaragela struggle began to take an aggressive tum from May 1985 onwards. The 
ALPC had organised its May Day rally in Siyambalanduwa to "boost the morale of the peasant 
struggle" and to highlight this issue and rally support. It was around this time that Metha 
International also began to bull-doze the lands which was to constitute the nursery area for the 
sugar plantation. The farmers protested and tried to prevent the bulldozers from leveling their 
lands. In this incident alone over 83 fanners were arrested and charged with "sabotage of the 
company and damaging property." In an effort from preventing the company from laying claims 
to their lands, the farmers planted banana saplings on the bull-dozed lands. The company 
retaliated by uprooting the saplings with the help of the local police force. 
In August 1985 the company began to plant sugarcane saplings in the nursery area inspite 
of the great resentment caused to the peasants of the area. As a show of strength, on August 30, 
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1985 over 500 farmers and ALPC activists gathered together and held a protest rally in the 
location of the nursery and uprooted the sugarcane saplings. Although no confrontation took 
place during this incident, the company officials brought in about 15 armed police battalions 
from В aduli a and Bandarawela to intimidate the peasants and threaten them with dire 
consequences if they continue to protest and oppose the company's operations in the area. To 
protect itself from the peasants protest, the company also erected a barbed wire fence around the 
nursery area, enclosing over 400 acres which included lands belonging to the Madugama and 
Kivaleyaya villagers. 
The Government's attitude towards the peasants plight in Monaragela has been one of 
indifference and evasion and also ignorance of the lower-rank government officials on the plans 
drawn up by the multinational companies to take over the peasants lands. When questioned by 
the peasant delegations which met the AGA of Monaragela, the latter seemed to be quite 
ignorant of the company's plans although he is said to have sent the police with those who went 
to mark the boundaries of the area that had been allocated to the Monaragela sugar company. 
Further, the Members of Parliament of Bibile and Monaragela too seemed unaware of the 
details drawn up by the company. Besides mere indifference and ignorance, government 
authorities also have used strong-arm tactics to threaten and intimidate the peasants and the 
ALPC organisers in Monaragela. When farmers held meetings in the villages to oppose the 
company's operations, the government took a decision in mid-August to ban such meetings in 
the villages using the pretext of the "State of Emergency" prevelant in Sri Lanka. 
What is indeed ironic in this situation is that the government had for long been clamoring 
for "self-sufficiency in sugar production", while at the same time, it had been importing 
thousands of tons of sugar under its Open Economy policy. And now, it has virtually handed 
over the entire sugar production in the country to foreign multinational companies to enable it to 
achieve this self-sufficiency. The government has justified this policy by stating that the benefits 
of the foreign sugar companies will accrue to the people of Monaragela which has been used to 
rationalise its total sell-out to foreign companies. 
The Government-company collusion in this operation in Monaragela has become quite 
evident. From the moment the company set foot in Monaragela, they have come to dominate the 
entire administrative and state machinery in the area. As Camini Yapa notes : "Making the 
Government Agent a mere officer in service they take all decisions at Colombo and dictate terms 
to all government officers and even to the police. Their payments are heavy and the gram 
sevakas and policemen serving them are getting attractive sums. It is suspected that some high 
bureaucrats are also on their payroll."109 
It is important to point out that the leaders of the two peasant struggles we have discussed 
above, including the activists of the ALPC, had been subject to severe repression - not only from 
State and its security forces, but also from paramilitary vigilante groups. After the Indo-Sri 
Lanka Peace Accord which was signed on July 29, 1989, a movement calling itself the "Patriotic 
Peoples Movement" (Deshpremi Janatha Vyaapaaraya - DJV) shot into prominence by 
unleashing a wave of terror and killings of prominent opposition politicians, human rights 
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workers, student leaders, peasant activists, religious leaders and NGO workers. This movement 
was in fact a front-organisation of the "People's Liberation Front" (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) 
the militant group that led the abortive insurrection of 1971 in Sri Lanka. 
Among the ALPC activists assassinated by the JVP during 1988-1989 included the 
following : Mr. Ananda Weerakoon - a veteran activist of left-wing politics since the 1940s and 
had spent his entire life working with the poor peasants of Uva province. Ananda was a 
prominent leader of the ALPC and was the undisputed leader of the peasants struggle in 
Monaragela against sugar transnational companies. Mr Jamis Athugala - a peasant leader who 
was the Assistant Secretary of the Kurunegala District Committee of the All-Lanka Peasant 
Congress.110 
5.6 The Politics of Agrarian Radicalism in Sri Lanka Today 
The significance of the two major peasant struggles in recent history of Sri Lanka that we 
have discussed above lies in the fact that, perhaps for the first time, the Sri Lankan peasantry 
stands in open confrontation with the forces of international capitalism and imperialism. 
Besides, the resurgence of peasant protest in recent years has marked a significant step forward 
for the peasantry against a backdrop characterised by the lack of a peasant movement and general 
passivity of the peasantry. The UNP government's Open Economy policy while sharpening the 
contradictions of peasant agriculture in Sri Lanka, has also enabled the peasantry to identify 
critical areas and issues that expose the fundamental weakness of the economy and to utilise 
these issues to mount pressure against the ruling elites. 
The post-1977 economic policy of the UNP government hastened the process of 
imperialist expansion in this small island and accentuated the contradictions of modern 
capitalism in predominantly agricultural Third World countries. In other words, with the 
plantation economy already decisively determining the major sector of the Sri Lankan economy 
for export-orientation, with the economic policies of the UNP government, new sectors of the 
local economy were thrown open to exploitation from foreign private interests and multinational 
corporations. It is a plain fact that the invasion of MNCs into the agrarian sector was to be a new 
experience for the peasantry in Sri Lanka which thereafter posed the forces of imperialism and 
multinational corporations as the targeted 'enemy'. 
I am inclined to suggest that this is a 'new experience' for the Sri Lankan peasants mainly 
because it has, for the first time, brought the peasantry in open conflict directly with foreign 
interests in the rural sector, and to confront the forces of modern capitalism in peasant 
agriculture. In the Monaragela peasant struggle, however, it still remains unclear whether the 
struggle against the sugar MNCs is basically a struggle of an encroacher peasantry to defend 
their lands from a 'multinational encroacher'; or it is a struggle of a 'nationalist peasantry' 
against the forces of imperialism. There does not seem to be much clarity on this question, both 
on the part of the ALPC organisers as well as the peasantry in Monaragela. 
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The struggle of the Monaragela peasantry, therefore, is a struggle to defend their rights to 
land they had cultivated for many years, although many of them are basically 'encroachers' on 
these lands and cultivating them under the traditional 'chena cultivation system'. In Sri Lanka, 
encroachment has been a widespread phenomenon in peasant agriculture. Investigations 
conducted by the Land Commission have revealed that "over 292,000 acres of state land which 
had been demarcated for forest reserves, public purposes, climatic reserves and other reserved 
areas by the government, are now occupied by encroachers."111 
Earlier, a survey done by the same Commission in 1979 stated that over 940,000 acres 
were occupied by unauthorised persons, and such encroachments had been recorded in the 
districts of Kurunegala, Anuradhapura, Ampara, Hambantota, Monaragela and to a certain 
extent in Colombo. Based on these findings the government has argued that "State lands" in 
some districts would be handed over to MNCs and that the encroachers on these lands have no 
legal right of land holdings ('unauthorised persons'). The peasants, on the other hand, have 
firmly stood to their position that they had occupied these lands for many years, and overtime 
they had been granted some legal rights to their holdings and their village settlements. The 
legality of this problematic is also a crucial element in the present struggle against sugar MNCs 
in Monaragela. 
The peasant struggle in Monaragela highlights many fundamental questions that have 
plagued the peasantry of Third World societies in the context of the inevitable development of 
capitalist production. This problematic can be stated in the following manner - with reference to 
Sri Lanka : The predominant agrarian sector of the Sri Lankan economy has for long remained 
stagnant and small-producer oriented with only some peripheral sectors under intensive capitalist 
agricultural production through cash cropping. 
It can therefore be argued that the struggle of the peasantry of "self-preservation" in such 
a social formation is a 'reactionary response' to the forces of modern capitalism and the 
inevitable assimilation of local economies into the world capitalist system. This process of 
assimilation brings into the local economy modern productive methods of agricultural 
production, technology and class polarisation in the agrarian sector. In many Third World 
societies, this remains an inevitable process of capitalist development in agriculture. 
Therefore, we need to pose the question : "Is it a futile attempt for an encroacher (small-
holding) peasantry to confront giant multinational corporations ? On the other hand, should the 
strategy be one that views this intrusion as inevitable in the circumstances and perhaps desired, 
in a situation where the State and the forces of 'national capital' are extremely weak or absent 
and unable to provide the alternate avenue for development of the productive forces and 
capitalist relations in agriculture?" This is precisely the problematic posed by the present 
Monaragela struggle, which has differed the attitudes and positions taken by various political 
parties and Left organisations towards the Monaragela peasant struggle. 
Hector Abewardena of the LSSP stated the problematic we have outlined above by 
arguing that : 
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"The peasantry in Monaragela is basically a poor, subsistence-based peasantry. 
Subsistence needs to be seen as a process of marginalisation. Can we, therefore, 
preserve the peasantry in these marginalised conditions? The MNCs are investing 
capital which the State is unable to provide, thereby creating a labour market for 
the employment of the peasants in Monaragela. We need to promote market 
economy in the country today. Hence, the need is to fight for compensation and 
rehabilitation of the peasantry, unless we ourselves can provide the required 
capital and employment in this area. It is therefore futile to "preserve" the 
peasantry under these conditions."112 
The leadership and the participants in the Monaragela struggle, on the other hand, have 
viewed its scope as one that strengthens the organisational and political power of the peasantry to 
defend their lands from being appropriated by a foreign company, and thereby expose the 
contradictions of the path of economic development adopted by the UNP government in Sri 
Lanka. It is precisely this conviction that has provided the rallying point for the development of 
peasant organisations initiated by the ALPC, and coloured the slogans of the struggle itself. 
Then, one would need to pose the question : "Does this understanding or conviction 
suffice as a justification to launch a militant peasant struggle against MNCs? And if so, what are 
its political consequences for the peasantry and for the economic development of a backward 
agricultural base of the Sri Lankan economy today?" Peasant activists have often viewed every 
grievance of the peasantry as a potential for launching peasant struggles, and in the process often 
overlook the broader political and economic implications of which the grievances are, in fact, 
only a response. 
At the other end of the political spectrum, we have the orthodox Marxists in Sri Lanka 
who believe in the 'inevitable doom of capitalism'. From this firm conviction emerges the 
opinion that modern capitalist relations and advanced productive forces are bound to sharpen the 
contradictions and eliminate backward agrarian relations and 'feudalism' in the countryside. The 
Monaragela struggle has, perhaps for the first time in Sri Lanka but also in many other parts of 
the Third World, highlighted once again this conventional Marxist dilemma and problematic in 
post-colonial agricultural societies. The allies and critics of the Monaragela struggle stand 
parallel to these divergent and contradictory theoretical positions. 
It was precisely for the above reason that the peasant upsurge in Monaragela has found 
little support from opposition political parties and broader political movements in the country. 
Inevitably, therefore, it has been confined to the area of struggle and the organisational backing 
of the ALPC which has for long been supporting the struggles of the peasantry in Sri Lanka. 
In the past years, with the various forms of non-violent peasant protest launched by the 
ALPC in Monaragela and elsewhere gaining little ground in restricting the expansion of MNCs, 
sections from among the activists are drawn to suggest more aggressive and violent forms of 
protest. This has often implied 'adventurist tactics' of sabotaging the company and its 
operations, eliminating officials and government allies. This has been a recent development in 
the Monaragela struggle and has consequently polarised the struggle into two sections : one 
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which argues for the withdrawal of the struggle as it seems a futile attempt to confront the giant 
MNC and government support for its operations and hence to take up employment with the 
company, the other, which seems convinced of a more aggressive method of struggle and 
prepared to go to any length to ensure the protection of their lands from take-over by the 
company. 
The ALPC and the peasant societies in Monaragela are caught in between those 
polarising sections within the peasantry and the activists. The manner in which this debate will 
be resolved would be determined by the following factors : (a) how the issue of sugar MNC 
penetration in the agrarian sector can be linked to broader economic and political policy options 
of the Sri Lankan government in the post-1977 period 7, (b) what forms of support can be 
mobilised from non-peasant sectors, especially left parties, workers, trade unions, students, and 
professionals ? (c) how to advance the stages of struggle against MNC exploitation to one that 
would challenge the whole economic setup and the class alliances (both national and 
international) of the UNP government and the ruling classes ?, and (d) who would exercise the 
decisive leadership within the peasant struggle and what ideological inclinations and alliances 
prevail ? 
It is important in this regard to mention here another level at which this conflict of 
interests and political inclinations is taking place presently in Monaragela. With some of the 
farmers taking up employment with the sugar company after losing their lands, a conflict of 
interests has emerged between those farmers who would want to pursue the struggle against the 
MNC, and those who have begun to work for the company basically to make ends meet. The 
latter have been quickly transformed - through a process of rapid imperialist intervention - from 
an "encroacher" small-holding peasantry to an agricultural labour force employed for wages. 
In such circumstances, therefore, the dominant conflict of interests between the 
Monaragela peasantry and the foreign MNC, has resulted in a subsidiary - yet crucial - conflict of 
interests among sections of the Monaragela peasantry itself. This is yet another level at which 
the problematic we have outlined above is prevelant in the Monaragela peasant struggle today. 
It is not surprising that the Left movements in Sri Lanka have been largely indifferent to 
the Monaragela peasant upsurge. This has indeed been a tradition in this country where the 
inception of Marxist politics began with a dominant Trotskyist tradition that always under-played 
the potentials of the peasantry. Therefore, the Left parties in Sri Lanka have seen the peasant 
sector only as a 'last frontier' in their stated revolutionary path to achieve socialism. The 
inevitable result of this history has been that the peasantry and peasant organisations (like the 
ALPC) have been unable to identify channels and platforms for developing class alliances with 
the militant industrial working class in Sri Lanka, or for that matter, the plantation labour force. 
Thus, even in those situations where there have been events of militant peasant protest (like for 
example, the Water-tax struggle and the current Monaragela struggle against sugar MNCs), 
barring formal expressions of solidarity and adopted political resolutions in Party Congresses, the 
Left parties in Sri Lanka have largely ignored the possible potentials that lie behind these peasant 
struggles. 
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At the same time, we must also point out that this is precisely the factor that has played 
into the hands of the ruling parties. In a situation where the Left has largely neglected the 
agrarian sector and peasant organisations, the UNP and the SLFP have been able to canvass the 
support of the agrarian population over the years and have built up an effective "patronage 
system" that flows from the "top" (government) right down to the "bottom" (village). This 
patronage system has secured for the ruling parties the important agrarian bloc in electoral 
support and passive political participation. 
In such a situation, it is quite understandable that peasant organisations, like the ALPC, 
find themselves quite isolated in their struggles and always confront barriers of political ideology 
and party policies when attempting to mobilise support for peasant struggles. The current 
peasant struggle in Monaragela has also felt the effects of the above, and perhaps, it is precisely 
this fact that may decisively determine the outcome and future course the Monaragela peasant 
struggle will take. 
Lastly, there has also been a strong tendency among peasant organisers and some peasant 
organisations in Sri Lanka to 'romanticise' the peasantry and bestow on it tasks which it has been 
unable to perform in the country's history. Some have gone to the extent of arguing that perhaps 
the current Monaragela peasant struggle signifies a continuation or reenactment of a historical 
struggle of the Vellassa peasant against foreign intruders a century ago.113 Such an assumption 
gives way to mere speculation that perhaps gives the Sri Lankan peasantry much more credibility 
than it has historically taken upon itself. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our review of peasant protest and rural elite strategies in Asian societies has shown that 
the peasantry has time and again risen up to challenge the status quo, and attempt to liberate 
themselves from foreign and local domination. This history reveals that the Asian peasants have 
repeatedly disproved Marx's polemics against peasants : "Clumsy but cunning, rascally but 
naive, oafish but sublime, a calculated superstition, a pathetic burlesque, and inspired but stupid 
anachronism, a momentous, historic piece of buffoonery, an undecipherable hieroglyph, for the 
understanding of the civilised..."1 
For Marx, therefore, the peasantry - and he was polemicising about the French peasantry 
of his time - was surely a "dying class". But other revolutionary thinkers had different 
conceptions about peasants : to Fanon, the peasant is "the motive force behind the revolutions of 
the dispossessed and the outcaste"; to the Maoist, he/she is the "backbone of the revolutionary 
army of national liberation"; and to Cabrai, "the repository of the finest and the best of the 
culture of the colonised." These varied conceptions, however, developed through peasant 
revolutions in former colonies after Marx's death, added increasing glamour and intrigue to the 
study and analysis of peasant protest and agrarian struggles. 
The history of Asian societies has been replete with anti-colonial peasant struggles. These 
struggles did not subside with the gaining of independence from colonial rule. Rather, peasant 
struggles in post-independent Asian societies - as we have seen in the case of some Asian 
countries - intensified and gained ideological and organisational strength and vigor. 
Thus, "in the post-independence era, peasant groups have engaged in mass protests in 
pursuing specific demands for agrarian reform, and, in some instances, have actually been 
successful. As a consequence, the political structure in most Asian countries is unfavorable to the 
development of genuine, peasant-based organisations. The ruling elite feel threatened by such 
organisations, which are frequently perceived as subversive and a variety of measures have been 
employed to suppress them. 
The first part of this chapter will attempt to answer the first question posed in Chapter 1, 
viz., "Have there been significant shifts overtime in the form and impact of peasant protest and 
agrarian movements - in particular relation to the ideology of protest, role of the leadership and 
social base, class alliances and strategies?" This will include a review of our main conclusions 
firom the three case studies - India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The second part of this chapter 
will address the remaining questions in Chapter 1. 
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6.1 India : Agrarian Protest and Agrarian Populism : The Escalating Conflict 
India has experienced a rich history of peasant protest against foreign colonial 
domination and against the independent Indian state and rural elites. Colonial Indian history had 
witnessed numerous peasant struggles - although many of them were "suicidal" in nature and 
posited a "millenarian vision" of social transformation to replace alien rule by a "home-made 
rural order". The formation of the All India Kisan Sabha and its impact among the Indian 
peasantry provided, for the first time, an organisational base for peasant protest during the period 
of nationalism led by the Congress party. While the AIKS was truly the first national-level 
peasant organisation in India, the fact that it was still dominated by the rural elite resulted in its 
capitulation to the elite politics of the Congress during the communist-led Tebhaga and 
Telangana struggles at the time of independence. Learning from the experiences and mistakes of 
the AIKS, the communist party led radical peasant movements in Tebhaga and Telangana that 
sought to confront colonial rule and the Indian state and replace it with a socialist society. 
Inevitably therefore, both these peasant movements armed themselves against the onslaught of 
the State and the vigilante groups of the rural elites. The leadership of these two radical peasant 
movements remained in the hands of poor and middle peasants with the vital impetus provided 
by the trained communist cadres of the party. 
It is for the above reason that the gains of the Tebhaga and Telangana peasant movements 
reached high levels of organisation, strategy and tactics and the establishment of "peasant self-
administration" (Village governments) in the Indian countryside. These successes 
notwithstanding, the experiences of the Telangana movement, in particular, also resulted in 
serious ideological rifts within the leadership and the communist party. 
It is at this juncture that the influence of the international communist movement - more 
precisely, the impact of the Chinese revolution and Mao Tse Tung Thought, and the growing 
Moscow-Peking rifts within the communist movement worldwide - on the Indian communist 
party, became a decisive factor that resulted in two major splits in Indian communist movement. 
The first major split in 1964 and the second in 1969 in the CPI and the CPI (M) respectively, 
resulted in the consolidation of two contradictory approaches of the Indian Left to the direction 
and leadership of peasant protest in India - (a) the communists who chose a "parliamentary path" 
to achieve "national socialism", and (b) communists who believed in waging an "armed struggle" 
of the peasantry in order to establish a "People's Democracy". 
While the All India Kisan Sabha under the CPI, and the CPI (M) symbolised the first 
approach in the ensuing years after independence and to the present day, the Naxalite movement 
of the 1960s and early 1970s - led by the CPI (ML) - symbolised the extreme case of the second 
approach to peasant protest and agrarian revolution in India. 
The chief problematic of peasant protest in contemporary India is located primarily in the 
ideological shifts and dogmatic politics of the Indian communist parties. The Indian peasantry 
has often been a faithful follower of the leadership and direction provided by the communist 
parties, but have not reaped the benefits of the successes gained through this rich history of 
peasant movements. On the contrary, their militant strategies of struggle and mass participation 
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has often been usurped by the leadership of the communist party and/or the charismatic leaders 
among the more-affluent peasants themselves, to provide electoral support for parliamentary 
politicking or misguided into adventurous and suicidal "annihilation campaigns". 
In the aftermath of the Naxalite movement, the rural elites - learning from the lessons of 
the communist-led peasant movements - evolved alluring strategies to unite the peasantry and 
provide the mass base for "agrarian populist movements of the rural elites". Once again, the 
Indian peasantry experienced manipulation from an "external force" that enticed their 
consciousness and dictated the form and nature of their struggle - without addressing their 
fundamental grievances that remained basic to the very cause for which they had time and again 
risen in revolt. 
Summarising our review of the history of peasant protest in India, we derive three main 
issues that appear central to modern peasant movements and peasant consciousness in particular 
viz., : 
i. The political dynamics of rural class differentiation and its impact on the nature of 
peasant protest, 
ii. The perceptions (ideology) and programmes of the (external) political party, activists, 
forces, and 
iii. The class nature of the State and rural elite power at definite historic junctures and its 
response to peasant protest. 
Let us briefly discuss these three central issues against the backdrop of the history of 
protest and elite strategies in India which we have considered in Chapter 3 above : 
(i) The Political Dynamics of Differentiation in the Indian countryside 
Our discussion will be limited to the processes of differentiation among agrarian social 
classes as reflected in political praxis in the Indian countryside since independence. The crucial 
question to be posed is : "What are the political implications of the processes of differentiation 
taking place in the Indian countryside today? Further, what does it signify for the future 
perspective and strategy of peasant protest and rural conflicts in the coming years?" 
It is certain that the capitalist forces of production have increasingly penetrated Indian 
agriculture, drawing the peasant into (direct or indirect) relationship to the local/international 
market, and consequently, commercialising agricultural production to serve the needs of this 
market. However, this has not been an even or "classical" process of capitalist development in 
agriculture - in the Marxian sense. On the contrary, capitalism in Indian agriculture has been 
significantly uneven, dependent and diffused. 
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The direct consequences of this process - and in some ways specific to Indian conditions 
- but also more generally prevelant in other Asian countries to varying degrees3, is that class 
contradictions operate at varying levels in different parts of the country.4 Thus, there are 
regions (e.g., East, North-east and Central) in rural India which remain "backward" and 
essentially "semi-feudal" in nature, and others (e.g., South, Western India, North-west) which 
show more clearly the prevelance of "capitalist" relations of production.5 With such a frame of 
reference and from our review of the peasant struggles in contemporary India the following 
conclusions can be drawn : 
(1) Peasant revolts of the 'Naxalite type' which erupted in the 1960s and 1970s have 
occurred primarily in the East and North-east regions of the country, i.e., regions 
of semi-feudalism. These revolts, therefore, were basically anti-feudal in 
ideology, but went further to posit a radical agrarian programme of socialism. 
(2) The fore-runner of the above type of peasant revolts in an earlier period of Indian 
history was the Tebhaga and Telangana movements in the mid-40s, which 
interestingly, also occurred in the same semi-feudal regions of the east and north-
east, as well as the south-central parts of India. 
(3) On the other hand, the more recent farmers agitations led by the rich (capitalist) 
peasantry in the early 1980s, seem to have occurred in regions of intense capitalist 
development or Green Revolution areas, viz., Coimbatore (south), Punjab (North-
west) and Maharashtra (West). 
The emergence of the rich peasantry to the pinnacle of the agrarian social structure and 
as the potential leadership of recent "farmers agitations" needs special attention, for it indicates a 
radical shift in agrarian politics and signals dire consequences for protest movements among the 
rural poor in the future. Gail Omvedt notes : 
"Capitalist farmers are the main force behind the 'farmers agitations' that are 
dominating the rural political scene : it is no accident that these agitations are 
centering in the more capitalistically developed regions, that their main demand 
for higher crop prices itself indicates the commercialization of the rural economy, 
and that in contrast to pre-independence peasant movements, they are not directed 
against any rural exploiter but rather seek to unite 'all peasants' with an ideology 
that claims the 'city' is exploiting the "countryside"."6 
This new phenomenon of - what we can call, "agrarian populism" - is politically 
significant. Its importance lies precisely in the fact that the "class power" of this rich peasantry is 
drawn not only from the traditional or commercialised rural sector; but also through close 
linkages with commerce, industry, the world market and urban politics. This new "class enemy", 
therefore, exercises an alarming political force in the Indian countryside, far more threatening 
than the "zamindari-landlord" power bloc of earlier decades. 
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(ii) The left parties and the peasantry in India today 
In our survey of peasant struggles we have noted the key role of "external elements" (e.g., 
party, activists, forces) which have been crucial to peasant movements in Indian history. 
Normally the "peasant microcosm" has been too predominant to provide necessary impetus to 
class-based and ideologically-oriented peasant movements that could trigger a sustained process 
of agrarian change. This has been possible, on the contrary, only in those situations where there 
has been a crucial intervention of an "external" force or political party, activists, or others, who 
bring to the peasant a radical ideology and organisational know-how to build such a peasant 
movement. As Hobsbawm notes : "...the idea of a general peasant movement, unless inspired 
from outhside or even better, from above, is quite unrealistic. (Emphasis added)7 
This "outside or external factor" to stimulate peasant protest, in other words, also implies 
that the peasantry is always subjected to a "superior authority or power" over itself; even in 
situations where they rise up and participate in militant peasant struggles. This is indeed an 
important contention that enables us to understand the possibilities and limits of "peasant 
consciousness" in modem societies. 
Thus, often in Indian history this "master" or "authority" over the peasantry has been a 
role exercised by Left parties in the course of peasant struggles; except in the recent "farmers 
agitations" where the class of rich peasants have taken over this role to the detriment of the 
genuine aspirations of the toiling peasantry. Surely the leadership provided by the Left parties 
during these peasant struggles has been decisive, and yet, especially in the Maoist tradition, they 
have expressed an "ideology of agrarian radicalism" that seemed to have promised "rain and 
sunshine from above." It is precisely this dialectic (between "theory" and "praxis"; "derived" 
and "inherent" consciousness) that seems to be the crux of the problematic of peasant politics and 
class consciousness in post-colonial Indian history. 
My inference, therefore, is that : Post-independent or modem peasant struggles were 
characterised by an ideology that was alien to the peasantry and external to its class position. 
The peasant's receptiveness to this ideology and the ideologically-motivated organisations 
(communist parties, in particular) is explained more because of the fact that this ideology 
symbolised the "peasant utopia" of "agrarian socialism", rather than any conscious 'class-for-
itself ' reason on its part. 
(Hi) The State and Peasant Protest 
In order to understand the class response of the Indian state and the rural elites to peasant 
protest at different historical junctures, it is necessary to see how "power" and "hegemony" of the 
State operate in conditions of revolutionary peasant protest. Gramsci's concepts of "hegemony', 
"subaltern classes", "common sense" and "ideology" are very relevant to this discussion. To 
Gramsci, "hegemony" was not only "political domination", but also the "subjectivity of 
subordination" of the peasantry. In other words, it was not just externally imposed (through 
force, economic and political structuresi, but was internalised by the peasants themselves as part 
of their culture and their consciousness. 
148 
It is this subjectivity of subordination that explains a whole range of "patron-client" 
relationship9 that operate in the Indian countryside today, their prevelance and their continuous 
reproduction. The caste system, in this context, is one of the most symbolic of examples in this 
country. "Like family, partly because it is in fact an extension of the family, caste has been a 
persistent and portentous form of social organisation and consciousness in the evolution of 
India's peasant and emerging post-peasant society."10 
On the other hand, the "subjectivity consciousness" of the peasantry is also revealing 
when we explore the precise linkages between "state power" and "peasant consciousness". For 
the peasant, the State is a "negative quantity", an "evil" that has to be immediately replaced by a 
"home-made social order".11 
Its immediate response, therefore, has been active support to a strategy of revolution that 
attempts to "smash the Indian state power", without any articulated or conscious vision of 
reconstructing that State after the revolution. This is indeed typical of Indian "peasant 
consciousness" as it has clearly expressed itself time and again in our post-independence history. 
Moreover, as Goran Therbom notes "...."force" and "violence" operate as a form of rule 
only through the ideological mechanism of fear...(and) .. fear plays a great role in the 
maintenance of bourgeois-democratic rule."12 In India it has been the same "force" and 
"violence" unleashed on the revolutionary struggles of the Indian peasantry that have repeatedly 
been decisive in crushing peasant protests, with the latter unable to defend itself and fleeing 
further away from the centres of State power and hegemony in order to protect itself. Thus, the 
tragic logic of peasant protest in the Indian countryside has been as Scott describes it : 
"The elite, by and large, abandons the countryside and moves for protection into 
the provincial towns or the capital itself where the coercive power of the state is 
concentrated. The peasantry often leaves the villages and heads for the hills, at 
the farthest possible remove from the state...the peasantry retreating 'back' down 
a rung of civilisation to the independence of primitive society; the elite retreating 
'up' a rung of civilisation where its interests are best defended."13 
It is this movement of the peasantry "downward" and the rural elite "upward", so to 
speak, that today symbolises the nature of class conflict in the Indian countryside. The Indian 
state, therefore, is able to effectively isolate - if not the peasantry "voluntarily" isolating itself -
agrarian protest and curtail its growth to a significant degree. Peasant struggles in the coming 
period, therefore, need to take careful note of this tendency in Indian politics, and evolve 
necessary defensive measures to overcome these implicit limitations of agrarian protest of this 
type. 
My inference from the above is that : Post-independent peasant struggles have portrayed 
a rather 'negative and polemical attitude' towards Indian state power. This is because at the very 
root of peasant consciousness there prevails a layer of "subjectivity" that implies acceptance of 
the hegemony and traditional authority of rural elites, and the formidable state power - expressed 
through the medium of caste, religion, language and culture. Thus, the objectification of peasant 
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consciousness in ideological terms have been unable to challenge and eliminate this underlying 
layer of peasant subjectivity and consciousness. 
6.2 The Philippines : Peasant Protest and National Liberation 
The Philippines has experienced a long history of peasant movements, beginning with 
the struggles against the Spanish, and later against American and Japanese colonial rule. A 
major landmark in this rich history of peasant protest in modem Philippine history was the Huk 
Rebellion (1942-1945) against Japanese colonialism. The Huks were successful in confronting 
the Japanese domination and establishing their control over large sections of Philippine society in 
Central Luzon. Although the Huks comprised of a relatively small number of fighters, they were 
able to effectively utilise guerilla warfare to challenge the Japanese. Also, the Huks were able to 
establish their dominance through "self-government" in the villages under their influence, and to 
carry out pro-peasant agrarian reform and land distribution. This symbolised a high level of 
political consciousness among the Huks. 
However, we must note that in the Huk Rebellion one also identifies the contradictions 
prevalent between the rural elites and the poor peasantry. While the rural elites - who had 
initially supported the Huk Rebellion, desired to restore American rule and thus united to drive 
out the Japanese, the poor peasantry, on the other hand, were determined to replace Japanese 
colonial rule with a new social order that was revolutionary in nature and assured the poor 
peasantry of freedom from foreign domination, land reform and a socialist model of 
development of Philippine society. It was precisely this radical perspective of the poor peasantry 
- who constituted the bulk of the Huks - that alarmed the Americans and resulted in their 
connivance with the Filipino rural elite to crush the Huk Rebellion after the defeat of the 
Japanese in World War II. 
In the aftermath of the World War, the defeat of the Huk Rebellion left a vacuum - which 
was to be filled with the formation of the Federation of Free Fanners (FFF) in 1953. The FFF 
developed as a genuine peasant organisation during the initial period prior to the capitulation of 
some of its leaders to the Marcos regime when Martial Law was declared in 1972. While the 
FFF showed signs of developing into a nation-wide legal peasant movement, the capitulation of 
its key leaders to Marcos resulted in yet another vacuum - this time, which could only be filled 
by the underground communist movement - with the brutal repression unleashed by the Marcos 
regime under Martial Law on all popular and democratic movements in the Philippines. 
Martial Law and the Marcos regime, therefore, provided the necessary impetus for the 
consolidation and growth of the underground Communist Party of the Philippines and its New 
People's Army (CPP-NPA). Under the repression of military rule, thousands of students, 
workers, professionals and others joined the underground movement in the countryside. There, 
these new recruits, came in contact with the already-politicised peasantry and were to provide the 
necessary intellectual and organisational know-how to strengthen and elevate the armed struggle 
and mass organisations of the CPP-NPA. The formation of the National Democratic Front 
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(NDF) soon after signifies the crucial role played within the underground movement by the new 
recruits and professional groups in the urban sector. 
The New People's Army (NPA) is predominantly a "peasant army" and claims 
widespread support in the Filipino countryside - a mass base that initially consolidated during the 
repressive government of Marcos, and continues to develop under the present government of 
Corazón Aquino. 
Although analysts expected a relative openness on the part of the NDF-CPP/NPA alliance 
in 1986 with the "democratic space" provided by the "People's Power Revolution" of Corazón 
Aquino - the continued military influence over the Aquino government, for example, the 
declaration of a "Total War" policy by the government to fight the CPP-NPA - pushed back the 
"democratic and legal agenda" of the Filipino Left. Successive failures in cease-fire agreements 
and "peace talks" between the NDF and the Government of the Philippines since 1986, further 
strengthened the widely-held suspicion on the part of the progressive forces in the Philippines 
that, although the Aquino government puts up a front of "democratic system based on people's 
power", its sustenance is propped up by the USA and the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP). 
There is some indication that in the past few years - especially after the "People's Power 
Revolution of 1986" - the CPP/NPA is in a general state of decline although the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines have yet to achieve a "strategic victory" over the communist movement in the 
Philippines. The AFP, however, claims to have reduced the number of NPA fronts, or base 
areas, from 71 to 57 over the past three years - a figure which even the CPP appears to 
acknowledge.14 The reasons for the decline of the CPP/NPA, as one source put it, are the 
following : "One in particular has been a steady improvement in military coordination and 
intelligence-gathering. Another has been the f?ilure of the party leadership to keep pace with 
changing political conditions at a time when communism itself is under worldwide siege."15 
At present the Left in the Philippines finds itself in a baffling situation, as Tadem notes : 
"After laying the groundwork for the anti-dictatorship struggle and leading it for many years, 
they suddenly find themselves at the tail-end of the popular movement. Worse, the dictator they 
had been fighting for fifteen years with a combination of legal, extra-legal, and armed struggle 
had suddenly been forced out with very little participation on their part."16 The contemporary 
peasant movement in the Philippines, therefore, continues to survive on two main fronts : (a) the 
"open and legal" front - led by the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Filipinas (KMP) - a mass-based 
peasant movement. 
The KMP has enjoyed widespread support all over the Filipino countryside with a rich 
history of successful peasant struggles against the agrarian policies of the Marcos and Aquino 
government's, and (b) the "underground and extra-legal" front - led by the New People's Army 
(NPA) of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) - a predominantly peasant-army 
exclusively involved in waging an armed agrarian struggle of guerilla warfare against the 
Philippine State and the AFP as well as the right-wing para-military forces and vigilante groups 
in the countryside. 
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6.3 Sri Lanka : State Patronage and Peasant Passivity 
Sri Lanka has been a particular case of peasant protest which was dominant during the 
period of colonial rule but subsided into passivity in the post-independence period. In Chapter 5 
we observed that the Sri Lankan peasantry carried out successful struggles against the political 
domination and economic policies of the alien British colonisers. The imposition of the 
plantation system of agriculture coupled with the British taxation policies were detrimental to the 
interests and aspirations of the Sri Lankan peasantry. The rural elites, however, provided the 
necessary leadership for these peasant struggles against British colonialism. The ideology of 
these struggles - while rooted in the anti-colonial sentiments - were, however, characterised by a 
type of "traditional nationalism" that was fundamentalist (Sinhala-Buddhist) and in contradiction 
with the aspirations of the poor peasantry. 
It is this phenomenon that provides an explanation for the agrarian policies of the 
independent Sri Lankan state after British rule. Colonialism had effectively transformed the 
"self-sufficient" small-peasant based economy of Sri Lanka, into a classical case of an export 
economy in the Third World under colonial domination. The post-independent Sri Lankan state 
(including the UNP, SLFP and other coalition governments that came to power) continued to 
follow the same colonial policy of export-orientation, while developing new policies to appease 
the disgruntled peasantry and ensure their continued political patronage over the Sri Lankan 
countryside. The phenomenon of State patronage over the Sri Lankan peasantry is the key to 
understand its political passivity in the country's recent history. 
The context in which the various forms of State patronage over the peasantry prevail can 
be summarised as follows : The agrarian society of present-day Sri Lanka is basically 
characterised by a predominant small-holding peasantry. Class differentiation has not developed 
sharply and therefore, the large majority of the peasantry in Sri Lanka can be defined as "petty 
commodity producers". This peasantry, however, while operating chiefly self-sufficient 
holdings, have shown an increasing desire to adopt modern techniques of production and 
commercialisation. It is only in some areas of the country - mainly the North, North-east, and 
the new settlements areas of the Mahaweli Development project - where relatively more visible 
polarisation of agrarian classes have been noticed. In these areas with increasing 
commercialisation and TNC intervention, we find the rapid growth of a class of agrarian landless 
labour, especially in the post-1965 period. There is clearly the lack of a landlord class in the Sri 
Lankan countryside, due to the absence of large holdings. 
However, the most conspicuous landlords in Sri Lanka are the State and the Buddhist 
temples who possess ownership of vast areas of land in the countryside. Further, a emerging 
phenomenon observed in the Sri Lankan countryside is the growth of a rural entrepreneur class, 
or an enterprising rich peasantry, drawn from non-peasant groups and closely tied to the 
commercialisation and transnational capital in agriculture. This class is yet to consolidate itself 
into a powerful rural lobby, but nevertheless shows signs of emerging as a powerful agrarian 
elite linked firmly to the State and transnational capital. 
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Viewed in this context. State patronage over the peasantry has played a crucial role in the 
formulation and implementation of the various State programmes towards agriculture and rural 
development. The initial stages of state patronage can be identified during the colonial times, 
when British land policy was oriented towards establishing an export-based plantation economy 
on the island, and at the same time, to "preserve" the character of the small-holding peasant 
producers. Colonialism, therefore, did not fundamentally alter the prevailing relations in the 
peasant economy, either through the introduction of the plantation system nor through its 
agrarian tax policies and programmes. After independence, both the SLFP and UNP 
governments in tum, adopted and improved upon many of the earlier colonial forms of State 
patronage of the peasantry. 
This ensured the ruling party of political support and a social base to carry forward its 
programmes and provide an effective electoral bloc to retain it in power. Political patronage in 
the Sri Lankan countryside operated through the given political institutions and structures of the 
ruling government set up for that very purpose. Periodically, the ruling party introduced 
necessary changes and reorganised the rural administrative and political structures and 
institutions, in order to ensure more effective patronage over the peasantry. For example, the 
UNP government attempted to further centralise the concept and role of Grama Sevakas, and 
create "Special Administrative and Political Officers" in the countryside, to act as its local agents 
and officials. The decisive impact of this system of state patronage was its success in 
subjugating the peasantry into submission and passivity, besides silencing political dissent in the 
countryside. 
In a situation where the peasantry has been historically accustomed to "State patronage" 
and reaped its benefits to fulfill its rising aspirations, radical agrarian programmes and agendas 
for peasant protest have not found place in the Sri Lankan peasantry's consciousness. Besides, 
Left parties and radical peasant organisations have been unable to pose an effective political 
challenge to this "patronage system" as it operates in the countryside. Patronage not only implies 
domination and incorporation, but also subjugation and loyalty to the State. In Sri Lanka State 
patronage has adopted very subtle forms, and therefore, quite difficult to view as an antagonistic 
State-peasantry relation. In the post-independence period this subtility has become even more 
pronounced, as the State adopted a Sinhala-Buddhist ideology that pervaded the entire social 
fabric in the city and the countryside. In the circumstances, the peasantry has continued to 
provide the social base and political loyalty to the State irrespective of the party in power. 
It is therefore imperative that we discuss peasant protest in Sri Lanka today in the context 
outlined above. Clearly, the peasantry in Sri Lanka is not a homogeneous group, but rather a 
differentiated agrarian population. Within a complex and evolving agrarian social structure, we 
can identify levels of varied class interests concomitant to the hierarchical economic status 
rankings of the peasantry. With the lack of sharp class polarisation in the country side, the forms 
of exploitation and patronage often appear subtle and display potentials of accommodating 
varied class interests and aspirations. The above-mentioned factors enable the peasantry to 
easily mobilise itself into a powerful "agrarian bloc", either in support of the state, or, around 
issues that affect their immediate survival and well-being. 
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At the surface, this "agrarian bloc" may appear as a "class bloc", and can therefore be 
misinterpreted as a peasant movement with advanced political potentials. This misconception 
has witnessed the danger of peasant activism devoid of class interests and a political programme 
in some recent cases of peasant protest in Sri Lanka. What in fact appears as a "class bloc" in 
peasant protest is in actual fact, merely a "social alliance" of the peasantry that is based on 
immediate issues confronting the peasantry without long-term goals of social transformation. 
The above fragile alliance can be easily broken when the interplay of contradictory class 
interests on the goals and means take effect within the peasant struggle. Peasant activism in Sri 
Lanka has often presumed that such social alliances within the peasantry can be mobilised into a 
political movement against the State and neo-colonialism. Therein lies the danger of peasant 
activism and peasant protest in Sri Lanka today. The peasant struggles in Monaragela District 
against Sugar TNCs, that we have reviewed in Chapter 5, provide a good example of the 
interplay of the problematic we have outlined above. 
The All Lanka Peasant Congress (ALPC) was a genuine peasant organisation that 
provided effective leadership to the Monaragela peasantry to struggle against the multinational 
sugar companies. However, the ensuing ideological conflicts and weakening of this struggle has 
been a consequence of both "internal" and "external" factors. The internal factors include a "loss 
of sense of direction" on the part of the ALPC activists and peasant leaders who were unable to 
mobilise the necessary support from the urban sectors (i.e., workers, trade unions, students. Left 
parties and middle-sectors) as well to spread out the area of struggle in the countryside; the 
external factors being the violent repression unleashed by the DJVP and other para-military 
groups on the ALPC activists and the Monaragela peasants, as well as the Sri Lankan state policy 
in connivance with the transnational companies, to push through with its policy of setting-up 
"Agricultural Promotion Zones" (APZ) in the Sri Lankan countryside. In this situation, what 
then are the prospects for radical peasant protest in modem Sri Lanka ? 
Our analysis so far seems to point in the direction that peasant protest in Sri Lanka today 
would be limited to issues that threaten the basic "survival of the peasantry". In other words, the 
peasantry can be mobilised only on a programme that seeks to "preserve" its independence and 
economic position vis-a-vis the forces that threaten its continued petty commodity production, 
especially the transnational corporations and international capital. The problematic of the form 
of peasant protest discussed above - as we have seen in the case of the Monaragela peasant 
struggle against sugar TNCs - is that it possesses the danger of strengthening the hands of the 
small-holding - yet influential - peasantry over the landless labourers and poor peasants in the 
countryside. 
In other words, the dominant "survival consciousness" of the more-affluent peasantry and 
rural elites would come into conflict with the class interests of the landless and poor peasants. 
Moreover, the absence of a polarised class structure in the agrarian society in Sri Lanka today 
and the "economic weakness" of the small-holding peasantry, brings up the question of a viable 
and effective leadership for peasant protest and peasant movements. 
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The predominant "struggle for survival" consciousness of the peasantry coupled with the 
lack of clear political alternative to State patronage, result in a situation where the issue-oriented 
struggles are led by the traditional rural elite and peasant organisers from non-peasant 
backgrounds. The dominant Left movements in the country have shown its inability to confront 
the overwhelming patronage system or to evolve an alternative agrarian programme for the 
peasantry. 
At the same time, the spill-over of "ethnic violence" in the North and the reemergence of 
Sinhalese para-military groups in the South, has also severely restricted the activism of the All-
Lanka Peasant Congress (ALPC) - perhaps the only nation-wide peasant movement that has 
developed in the post-independent period of Sri Lankan history. While this fact explains to a 
large extent the phenomenon of peasant passivity in Sri Lanka, it also highlights the limited 
prospects of peasant struggles to come in the future. In sum, therefore, the prospects for radical 
peasant protest in Sri Lanka appear severely limited in the scenario we have outlined above. 
Peasant protest seems therefore to be confined to issues that directly affect or threaten the 
survival of the peasantry. And once this threat is removed or withdrawn, peasant protest will 
inevitable collapse. On the other hand, the peasantry will make compromises and concessions 
insofar as it continues to survive with some degree of autonomy and patronage from the State. 
This consciousness of "survival" and "subjugation" would take precedence over accommodating 
the aspirations and demands of the poorer sectors of the peasantry and agricultural labourers, or 
in evolving a radical political programme for agrarian transformation in Sri Lanka today. 
6.4 Concluding Observations 
To finalise, in attempting to review and analyse the history of peasant protest and rural 
elite strategies in some Asian countries (India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka) this study has 
pointed out the complexity of the problematic of this phenomena as prevelant in the Asian 
region. It would be frivolous to attempt a sociological typology of peasant protest and rural elite 
strategies in these countries given the specificities and complexities of each context. 
In this final section, we shall return to review the remaining questions posed in Chapter 1, 
viz., (a) "To what extent have power elite strategies and State-sponsored agrarian policies 
enabled or hampered the articulation of peasant protest and why?", (b) "What has been the role 
of local/national and international forces in response to radical peasant protest in Asia, especially 
the role of foreign states, aid agencies and local/international power elites that exercise 
significant influence in the Asian countryside?", and (c) "What strategies were adopted by the 
State and rural elites to co-opt the peasant movements? How did the State and rural elites 
facilitate certain movements on particular issues and what movements were repressed?" Based 
on our review of peasant protest and rural elite strategies in some Asian countries the following 
general concluding remarks can be made in response to the above-mentioned questions : 
(1) The problematic of peasant protest and rural elite strategies in the Asian region needs to 
be understood in relation to the centrality of the "land question". Asian societies, which 
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are predominantly agricultural in nature, are based principally on the control and 
ownership of land. Consequently, the power of the Asian rural elites - as well as foreign 
corporate interests - together with the politics of peasant protest, are both located in the 
fundamental struggle to exercise control over land. Thus, to understand the dynamics of 
Asian societies we need to comprehend the historical and sociological factors and 
interplay of the "politics of land ownership and control" in Asia. 
It is within this scenario that we have seen how Asian governments have attempted to 
address the "land question" through specific Agrarian/Land Reform programmes. The 
need for such drastic reforms are located not just in the requirement of governments to 
increase agricultural productivity, revenue/taxation and to feed the burgeoning 
population, but primarily because of the prevalence of radical peasant unrest in the 
countryside aggravated by genuine peasant grievances. In this process, the strategy of 
several Asian governments - in connivance with foreign powers and multi-national 
institutions - has been to woo the disgruntled peasantry through nominal land 
redistribution ("Land to the Tiller"). 
The political basis and ideological content of the "Agrarian/Land Reform" programmes 
of Asian governments - particularly in the case of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea - was 
evidently inspired by an ideology of "anti-communism" given the threat of Communist 
China after the Revolution of 1949. US policy in Asia in the aftermath of the Chinese 
Revolution was thus based on patronising and strengthening the "anti-communist" 
governments of neighboring Asian countries - to offset the alleged fear of communist 
expansion in the Asian region. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the US has clearly played a 
decisive role in the planning and implementation of Land Reforms in these three 
countries. The ideological content of this role of the US was based on its own strategic 
interest in aiding these countries to fight communism and winning over the governments 
through providing economic and technical assistance as a pre-condition to military 
protection to fight internal and external threat:, from communism. 
However, the peasantry in many Asian countries were particularly vulnerable to the 
Maoist ideology of peasant revolution that had been successful in China. US policy, 
therefore, was geared towards aiding Asian governments to thwart any influence of the 
Maoist ideology among the radical peasantry, while at the same time, providing the 
necessary economic, financial and technical means (including dumping of food surpluses) 
to conservative and dictatorial political elites to sustain them in power. In essence, 
therefore, the "Agrarian/Land Reform" programmes in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and 
other South-East countries in the late-1940s and 1950s - while apparently based on 
economic considerations, was, in essence, a sophisticated political and "counter-
insurgency" ideology to fight communist expansion in Asia. 
(4) Some Asian governments have undertaken reforms to radically reorganise the 
land ownership pattern in order to liquidate traditional and unproductive forms of agricul-
tural production and to unleash the forces necessary for rapid capitalist and commercial 
("export-oriented") production in the Asian countryside. This agrarian policy of Asian 
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governments have been greatly facilitated by the Green Revolution strategy of the IRRI 
and multi-lateral institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Devel-
opment Bank, among others). As we have seen, this strategy was geared towards 
strengthening the power of the rural elite that would quickly adapt to commercial farming 
and forge links with foreign agribusiness companies and the urban commercial sector. 
Our discussion on the emergence and political clout of this class of rich peasants - espe-
cially in the case of India in Chapter 3 - has shown clearly the strong political base of 
this new rural elite that remains a major threat to radical peasant movements. In this 
process of "agrarian revolution from above", foreign governments - especially the USA, 
as we have seen in the case of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in Chapter 2 - have played 
a vital role in empowering this class of rural elite to maintain its tentacles of power in the 
Asian countryside. In sum, therefore, the "agrarian revolution from above" of most Asian 
governments have been geared towards stifling radical peasant protest and sponsoring 
the new rural elites. 
The peasant movements in the Asian countries we have reviewed above have been 
largely characterised by periodic shifts in ideological positions culminating - especially in 
the case of India and Sri Lanka - in serious ideological divisions within the communist 
parties and personal rivalries in the leadership of peasant movements. A number of 
factors have influenced this scenario : the conflicts and splits within the international 
communist movement and its direct/indirect impact on Asian communist parties, 
personality conflicts within the leadership of peasant movements resulting from regional, 
ethnic, socio-economic and ideological variations, the desire to "import models of 
peasant revolution and socialism" from other countries - particularly China, and the 
excessive "ideologization" by the leadership of peasant protest, especially in India and Sri 
Lanka. 
In this study we have identified the decisive role played by the leadership of Asian 
peasant movements - on an individual (personality) or collective (party) basis, as well as 
the strategies used in the course of peasant struggles - ranging from passive resistance 
(for example, as in the case of the Monaregala struggle in Sri Lanka) to armed insurgency 
(for example, as in the case of the Naxalite movement in India and the New People's 
Army in the Philippines). 
In our review of the history of peasant protest and rural elite strategies, it appears that in 
the arena of radical peasant protest there lies - as Nemenzo notes - a serious discrepancy 
between "party documents and propaganda material on the one hand, and the governing 
ideology of the mass movement on the other. The former is invariably couched in Marxist 
language but the latter displays the lingering influence of millenarian populism".17 
The communist parties in Asian countries - which have largely provided the 
organisational base for the consolidation and growth of peasant movements - have often 
sacrificed the genuine peasant aspirations for ideological considerations. As we have 
noted earlier, especially in the case of India and Sri Lanka and also to a certain extent in 
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the Philippines, while this fact has provided the necessary organisational strength to 
guide peasant movements, it has also resulted in serious conflicts and splits within 
peasant movements. 
Deducing from the above, it is also important to distinguish the stage at which "peasant 
rebellion" is coopted by "ideological insurgency". The Naxalite movement in India and 
the CPP/NPA struggle in the Philippines have both experienced this phenomenon. As 
Tom Marks notes following from the analysis of James Scott : "... the peasant grievances 
that provide the foot soldiers and the ideological visions that guide the leadership. It is 
when the latter achieves ascendency that grievances are superceded by organisational 
infrastructure and its prerogatives."18 In all the cases of peasant movements in Asian 
countries that we have surveyed in this study, ideology has played a decisive role in 
determining the form and content of peasant protest. This can be explained largely 
because of the dominant role of communist parties in peasant movements and the specific 
Asian cultural tradition of "submission to authority" personified in charismatic political 
ideologues and peasant leaders. Thus, while ideological considerations have provided the 
necessary impetus to sustain peasant movements, they have also paradoxically contribute 
towards the cooptation of genuine peasant grievances into party structures and political 
considerations of the party leadership. Consequently, genuine peasant protest has often 
ended up in many Asian countries as mere ideological insurgency. This problematic is 
central to the contemporary crisis in peasant protest - especially in countries like India, 
the Philippines and Sri Lanka - and needs to be taken into account by the leadership of 
peasant movements and its allies. 
The strategies of the Asian rural elites ("Counter-forces") has been one of subtle 
cooptation of the peasant leadership through state patronage, or outright violent 
repression of the peasant movements. In this field the Asian rural elites have learnt much 
from the policy and programmes of foreign governments as well as multi-lateral 
institutions and transnational corporations. In particular, US policy in the Asian 
countryside has aided the rural elites in developing appropriate, and often effective, 
strategies of "anti-subversion" through repressive National Security Laws, Rural 
Development programmes and direct or indirect military aid to Asian governments to 
fight internal dissent. It is precisely for this reason that in many Asian countries today the 
"counter-forces" against peasant protest - State machinery, rural elites and their allies -
are extremely well-organised and sophisticated in their strategy to curb radical protest. 
While, on the other hand, peasant radicalism has been confined to sporadic outbursts of 
armed insurgency and remain divided along ideological and party lines. When confronted 
with the power of the "counter-forces", peasant protest remains defenseless and 
vulnerable to outright repression. 
Moreover, Asian governments have openly endorsed and financed certain types of 
peasant organisations - e.g., farmers associations, village clubs, community development 
and welfare groups, - while, on the other hand, outlawing the more radical peasant 
organisations. There have also been a number of cases in Asian peasant history where the 
leadership of progressive peasant movements have also been coopted into the State and 
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government programmes. It is only when State and elite strategies of cooptation of 
radical peasant protest fails, that it is deemed as subversive. Simply put, therefore, 
radical protest is often concomitant with "subversion" - in the viewpoint of many Asian 
governments and rural elites. 
(9) Peasant movements in Asia have been characterised by splits and factionalism in the 
ranks of the peasant leadership. Besides, Communist parties have often sacrificed peasant 
aspirations for ideological considerations, leading to further fragmentation of the peasant 
movements. On the other hand, the strategies of Asian rural elites ("counter-forces") have 
been one of subtle cooptation of the peasant leadership through State patronage or 
outright violent repression of radical peasant movements. In this regard, foreign 
governments - especially the USA, multinational agribusiness and transnational 
corporations and international financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund), among others, have advised and aided Asian governments and rural elites to 
develop effective counter-insurgency strategies to fight radical peasant rebellion. The end 
result of this process in Asian societies has been the emergence and consolidation of a 
class of new rural elites who are politically conservative, closely tied with international 
corporate interests and national power elites, and who today wield tremendous power in 
the Asian countryside. 
The contemporary scenario of Asian peasant protest and rural elite strategies presents to 
us a challenge - as we have outlined above - of overcoming the immense power and control 
exercised in the Asian countryside - not only by the State and local/national rural elites, but also 
by powerful international agribusiness interests and foreign governments. The "solo songs" of 
peasant movements we have reviewed in earlier chapters - especially in the three case studies of 
India , The Philippines and Sri Lanka, as well as in Chapter 2 in relation to Japan, Taiwan and 
South Korea - although commendable in their determination and endurance, remain just "solo 
songs" in the Asian region. 
We have had too many "solo songs" in Asian peasant history, and it is about time that the 
"chorus" begins to play and be heard by all ! 
Lastly, as an old Vietnamese folksong reveals, there will come a time when the 'LAST 
WILL BE FIRST' : 
"The son of the king becomes king, 
The son of the temple watchman knows only how to sweep. 
When the people rise up, 
The son of the king, defeated, 
Will go sweep the pagoda."19 
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Barrios 
Bharat 
Bhikkus 
Bhil 
Bhoomisena 
Brahmin 
Chena 
Chonnongnyom 
Coolie 
Dal 
Dece an 
Deshmuks 
Girijans 
Gonds 
Govi 
Gram Raj 
Grama Sevakas 
Harijan 
Inquilab 
villages (The Philippines) 
India 
Buddhist monks (Sri Lanka) 
tribals/indigenous peoples (India) 
land army (India) 
the teachers/priests/intellectuals; 
first strata in the Indian caste system (India) 
slash and bum/shifting cultivation (Sri Lanka) 
National Alliance of 
Farmers' Movements (S Korea) 
workerAabourer (India) 
Indian lentils 
plateau in central India 
landlords (India) 
Tribals in Andhra Pradesh (India) 
tribals/indigenous peoples in Maharastra State (India) 
peasant/fanner (Sri Lanka) 
village government (India) 
village leaders/officials (Sri Lanka) 
children of God - name given to 
"untouchables" by Mahatma Gandhi (India) 
revolution (India) 
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Peoples' Association (India) 
Janata = people (India) 
Kaccheri = city hall (India) 
Kallar = low caste group in South India 
Khet Mazdoor 
Sangh = Faim Labourers' Union (India) 
Kisan = peasant/farmer (India) 
Kulak = rich peasant 
Lai Sena = Red Army (India) 
Mahatma = "the holy one" - popular title bestowed 
on M.K.Gandhi in India 
Masagana = bountiful (The Philippines) 
Moplah = Muslims in Southern India 
Munda = tribals/indigenous peoples in India 
Naxalite = term utilised by the Indian goveniment and police for 
activists of the CPI(ML). The name has its origins from the 
communist-led peasant movement in the 
region of Naxalbaii in Eastern India. 
Nizam = Muslim king/ruler of Hyderabad State in Southern India 
Paddy = rice 
Pandit = teacher/learned one (India) 
Pesos = Philippine currency 
Peramuna = Front (Sri Lanka) 
Purdah = cloth worn by Muslim women to cover face (India) 
Rajakariya = free labour/service to the State (Sri Lanka) 
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Razakars 
Reddy 
Rupee 
Sabba 
Sammelanaya 
Sangamaya 
Sangham 
Santhal 
Sathyagraha 
Seamaul Undong 
Sepoy 
Sharmadana 
Shetkari 
Sanghatana 
Swadesh 
Taluka or 
Taluq 
Tebhaga 
Vellassa 
paramilitary forces of the Nizam of 
Hyderabad in South India 
high caste name in the State of 
Andhra Pradesh in Southern India 
Indian currency 
Association/Organisation (India) 
organisation/association (Sri Lanka) 
union/association (Sri Lanka) 
Association/Union (India) 
tribal/indigenous peoples in Eastern India 
"soul force" - non-violent civil disobedience 
introduced by Mahatma Gandhi in India 
New Community Movement (South Korea) 
Indian soldier 
sharing of labour (India/Sri Lanka) 
Toiling workers/labourers 
association/movement/front (India) 
freedom/independence/self-rule (India) 
sub-district/district (India) 
"two-thirds" of the harvested crop (India) 
"a hundred thousand paddy fields" - the 3 regions of 
Kurunegala, Anuradhapura and Monaragela 
districts in North-Western Sri Lanka. 
Vetd System feudal exactions in the State of Hyderabad, Southern India 
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Vimukti = liberation (Sri Lanka) 
Won = South Korean currency 
Yen = Japanese currency 
Zamindar = landlord (India) 
Zenno = National Peasants' Union (Japan) 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ADB = Asian Development Bank 
AFP = Armed Forces of the Philippines 
AGA = Assistant Government Agent (Sri Lanka) 
AIKS = All India Kisan Sabha (India) 
ALPC = All Lanka Peasant Congress (Sri Lanka) 
AMG = Army Military Government (South Korea) 
APZ = Agricultural Promotion Zones (Sri Lanka) 
BKU = Bharatiya Kisan Union (Indian Farmers' Union) 
CARP = Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program 
(The Philippines) 
CIA = Central Intelligence Agency 
CP = Communist Party 
CPI(M)= Communist Party of India-Marxist (India) 
CPI(ML)= Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (India) 
CPP = Communist Party of the Philippines 
CPSL = Communist Party of Sri Lanka 
CSP = Congress Socialist Party (India) 
СГС = Ceylon Tobacco Company (Sri Lanka) 
DJV = Deshpremi Janatha Vyaapaaraya - Patriotic People's Movement (Sri Lanka) 
EOI = Export-oriented Industrialisation 
FFF = Federation of Free Farmers (The Philippines) 
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FTZ = Free Trade Zone 
GA = Government Agent (Sri Lanka) 
GCEC = Greater Colombo Economic Commission (Sri Lanka) 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
IAS = Indian Administrative Service 
IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IMF = International Monetory Fund 
IRRI = International Rice Research Institute 
JCCR = Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (Taiwan) 
JCPF = Joint Committee of Peasant Federations (Sri Lanka) 
JVP = Janata Vimukti Perumana - People's Liberation Front (Sri Lanka) 
KMP = Kilusang Magbubukid ng Filipinas - National Peasant 
Movement in the Philippines 
KMT = Koumingtang (Taiwan) 
KPMP = National Peasant' Union of the Philippines 
LRC = Land Reform Commission (Sri Lanka) 
LSSP = Lanka Samasamaja Party (Sri Lanka) 
MDP = Mahaweli Development Project (Sri Lanka) 
MLA = Member of the Legislative Assembly (India/Sri Lanka) 
MNC = Multinational Corporations 
MP = Member of Parliament (India/Sri Lanka) 
NDF = National Democratic Front (The Philippines) 
NEP = New Economic Policy (Sri Lanka) 
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NGO = Non-Govemmental Organisation 
NPA = New People's Army (The Philippines) 
NSSP = Nawa Samasamaja Party (Sri Lanka) 
OPC = Office for Policy Coordination 
PAR = Participatory Action Research 
PARCODE = People's Agrarian Reform Code (The Philippines) 
PD = Presidential Decree (The Philippines) 
PKM = National Peasants' Union (The Philippines) 
PL = Public Law (USA) 
PWF = Progressive Women's Front (Sri Lanka) 
RLU = Rural Labourers' Union (Sri Lanka) 
SLFP = Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
SLMP = Sri Lanka Mahajana Party 
SS = Shetkari Sanghatana - Farm labourers' Association (India) 
TAA = Tamilnadu Agriculturists' Association (India) 
TNC = Transnational Corporations 
UF = United Front (Sri Lanka) 
UN = United Nations 
UNP = United National Party (Sri Lanka) 
US = United States of America 
USAID = United States Agency for International Development 
US AFFE = United States Armed Forces in the Far East 
WB = World Bank 
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Samenvatting 
Deze studie behandelt boerenbewegingen en daarop reagerende tegenkrachten in verschillende 
landen van het Aziatische continent, in het bijzonder India, de Filippijnen en Sri Lanka. 
Ondanks een lange geschiedenis van boerenprotest in deze landen tijdens de koloniale periode 
en na de onafhankelijkheid, lijden hedendaagse boerenbewegingen vaak aan een ideologische 
verdeeldheid die hun effectiviteit belemmert Deze studie tracht de groei van en 
verschuivingen binnen de vooraanstaande boerenbewegingen in India, de Filippijnen en vooral 
Sri Lanka te analyseren. 
Dit gebeurt in een perspectief dat omschreven kan worden als de "view from within and from 
below", de visie van binnenuit en van onderop, om de meningen van de boeren zelf, hun 
specifieke ervaringen van strijd en hun ideologische opvattingen weer te geven. Deze 
benadering wordt gebruikt om de ideologische wortels van het boerenprotest en ook de 
invloed van het staatsbeleid daarop te onderzoeken. Voorts de strategieën van de elite ten 
opzichte van het boerenprotest en de rol van nationale en internationale krachten die de 
politiek van de locale elite tegenover die van radicale boerenbewegingen ondersteunen. 
Deze studie veronderstelt dat het "boerenbewustzijn" als een concrete sociale kracht bestaat en 
functioneert. Het boerenbewustzijn wordt hier beschouwd als zou het niet alleen beïnvloed 
worden door "interne krachten" d.w.z. de culturele normen, waarden en gewoonten van de 
plattelandsgemeenschap en de levenswijze van de boeren, maar ook door "externe krachten" 
(bv. de elite, de staat, politieke partijen). 
In de meeste gevallen waar boerenbewegingen in Aziatische landen geïnspireerd en geleid 
werden door communistische partijen, blijkt de Marxistische ideologische oriëntatie van deze 
partijen sterk beïnvloed te zijn door de Chinese revolutie en het Maoïstisch denken. 
Een andere belangrijke invloed vooral op de Indiase boerenbevolking, ging uit van Mahatma 
Gandhi, wiens anti-westerse en pro-boeren ideologie een belangrijke drijfkracht was voor 
boerenbewegingen tijdens de koloniale periode in de Indiase geschiedenis. Het werd echter 
duidelijk dat Gandhi later in feite nauwelijks meer van belang was voor wat betreft de Indiase 
context, terwijl de ideëen van Mao Tse Tung en de Chinese boerenrevolutie de aard van het 
boerenprotest blijven beïnvloeden. 
Er wordt gesteld dat het beleid betreffende het landbezit centraal staat voor het begrijpen van 
de aard en vorm van boerenprotest in Aziatische landen. Azië is voornamelijk een agrarisch 
gebied waarin de meerderheid van de bevolking op het land werkt of voor haar 
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levensonderhoud daarvan afhankelijk is. Land is zodoende een belangrijk element van de 
macht van de plattelands-elite en dus ook een bepalende factor bij de uit zeer ongelijke 
verdeling voortvloeiende conflicten en het boerenprotest 
Verschillende Aziatische regeringen hebben getracht het probleem van landbezit op te lossen 
en onder controle te krijgen door middel van landhervormingsprogramma's. De socio-
economische en politieke contekst waarin de landhervormingen geïntroduceerd werden in 
Japan, Taiwan en Zuid-Korea worden behandeld en ook de ideologische implicaties ervan. De 
hervormingen zijn door de Verenigde Staten van Amerika nadrukkelijk aanbevolen en 
gesteund, met oog op het inperken van radicaal boerenprotest en het verspreiden van de 
communistische invloed vooral die van het voorbeeld van de Chinese boerenrevolutie. 
Vervolgens worden belangrijke case-studies behandeld van boerenbewegingen en de 
strategieën van de plattelands-elite van India, de Filippijnen en speciaal van Sri Lanka. 
India kent een lange geschiedenis van boerenprotestbewegingen tijdens de koloniale periode en 
na de onafhankelijkheid. In dit kader wordt de boeienstrijd die geleid werd door de All India 
Kisan Sabha tijdens het hoogtepunt van het Indiase nationalisme tegen het Britse gezag 
besproken. In de periode na de onafhankelijkheid laait de boerenstrijd weer op onder leiding 
van de Communistische Partij: de Tebhaga strijd (1946-1947) en de Telangana opstanden 
(1946-1951), daama het Maoïstische agrarische verzet: de Naxalite Movement (1967-1971) en 
de huidige Maoïstisch georiënteerde boerenopstanden. 
Een nieuw verschijnsel in de agrarische sector van India dat zich de afgelopen jaren heeft 
voorgedaan, is de opkomst van boerenacties die geleid worden door rijkere boeren. Het 
onderzoek gaat in op de achtergrond en aard van dit boerenverzet en geeft aan dat de 
groeiende kracht van deze rijkere boeren op het Indiase platteland een gevolg is van de 
"Groene Revolutie". Het is nu deze boerenstand die het hoofdobstakel vormt ten aanzien van 
de groei van radicale boerenbewegingen van arme boeren op het platteland van India. 
Op de Filippijnen begon het radicaliseren van de boerenbeweging met de boerenopstanden 
tegen de Japanse bezetting tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. De Huk Rebellion (1942-1945) 
wordt behandeld en ook het Amerikaanse en Filippijnse regeringsbeleid na de oorlog om de 
groei van deze radicale boerenbeweging te beperken en haar de wind uit de zeilen te nemen. 
Tijdens de latere periode van de Staat van Beleg onder President Marcos in de zeventiger 
jaren werden een aantal agrarische hervormings-programma's (zoals Masagana 99, Samahang 
Nayon, Corporate Farming Program) ondernomen waardoor het Filippijnse platteland verder 
opengesteld werd voor exploitatie door transnationale ondernemingen. Tegelijkertijd 
resulteerde de Staat van Beleg in een gewelddadige onderdrukking van radicaal protest wat 
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echter weer aanleiding gaf tot de opleving van de gewapende boerenstrijd die geleid weid 
door de Communistische Partij van de Filippijnen en de New People's Army (CPP-NPA). 
De Aquino regering begon eveneens een ambitieus "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program" dat er echter ook niet in slaagde de fundamentele problemen betreffende 
ongelijkheid en armoede op het Filippijnse platteland op te lossen. Zo groeiden er politieke 
controversen tussen de regering van Aquino en de nationale boerenorganisatìe - de Kilusang 
Magbubukid ng Filipinas (KMP) - die zich dusdanig wist uit te breiden dat zij een niet 
onbelangrijke kracht vormde. 
Na het onderzoek naar boerenbewegingen in India en op de Filippijnen, is er speciale aandacht 
besteed aan het boerenprotest in Sri Lanka. Tot op heden zijn de studies over het 
boerenprotest in Sri Lanka nogal beperkt gebleven hetgeen het nodig maakte om de evolutie 
van het boerenprotest en de strategieën van de plattelands-elite van dit land uitgebreider te 
documenteren. In Sri Lanka legde het Britse koloniale beleid het fundament voor een 
afhankelijke export-economie die gebaseerd is op het plantagesysteem. Deze studie behandelt 
bepaalde Britse beleidsvormen in het traditionele Ceylon en de talrijke gevallen van 
boerenopstanden tijdens de koloniale periode. Deze boerenopstanden bevatten een sterk 
element van het traditionele nationalisme. Dit onderzoek gaat op kritische wijze in op het 
agrarische beleid van de opeenvolgende regeringen van Sri Lanka na de onafhankelijkheid -
met name de Groene Revolutie en Peasant Colonisation programma's (1948-1971), Land 
Hervorming en Nationalisatie (1972-1977), de Open Economy Policy (1977-1985), het 
Mahaweli Development Scheme, de Ceylon Tobacco Company en de Sugar Transnational 
Corporations in Agricultural Promotion Zones in Sri Lanka. 
De discussie over de boerenstrijd in het moderne Sri Lanka richt zich voornamelijk op de 
hoofdrol van het All Lanka Peasant Congress en gaat in op twee belangrijke 
protestbewegingen die in de afgelopen jaren veroorzaakt werden door deze nationale 
boerenorganisatìe, namelijk de Water Tax Struggle en de Monaragela Struggle tegen de Suiker 
TNCs. In de periode van 1985 tot 1987 zijn deze twee gevallen door de auteur bestudeerd en 
gedocumenteerd mede dankzij een mate van directe betrokkenheid bij de ALPC en haar 
leiders en basis. Tenslotte wordt ingegaan op de problematiek van het boerenprotest in relatie 
tot de regeringsbeleidsvormen en de politiek van de progressieve bewegingen en partijen in 
het Sri Lanka van vandaag. 
Dankzij bovengenoemde case-studies kan geconcludeerd worden dat de problematiek van het 
boerenprotest en de strategieën van de plattelands-elite in de betreffende Aziatische landen 
begrepen moet worden binnen het kader van de politiek ten aanzien van het 
landbezitsvraagstuk. De inspanningen van de betreffende Aziatische regeringen ten aanzien 
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van landhervorming zijn niet slechts een poging geweest tot het vergroten van de agrarische 
productiviteit, maar ook een direkte reacüe op de opkomst en groei van radicaal boerenprotest 
dat dikwijls geleid werd door een communistische partij. Bij dit beleid zijn de betreffende 
regeringen geadviseerd en bijgestaan door internationale belanghebbenden en vooral de 
regering van de VS, zodat er een sterk element van "counter-insurgency" zichtbaar was in de 
agrarische hervonrangsprogramma's. 
Boerenbewegingen in Azië (vooral in India, de Filippijnen en Sri Lanka) zijn vaak gekenmerkt 
door verschuivingen in ideologische posities vooral ten gevolge van veelvuldige verplintering 
in de gelederen van de betreffende communistische partijen. Belangrijke factoren die hiertoe 
hebben bijgedragen zijn onder andere persoonlijke conflicten binnen het leiderschap van het 
boerenverzet die gebaseerd zijn op ideologische, regionale, etnische en socio-culturele 
verschillen, het overdreven ideologiseren van het boerenprotest, vaak resulterend in 
ontgoocheling ten aanzien van de communistische ideologie en strategie en in een brede kloof 
tussen het leiderschap en de brede basis van de boerenbewegingen. Geconcludeerd wordt dat 
de communistische partijen de boerenaspiraties vaak opgeofferd hebben aan ideologische 
overwegingen. 
Daarnaast zijn de strategieën van de Aziatische plattelands-elite erop gericht geweest het 
leiderschap van de boerenbewegingen op subtiele wijze over te nemen of te neutraliseren door 
middel van patronage invloed of door gewelddadige onderdrukking. Op dit terrein hebben 
eigen en buitenlandse regeringen (in het bijzonder de VS) en ook multinationale agribusiness 
ondernemingen een bijdrage geleverd. 
Een van de resultaten van bovengenoemde processen in sommige Aziatische landen is de 
opkomst en consolidatie van een klasse (stand) van nieuwe plattelands-elites die in politiek 
opzicht conservatief zijn en die nauw verbonden zijn met de internationale ondernemingen en 
de bestaande nationale machtselites. De invloed die door deze nieuwe boerenstand op het 
Aziatische platteland uitgeoefend wordt, vormt het belangrijkste obstakel voor de groei en 
consolidatie van radicale bewegingen van arme en (semi-)landloze boeren. 
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